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The standard schema for discussing Foucault’s work posits three periods: archaeology, genealogy, and ethics. Using this schema, Foucault’s concern with the body can be summed up in the following way: the body is an *object of knowledge* in the discursive practices revealed in archaeology; it is the *target of power* in the non-discursive practices revealed in genealogy; and it is a *matter of concern* for techniques of the self of Greek and Roman ethical subjects.

The body first appears in Foucault’s work as an object of knowledge in the discursive practices revealed in archaeology. We cannot hope to enter in the dense web that is *History of Madness*, but we can locate some markers. Among the most interesting observations of HM is that the nineteenth century is an age of medical dualism in which a spiritualist or a materialist psychiatry is possible; in the nineteenth century one could say, “either madness is the organic disturbance of a material principle, or it is the spiritual troubling of an immaterial soul” (212). But we realize we are on the other side of an epistemological break when we read that such dualism is mere “philosophy” for the medicine of the classical age, which insists on a medical unity of body and soul (213): “to speak of madness in the seventeenth and eighteenth century is not, in the strict sense, to speak of ‘a sickness of the mind’, but of something where both the body and the mind *together* are in question” (214; italics in original).

In *Birth of the Clinic*, the body has center stage as Foucault traces the shifting forms of the historical a priori governing medical perception. Hence the relations of life and death, of living body and corpse, of surface and depth, of lesions and processes, of anatomy and physiology, are the central concerns. In its largest outlines, we can say BC traces a shift from knowledge oriented to the visible surface of the body to knowledge oriented to internal processes and forces; not simply a move from space to time, but a different articulation of space and time (the inside is still a spatial category after all). We see a similar move in *Order of Things*: the key move in the shift from natural history to biology is from the tabular classification of visible surface properties to internal functions and temporal processes. The move to organic functions as the essence of life is the revealing of a temporal dimension. In a celebrated archaeological *tour de force*, Foucault shows how Cuvier is the decisive break; by positing organic structure as prior to taxonomy, Cuvier could isolate the functions rather than the properties (size, shape, location, etc) of organs. With
Cuvier, life becomes a functional system and a science of life, modern biology, is possible.

We will see this move from surface display to internal temporality in the genealogical register of Discipline and Punish, to which we now turn, a move from the surface of the body on which torturers and executioners display the power of the sovereign to the internal forces of bodies which disciplinary practices harness and make work together. The titles of two key chapters of DP indicate our itinerary: from “the body of the condemned” on the scaffold of the sovereign to “docile bodies” trained in disciplinary institutions.

DP presents itself as a study of different stages in the “political economy” of the body, in which it is always “the body and its forces, their utility and docility, their distribution and their submission” which are at stake (25). Foucault’s focused treatment of the body in DP is to be distinguished from the “history of the body” others have attempted, which considers the relation of politics and the biological reality of human populations (25; this is what will be later be treated as “biopolitics” by Foucault in HS1 and in the lecture course published as Security, Territory, Population). Here in DP, however, Foucault is interested in how the “body is also directly involved in a political field” (25), that is, how, via a “political technology of the body,” the body “becomes a useful force only if it is both a productive body and a subjected [assujetti] body” (26). To conduct this investigation, we need to thematize “a micro-physics of power, whose field of validity is situated in a sense between these great functionings [social institutions and state apparatuses] and the bodies themselves with their materiality and their forces” (26).

We should note the way in which the political technology of the body inherent in disciplinary practices gives birth to the modern “soul” (âme) (29). The modern soul is a reality formed via discursive and non-discursive practices targeting the body in the disciplinary matrix of the human sciences. The modern soul is “psyche, subjectivity, personality, consciousness” (29); in DP the soul is the seat of the criminal behind the crime, and in HS1, that of the homosexual behind the act. The modern soul is historically constituted; it is the "present correlative of a certain technology of power over the body" (29). The modern soul is no religious fiction; it “has a reality, it is produced permanently around, on, within the body by the functioning of a power that is exercised on those punished – and in a more general way, on those one supervises, trains and corrects” (29). In tracing the political economy of the body, in particular, in focusing on the genealogy of the disciplinary “political technology of the body,” we see "the historical reality of this soul ... [which] is born ... out of methods of punishment, supervision and constraint" (29).

In DP we find three different dispositifs of the political economy of the body as target of punishment: those in which the predominant form is sovereign power, reform punishment, or discipline. For sovereign power, the body of the criminal tortured upon the scaffold is the scene whereby the might of the sovereign can be displayed. For the reformers, the body displayed in the punitive city is the site where the idea
of punishment could be linked to the idea of the crime. For discipline, bodies are malleable; they are what is to be rendered docile, so that productivity increases while political resistance decreases.

Foucault’s treatment of the body as target of sovereign power produces the gut-wrenching and unforgettable opening passage of DP. It both describes the way in which the torture and destruction of the body of the criminal displays the dissymmetry of power that reveals sovereign might, and reminds us that the bodies of the spectators were essential to the dispositif of sovereign power. Sovereign power is quite literally terroristic (49); we can speculate, though Foucault does not thematize this dimension, that the terror of the spectators rests on a bodily sympathy, a sharing of the pain of the victim ("feelings of terror": 58). But this sympathy was both the basis of terror and the basis for possible revolt against the agents of the crown (58-65). This is danger of the scaffold that the reformers thought was too much to risk (63).

The body for the reformers was only a means of producing signs, part of a "semio-technique of punishment" (103). (Foucault does discuss the "social body" in this context as a term for society [e.g., 80, 92, 139] but it’s only a figure of speech, notwithstanding an interesting reference to the "homeostasis" of the social body at HS1 107.) For the reformers, it wasn’t the body that was of interest; what counted was the juridical subject as constituted in social contract theories. Foucault encapsulates the move from the tortured body subjected to sovereign power to the juridical subject that was the focus of the reformers in a justly famous phrase: "from being an art of unbearable sensations punishment has become an economy of suspended rights" (11). For the reformers, the body was only a support for life, so capital punishment was simply the deprivation of the right to life (11). Hence the logic of the guillotine, which would take life via minimal contact with the body (13).

The reformers failed to take hold; the focus of DP, what makes it a classic, is the analysis of discipline. With the disciplines, the classical age "discovered the body as object and target of power" (136). The body is a machine, though not simply a mechanism; the disciplined body is not simply a "mechanical body – the body composed of solids and assigned movements" (155). The machine-body had two registers, the body as object of knowledge, an “analyzable” and “intelligible” body written in the “anatomico-metaphysical” register begun by Descartes, and a “manipulable” body found in the “technico-political” register of military, educational, and medical institutions. Their point of overlap, which Foucault claims to be able to read in La Mettrie’s L’Homme-machine, is the docile body, “which joins the analyzable body to the manipulable body. A body is docile that may be subjected, used, transformed and improved” (136; see also HS1 139, where Foucault talks about the disciplinary body as a "machine" when contrasted with biopolitical population management.)

While the “disciplines” that constructed docile bodies were not new, they changed scale, object, and modality to the point whereby they became "general formulas of
domination” (137). Disciplines work at the intersection of individual and group, producing, by teams of four great techniques – the drawing up of tables, the prescription of movements, the imposition of exercises, and the arrangement of tactics – an individuality with four characteristics: cellular (distributed bodies); organic (coded activities); genetic (trained aptitudes); and combinatorial (composition of forces). The summary formula of discipline is: “the architecture, anatomy, mechanics, economy of the disciplinary body” (167).

The first two of the four procedures of discipline – the spatial distribution of bodies and the control of time via the time-table – could work with a “mechanical body,” a body of “solids” and “movements.” But the full flowering of the disciplines needed a “new object” beyond the mechanical body; they needed a “natural” body, “the bearer of forces and the seat of duration” (155; see McWhorter 1998: 153). The natural and organic body is the target of the “organization of geneses” (graduated exercises: 156-62) as well as the “composition of forces” (practices inculcating teamwork: 162-67). But this natural and organic body constituted by these practices is still part of a machine: “the solider whose body has been trained to function part by part for particular operations must in turn form an element in a mechanism at another level... The body is constituted as a part of a multi-segmentary machine” (164).

There are many challenging philosophical issues raised by Foucault’s treatment of the body in DP: what is a “natural” body that is at once a “new object” and part of a “machine”? How can the natural body be “discovered” at a point in time? How could that discovery of the natural body come after and “supersede” the “mechanical” body? How can the natural body be more amenable to incorporation in a machine than a mechanical body? Whatever we might say about Foucault’s treatment of the natural-machinic disciplinary body, we cannot claim it to be resting on a raw “nature” outside of culture, for the “natural” body of the disciplines is constituted by its submission to exercises and teamwork. If there is any biology at work here it must be a biology of plasticity: not pure social constructivism, but not raw extra-cultural nature either; unfortunately, fully exploring these issues is beyond the scope of this entry, but we can at least mention the school of thought known as Developmental Systems Theory, with its emphasis on epigenetic and even social factors of development, as a possible resource in further exploring the natural-machinic body (Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray 2001).

As might be expected, the body also plays a central role in Foucault’s second great genealogy, *History of Sexuality, volume 1*. The major claim here is that sexuality is at the intersection of the disciplines of body and the biopolitical management of populations (145). We see this intersection in the four “figures” of the deployment of sexuality, each of which is an individual body defined in its relation to the reproductive capacity of the population: the hysterical woman (who may neglect her motherly duties), the masturbating child (whose sexual potential is at risk), the Malthusian couple (which must be guided, via economic and political incentives as well as medical interventions, to play its proper role), and the perverse adult (who must be studied and rehabilitated) (105).
The body also plays a key role in Foucault’s deflationary nominalism with regard to both “sexuality” and to “sex.” Far from being a natural kind, a trans-historical essence whose truth we are now only beginning to glimpse via our scientific treatment of what had previously been shrouded in myth and superstition, sexuality for Foucault is a “historical construct,” a “great surface network” linking together a series of separate factors: “the stimulation of bodies, the intensification of pleasures, the incitement to discourse, the formation of special knowledges [connaissances], [and] the strengthening of controls and resistances” (105-6). Foucault is similarly nominalist when it comes to the notion of “sex” as an “in itself” separate from its components. Foucault is skeptical of “sex” as the “idea that there exists something other than bodies, organs, somatic localizations, functions, anatomophysiological systems, sensations, and pleasures; something else and something more, with intrinsic properties and laws of its own: ‘sex’” (152-53). In another passage, Foucault seemingly ups the ante on his nominalism, as “body” no longer appears, being itself dissolved into its components. Here, in stressing that “sex” has a function in the dispositif of sexuality, and there alone, Foucault moves below even “body”: “The notion of ‘sex’ made it possible to group together, in an artificial unity, anatomical elements, biological functions, conducts, sensations, and pleasures, and it enabled one to make use this fictitious unity as a causal principle, an omnipresent meaning, a secret to be discovered everywhere: sex was thus able to function as a unique signifier and as a universal signified” (154). But we should not place too much weight on this passage, as soon thereafter “bodies” reappear in their role as component of the “fictitious unity” of “sex.” Foucault writes, “sex is the most speculative, most ideal, and most internal element in a deployment of sexuality organized by power in its grip on bodies and their materiality, their forces, energies, sensations, and pleasures” (155).

Finally, there is the famous and cryptic slogan: “the rallying point for the counterattack against the deployment of sexuality ought not to be sex-desire but bodies and pleasures” (157). While duly noting the enormous commentary on this phrase, a good bit of it devoted to accusing Foucault of an escape to a pre-cultural “nature,” we can point to others who see the body here as not an ahistorical body, but as the sort of plastic, bio-social, body we encountered in DP (on both points, see McWhorter 1998: 157 and 251, n. 14). A plastic body, literally a “body politic.” We might say that the key to fighting the deployment of sexuality, which claims scientific knowledge of the natural body, is to design, in connection with others, your own disciplinary practices, your own techniques of the self.

With this last phrase we can move to a very brief discussion of the body as it appears in the last period of Foucault’s work. Briefly put, the body is a matter of concern to the ethical subjects in History of Sexuality, volumes 2 and 3. For the Greek and Romans Foucault examines, there are three areas of concern: dietetics, economics, erotics. That is, the concern with the body as seen in regimes of diet, exercise, and sleep, as mediated by advice by physicians (HS2: 95-139; HS3: 97-144); the concern with the relation to others in the household (HS2: 143-84;
HS3:147-85); and the concern with the relation to the beloved (HS2: 187-246; HS3: 189-232). These concerns are not those of escaping, as in certain Platonic schemes, the body as prison of soul. Rather, the body is one of the matters of concern the ethical subject will have with regard to himself.

WORKS CITED
