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Speech and Phenomena
Chapter 4: "Meaning and Representation"
I.Introduction [48-49]
A.recap: expression is not communication [indication]
B.two arguments about inner monologue
1.no communication, only
representation and imagination
2.no need to communicate,
because of self-presence of subject
C.status of representation in language
1.general sense of Vorstellung
2.re-presentation
3.place holder
II.the first argument [49-57]: imagination and representation
A.EH wants to apply distinction between reality
and rep. to language
1.effective communication
[indication] vs "represented" communication
2.to reach inner monologue
as pure rep., a fiction [i.e., a representation] is needed
a.this is imaginary representation
b.= neutralizing representation
B.can these distinctions be applied to language?
1.we would have to suppose
rep. is not essential to communication
2.but it is impossible to
rigorously distinguish rep. [imagined expression] and reality [effective
indicative communication], bcs. all communication, as signitive, is repetitive,
and hence representative
3.thus representation is
on both sides of the distinction btw indicative communication and imagined
expression
C.EH gives us motives to take opposite position
1.RE: B.1.: representation
is essential to communication: effective use of signs implies structure
of repetition [= representation]
2.here JD is showing ideality
of external, empirical communication
a.sign is never an "event"
b.must be formally recognizable across empirical iterations
c.must remain the "same"
d.must be repeatable as such
e.this formal identity is ideal, which implies three forms of rep.
(1) Vorstellung = locus of ideality in general [conceptuality]
(2) Vergegen. = possibility of repetition in general
(3) Repräsentation = placeholder. each instance takes place
of:
(a)signified
(b)ideal form
3.since representation =
signification, effective discourse, as signitive, is representative
D.but EH wants to have only expression be representative,
not indication
1.but indication is indeed
representative, since it is made possible by repetition
2. if [all] discourse is
representative, distinction btw effective [indicative] and merely represented
[expressive] discourse is suspect
a.whether the represented discourse is expressive or communicative
b.bcs. of repetitive [that is, representative] nature of signs, distinction
of effective and imaginary is contaminated
c.bcs. founding distinction of presence and repetition is also contaminated
E.signs, presence and the closure of metaphysics
[51]
F.EH's descritive breakthrough: presence derived
from repetition [52b-53a]
1.ideality as structure
of discourse
a.sensible form of signifier
b.signified = intended sense = Bedeutung
c.sometimes, object itself [e.g., Pythagorean theorem]
2.ideality depends on possibility
of acts of repetition
3.being = ideality = repetition
G.EH's thematic metaphysical investment: being as
ideality "paradoxically one" w/ being as presence [53b-54a]
1.pure ideality
a.= ideal object present before act of repetition
(1) Vor-stellung = presence before act of intuition
b.temporality founded on LP [now as source point]
(1)ensures purity of ideality
(2)that is, openness for infinite repeatability of same
2.principle of principles
a.form of all experience is the present
(1)last hiding spot of being as presence
(2)relation to such presence is how I transgress empiricity
(a)especially my own empiricity [=mortality]
(b)thus presence as repeatable, universal form of experience
i)is my relation to my own death
ii)so T life is relation to empirical death
iii)sign [=repetition = ideality = form of LP] = death
H.the relation [life/death]: death and the subject
[54b-55a]
1.relation to death constitutes
subjectivity
2.that is, possibility of
my absence, which reveals repeatable form of the LP, is my relation to
T ego, seat of capabilities of constituting acts [= ability to synthesize
temporality so all acts have same form--any possible act, by anyone, any
"I," at any time]
3.some paradoxes:
a.thus "I am" = "I am mortal"
b.and "I am immortal" is impossible
c."I am who am" is saying of a mortal
4.so seeing T ego as res
cogitans, as immortal, enduring presence, conceals signs/death, the very
conditions of that presence
I.EH has confused effacement of signs w/ reduction
of imagination [55b
1.EH's ambiguous relation
to the traditional notion of imagination
a.profoundly renewed question of the imagination
b.yet imagination is "neutralizing" re-presentation
(1)both image and memory are re-presentations [of a presence]
(2)imagination modifies in neutralizing it, a positional re-presentation,
i.e, memory
(a)NB: "positional" = objectifying
(b)image has then reference to primary presentation
i)perception
ii)positing of existence
2.pure ideality via neutralization
[= phen. reduction] is not fiction
3.remark on Husserl and
Hume: contamination of powers of repetition
a.pure repetition opening ideality
b.imaginative reproduction of empirical perception
J.four disconcerting points about the 1st LI
[kettle logic reveals desire]
1.pure expressions are imaginative
representations
2.communications in monologue
are fictions
a.expression thus seem to be effective [=non-fictional]
b.but expression is supposed to be non-effective
3.communication uses same
[ideal] words as does expression
a.yet EH wants to keep ideality for expression
b.thus it seems effectiveness is to expression as body to soul
4.in inner monologue, some
discourse
a.is effectively representative
(1)= expressions
(2)purely objective, theoretical language
b.while some is fictional
(1)[= not really representative,
(2)but communicative]
K.but if signs are repetitive, then fiction v effective
signs is contaminated [56f-57a]
1.repetition destroys presence/reality
vs re-presentation/fiction
2.= signs are wrought by
fiction
3.no sure criterion to distinguish
inner vs outer language
4.or in inner language,
between effective and fictitious
a.but this is needed for EH to reduce indication from expression
L.sign demonstration holds for acts of the subject;
this leads to:
III.the second argument [57-59 {and Ch.5}]
A.bcs of repetitive signs, distinction of effective
vs. represented speech is contaminated [bcs. repetition erodes distinction
of reality vs fiction, or primary vs secondary]
1.consequences:
a.subject cannot speak [effectively] w/o representation of speech
b.subject cannot represent w/o effectiveness
2.conclusion: primordial
unity of speech and rep. of speech
a.speech represents itself; it is its representation
b.speech is the representation of itself
B.EH seems to allow simple exteriority of effectiveness
and representation of the subject
1.thinking you are communicating
w/ yourself internally is falsity
2.if this is the case--a
false cness--then truth seems to be uncons.
a.but this can't be, bcs. cness is self-presence of living
b.experience is thus simple and truthful, since self-present
3.thus illusion of inner
communication floats on surface of experience as secondary cness
C.anticipation of EH's desired reduction of expression
to sense:
1. language [and representation
of lang] is addition to self-present conscious experience
2.or at least an experience
[sense as object held for vision] that reflects its own presence in silence
[in voice {"that keeps silence"}]
3.signs are thus foreign
to presence of intuition/perception
D.representation of indication is false bcs useless,
needless, superfluous
1.this uselessness is nonalterity
of self-presence
2.presence
a.enigma of proximity to self
b.temporal essence of this proximity
(1)self-presence must be produced in present as now
(2)indivisible blink of the eye