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In _Discipline and Punish_ (1975), Foucault uses “war” (or at least “battle”) as a “model” for understanding social relations. But this epistemological use of “war” did not last. In consulting the Collège de France lecture courses, we see him conduct a genealogy of the war model in “Society Must be Defended” (1975-76). As a result of this investigation, the use of “war” in _History of Sexuality, volume 1_ (1976) is no longer epistemological, but practical: “war” is seen as a “strategy” for integrating a differential field of power relations. Then, toward the end of the 1970s, perhaps in dismay at discovering in his genealogical investigation a deep relation of the war model and state racism, in _Security, Territory, Population_ (1977-78) Foucault drops “war” to move to “governmentality” as the “grid of intelligibility” of social relations.

In _Discipline and Punish_, Foucault held to what we can call a Deleuzean concept of “emergence” for analyzing social relations. To understand social power we have to see macro-level social relations (for instance, those between "experts and subjects" or "men and women" or "bourgeoisie and proletariat") as emerging from a "micro-physics of power" by means of a resolution or integration of a multiplicity or differential field of force relations.1 It is in this emergence scheme, moving from social relations back down to the micro-physics from which they emerge, that Foucault uses the war model rather straightforwardly in _Discipline and Punish_: “Now, the study of this micro-physics presupposes that the power exercised on the body is conceived not as a property, but as a strategy, that its effects of domination are attributed not to ‘appropriation,’ but to dispositions, maneuvers, tactics, techniques, functionings; that one should decipher in it a network of relations, constantly in tension, in activity, rather than a privilege that one might possess; that one should take as its model a perpetual battle rather than a contract regulating a transaction or the conquest of a territory” (DP 35F / 26E).2

In the 1975-76 lecture courses, published as "Society must be defended,"3 Foucault conducts a genealogy of the epistemological use of “war” as a model for social relations. In _Society_, Foucault proceeds by inverting the Clausewitzian saying that "war is politics by other means," or better, by showing that Clausewitz had himself inverted an older discourse whose formula "politics is war by other means" had put war as the model or "grid of intelligibility" for social relations (SD 145F / 163E). In fact, Foucault finds that war as a grid of intelligibility has been "posited" for our historical discourse (145F / 164E). In other words, while a statement from an earlier discourse about, say, the Trojan origins of the Franks, would be neither true nor false for us, statements in the discourse in which the grid of intelligibility for social power is war would have a truth value for us: they could be demonstrated to be either true or false (145F / 164E).
The content of the war model has three aspects: 1) social power relations are anchored in a given historical war so that politics "sanctions and reproduces" the result of that war; 2) political struggles are continuations of that same war; and 3) a final decision that ends politics can only come in a final battle (15-16E). These three aspects produce three novelties of the war model: 1) it is the first historical-political discourse in post-medieval Europe; 2) it enshrines an explicit perspectivalism, in that the speaking subject must be on one side or the other of the social binary; and 3) as a result of the anchoring of politics in specific historical sequences, there are singular rather than universal rights (52E).

What Foucault finds as the results of his genealogy of the war schema was most likely dismaying to him, for he finds one of the main origins of it in the "race war" theory of Boulainvilliers and the 17th and 18th century French reactionary petty nobility, as well as the final imbrications of it in contemporary state racism and biopower (SD 229-233F / 258-261E). We must remember here that "race" for Boulainvilliers was not a modern biological racism, but indicates a "people" like the Franks, Gauls, Romans, or Celts in struggle with another "people" (77E). While the analysis of these peoples might certainly involve "physico-biological facts" (54E), "race" was not so much a biological object in itself as a discursive strategy in a social struggle (61E).

Foucault begins his genealogy of the war model by dismissing the "false paternity" of the social war discourse in Machiavelli and Hobbes. Rather than a political tactic as it was for Machiavelli (164E, 169E) or a philosophical principle as it was for Hobbes (89-99E), "war" in the social war discourse is real historical war. There is thus a dual birth of the social war model, in the English revolutionaries in the 1630s, who point back to the Norman Conquest (99-109E), and in the French petty nobility in the 1690s, who point back to the victory of Clovis and the Franks over the Gallo-Romans (144-155E). In reading the English revolutionaries and the French petty noble Boulainvilliers, Foucault notes a paradox: it is with the defeat of the noble right to war, when war becomes monopoly of State, that social war model arises (49E). For Boulainvilliers, history, or the clash of unequal forces, is always stronger than nature and its theoretical equality (157E). Thus we must focus on how the military institutions are integrated into the general political economy of each society, for this holds the key to the clash of unequal forces in war. Boulainvilliers can thus point out the difference between heavily armed warriors who support themselves via feudal land ownership and the King, who can afford an army of foot soldiers through his powers of central taxation (159E).

Moving out of the French Revolution and through the 19th century, Foucault traces first how the notion of war as grid of intelligibility of the social was overcome by the theme of "national universality" (239E); with characteristic panache, Foucault ties this overcoming to the birth of dialectical philosophy (236-37E). He then moves to consider the relation of modern biological racism to the birth of modern "biopolitics" (243E). (It is beyond the scope of this entry to do more than note the strange absence of the Atlantic slave trade from Foucault’s account of modern biological racism, though it should be noted that he does appeal to “colonization” [257E].) First, Foucault notes how nineteenth-century revolutionaries transformed the race struggle (of "peoples" in conflict) into class struggle, at the same time as “race” in the bio-medical sense is born (60-62E; 254-5E). Thus as society came to be seen in the evolutionary sense of being engaged in a struggle for existence, it became seen as biologically monist, as a substance into which foreigners have
invaded or infiltrated and in which deviants are produced within society as degeneration (80-81E). Racism thus introduces a “break” in the domain of life that biopolitics places under the control of the state (255E), and it thus allows a justification of the “murderous function of the State” as that violence which is deployed to combat the biological threat to the race under its protection (256E). Thus the state plays a new role when biological racism is introduced; it is no longer an instrument of one race against another, as it was in the struggle of “peoples,” but in the birth of modern racism, the state becomes the protector of the integrity, superiority, and purity of the national race (81E), as well as charged with regenerating the purity of the race in the crucible of war (257E). Thus we see racism as an inversion of revolutionary discourse; race discourse for Boulainvilliers had been a weapon against State (royal) sovereignty, but it is now used by the State to protect its sovereignty via medical normalization and eugenics (81E).

From there, Foucault traces twentieth-century transformations of racism, revealing why the most murderous States are those most immersed in biopolitics and hence racism (258E). First, Nazi state racism, which is re-inscribed in the prophetic discourse from which race struggle once emerged, as we see in the Nazi myths of popular struggle: the Germans victimized by the Versailles treaty and awaiting a new Reich which will usher in the apocalypse, the end of days (82E). The specificity of the Nazis however comes not in the recycling of old myths, but in their simultaneous unleashing of sovereign murderous power and life-administering biopower throughout the entire biological reality of the people under the control of the state, a combination that ultimately makes the State suicidal in its desire to expose the people to the purifying violence of constant and intense exposure to death (259-60E). Finally, Foucault treats Soviet scientific racism, in which the class enemy becomes biological threat, and medical police eliminates class enemies as if they were a biological threat (83E; 261-62E).

As a result of conducting his genealogy of the war model in "Society," Foucault comes to nuance his use of “war” in History of Sexuality, volume 1, published in 1976, that is, during the year in which the "Society" lectures were delivered. In HS1, war is no longer seen as a grid of intelligibility that reveals a regime of truth governing a particular historical discourse. Rather, it is seen as a practical option for "coding" the multiplicity of force relations, that is, an optional and precarious "strategy" for integrating them:

Should we turn the expression around, then, and say that politics is war pursued by other means? If we still wish to maintain a separation between war and politics, perhaps we should postulate that this multiplicity of force relations can be coded—in part but never totally—either in the form of 'war,' or in the form of 'politics'; this would imply two different strategies (but the one always liable to switch into the other) for integrating these unbalanced, heterogeneous, unstable, and tense force relations. (HS1 123F / 93E)

The context for this remark, we should recall, is subtle and ambiguous. It comes in the "Method" section of Part IV of HS1, "The dispositif of sexuality." The ambiguity of Foucault's position is set up by his remark a moment earlier when he discusses power as de-centered: "power's condition of possibility, or in any case the viewpoint which permits one to understand its exercise ... and which also makes it possible to use its mechanisms as a grid of intelligibility of the social order, must not be sought in the primary existence of a central point" (122F / 93E). Here we see Foucault's famous ambivalence toward Kant: no sooner does he say "condition of possibility" than he has to nuance it.5
Thus at this point Foucault has "power" as the grid of intelligibility for social relations and "war" as an active strategy of political practice; looking at the social field in terms of power lets us see war as a possible strategy for integrating a multiplicity of force relations, whereas power "itself" can only be seen if we look at it as such a multiplicity: "It seems to me that power must be understood in the first instance as the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own organization" (121-22F / 92E). So, in HS1 the "multiplicity of force relations" is the grid of intelligibility for power, which is in turn the grid of intelligibility of the social field. These successive grids of intelligibility reveal a dynamic social ontology, an interactive realism, in which war is a strategy for action in the social field, a way of integrating the multiplicity of force relations that constitute that field and thereby constituting the protagonists of political history as engaged in a "war by other means." The looping effect or self-fulfilling prophecy here should be clear: it's almost a cliché to say that naming yourself and others as warriors tends to create the reality in which others treat you as such and you respond in kind since they have just proved your point!

At the end of HS1 we find Foucault's first published theses on state racism and biopower. After the publication of the lecture courses, we can now see this analysis as having been developed in the last lecture of “Society Must Be Defended” (SD 239-263E). The outlines of Foucault’s treatment of sovereign power as the right to decide life and death in HS1 are well known. The sovereign power to decide life and death has a formal derivation from absolute Roman patria potestas, but survives in diminished form in classical legal theory, so that, only when a threat to the sovereign is present can the right be exercised. The sovereign has only an indirect hold on the life of the subject in regard to external enemies; here the sovereign can indirectly expose the subject to death by compelling him to defend the sovereign in war. But in response to an internal threat, the sovereign can exercise a direct power and put the subject to death (HS1, 135E). So the sovereign has a “dissymmetrical” right with regard to the life of subjects, being able to reach life only via death, by killing or refraining from killing. The symbol of such sovereign power is the sword, and the major form of power is means of deduction (prélèvement) (136E). The power over life is transformed in the modern West, however. There are many forms of power, not just deduction, for the aim is no longer simple enrichment of the sovereign, but an intensification of forces. Thus life becomes the positive object of administration, and death is just the reverse side of life. Two symptoms reveal this transformation: first, the increased bloodiness of war, for modern states must defend everyone, not just the sovereign; and second, the death penalty became the scandal of a power that administers life (136-38E).

Perhaps dismayed at the results of his genealogy of the war schema, Foucault moves in the fourth lecture of Security, Territory, Population to "governmentality" as the model for social relations, as its grid of intelligibility. Rather than social relations being seen as war, we are asked to see social relations as the "conduct of conduct," as the leading of men's lives in quotidian detail. There is still the Deleuzean concept of integration of a multiplicity of differential elements and relations as embedded in the interplay of power and resistance in practices, but the grid of intelligibility is no longer war, but governmentality. Along with the change in the grid of intelligibility comes a change in the nature of the relata. It is no longer "force" relations, but relations of "actions" that are to be integrated. Foucault's formula is now that "to govern ... is to structure the possible field of action of others." Now
we must avoid reading Foucault as if a concern with subjectivity comes to replace a concern with power. Rather, subjectivity is the mode in which power operates in governmentality; the conducting of the conduct of our lives is done by inducing us to subjectify ourselves in various ways, as sexual subjects, or indeed, as self-entrepreneurs.7

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5 An extended study of Foucault that takes the relation to Kant as a major theme is Béatrice Han, Foucault's Critical Project: Between the Transcendental and the Historical (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002). The title of Han's French original is instructive in regard to our interrogation of the relation of Foucault's realism toward historical order and the interactive realism he discovers therein: L'Ontologie manquée de Michel Foucault.


7 For a strong argument on the inducing of subjectivity in contemporary governmentality as a mode of power, see Jeffrey Nealon, Foucault Beyond Foucault: Power and its Intensifications since 1984 (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 2008).