

HUMAN NATURE  
MULTIPLICITY AND JOY

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FLIPPING THE SCRIPT

A few weeks ago, I ran across an article on disaster behavior – comparing the *Lusitania* and the *Titanic* – which started out: “To understand human behavior, it is important to know under what conditions people deviate from selfish rationality” (Frey et al 2010).

But this has things backwards. Prosociality or other-directed care and cooperation, even at a cost to the agent, is our evolutionary heritage; it is an adaptation; it helped our ancestors and can help us if we let it. It was and is so wide-spread as to have been, and continue to be, the oft-overlooked glue of society. It is the water the economic fish doesn’t notice.<sup>1</sup>

It’s rational egoism that depends on extreme social conditions. What distinguishes classical liberalism from neoliberalism is that the latter has given up the former’s notion of a natural “propensity to truck, barter, and exchange” and has devoted itself to the construction of institutions that produce rational egoist behavior via artificially imposed scarcity.

For example, converting universities from a generational time-scale tax-payer supported common good aimed at the development of epistemic and civic virtue to an individual up-front tuition-driven and student-major-evaluated employment certification factory, thus pitting student against student and department against department (Satz and Frerejohn 1995); such produced behavior is then held to justify the assumption (“aha, I told you people are naturally competitive!”) (Ostrom 2005; Appendices G and H).<sup>2</sup>

Hence the tension in contemporary managers: intra-organizational work depends on cooperation, but they keep searching for way to instill competition. But is competition for scarce resources really the best or even the only way to motivate innovation and productivity? What is the hidden notion of human nature at work here?

As I don’t think we can get away from an implied notion of human nature in our philosophy I’ll be as upfront as I can. My notion of human nature, then, is “a multiplicity of prosocial politically-inflected affective cognition.” I will explain those terms in a bit.

If “prosociality” is the default setting, then the following is an ethical standard that finds support in an evolutionary account of human nature: *act such that you nurture the capacity to enact repeatable active joyous encounters of positive sympathetic care and fair cooperation for self and others without qualification.*

This is an exhortation to a way of life rather than full-fledged moral imperative; hermits and misanthropes are not necessarily immoral but they are not living as well as they could be.<sup>3</sup> It is also just a first-order account; I won’t enter into meta-ethical territory, and I’m leaving the principle’s relation to law-making to one side.<sup>4</sup> I can say that whatever your principle of moral judgment, a grasp of evolved human nature is important for your moral pedagogy, how to get to where we should be from where we are.

I avoid the naturalistic fallacy in that I don’t claim my standard is *correct because* it is grounded in evolved human nature. But I do think showing that evolved human nature is congruent with that standard is a needed intervention in contemporary debates in philosophy, anthropology, and psychology.

#### PRELIMINARY SKETCH OF HUMAN NATURE: PLASTICITY AND PROSOCIALITY

Human nature is a multiplicity. A multiplicity has two side, virtual and actual: virtual patterns, triggers, and thresholds of a set of interacting processes and the differing assemblages that actualize the virtual. “Virtual” is a term of ontological modality – the pattern of hurricane formation does not exist in the same way the Katrina and Rita and Harvey and Irma assemblages existed. Rather, we should say the virtual patterns, triggers, and thresholds “insist” in those actual events.

The multiplicity of human nature is a virtual differential field of bio-neuro-cultural processes insisting in different existing actual assemblages of prosocial politically-inflected affective cognition. Each person is an assemblage differently incarnating that pattern: we are all solutions to the problem “how to be human”?

Prosociality means a primary orientation to sympathetic care and fair cooperation, which is nonetheless admitting of rational egoist-driven violence and competition under duress. Furthermore, with certain territorializing practices – perhaps beginning with herding, but certainly accelerating with states and grain agriculture – prosociality comes with a gradient favoring the in-group. (And perhaps as well the reduction of women to reproductive capacity — Lerner 1987.)<sup>5</sup>

This notion of human nature as a multiplicity of bio-cultural processes with differentiating singular outcomes resonates with Sylvia Wynter’s “sociogenic principle” (2001). Wynter invokes a deep plasticity whereby social patterns of experience use biological capacities for targeted release of neurotransmitters to produce feeling structures. Wynter takes her cue from Fanon’s analysis of how “black skins” are overlain by “white masks” and how the pathologies of

colonialism can become deeply embodied as “cortico-visceral illnesses” in both colonizer and colonized.<sup>6</sup>

Thinking human nature in this way means paying attention to the production of different actual bodies via their differential access to training in affective and cognitive skills. For example, the development of skills is differentially distributed in many societies along gender lines, such that feminized and masculinized bodies politic can have different “spheres of competence,” as we know from “Throwing Like A Girl.”

But we needn’t always replace a single abstract subject, “the” human, with two abstractions, “the” feminized and “the” masculinized subject even if, for certain political purposes, we might stop there in a “strategic essentialism” move. If we wanted, for other political purposes, to think more concretely, we could look at multiple gendering practices that are distributed in a society at various sites (family, school, church, media, playground, sports field ...) with variable goals, intensities, and efficacies. These multiply-situated gendering practices resonate or clash with each other and with myriad other socializing practices (racializing, “class-ing,” “religionizing,” “nationalizing,”). In other words, we have to think a complex virtual field of these differential practices producing individual men and women.

But even this is still too simple, as these gendering practices also enter into complex feedback relations with the singular body makeup of the people involved. These complex dynamics frustrate any search for the key to gender, especially not the “reproductive strategies” gambit of Evolutionary Psychology.

To repeat, then, evolved human nature is a multiplicity of bio-neuro-cultural processes producing different individuals with different patterns of “prosocial politically-inflected affective cognition”. The range of those differences – all formally prosocial, but with different content – comes from our plasticity.

When our early hominin ancestors moved onto the plains, they encountered a highly variable environment necessitating collaboration. Counter-intuitively – but why do we have *this* intuition? – the world was too dangerous to afford competition, let alone war. We therefore evolved toward great plasticity of intelligent behavior to the extent that we engage in “niche-construction”: we change our environment so that it could be inherited in predictable ways but never so rigidly as to disallow cultural change.

Together, then, plasticity and niche-construction mean humans have evolved so that most are open to prosocialization processes. “Prosocialization” entails being evolutionarily prepared to be intellectually and emotionally invested in, though never determined by, the social and somatic patterns we inhabit and that guide our caring and cooperative relations – and even our stressed violent and competitive relations – with those around us.

Cultural accrual is not naively progressivist; many cultures produce vastly unequal distributions of costs and benefits, very often intertwined, as we have hinted, with gender and race

distinctions. Some even reach the point where we emotionally invest in being dominated. As Spinoza put it, sometimes we fight for our domination as if it were our salvation. This is the problem of fascist desire, the desire to have command and obedience be the sole form of human relation. We will return to this in the Conclusion.

I also hasten to say that when those social patterns conflict, moral reflection and collaborative discussion can and should intervene – and they conflict quite often, even in forager band societies earlier generations would have characterized as “simple.” Humans have been arguing about what is the right thing to do for a very long time; we are “political animals” even before or outside the restricted sense of “polis” as city; in fact, I’d say there’s more political / moral reflection and discussion in “simple” egalitarian forager bands than in the households and imperial courts of “complex” hierarchical situations, where commands are issued and obeyed or resisted. We could say that prosocialization is always fracturing and being repaired with both affective and cognitive remediation qua sympathetic care and moral argument – as Deleuze and Guattari say in *Anti-Oedipus*, “desiring machines only work by breaking down.” (Appendix I.)

But now to deal with the elephant in the room: the “gradient” of prosociality at the boundary of the group, such that we tend to put social group “qualifications” on our care and cooperation.<sup>7</sup>

Because of this, the moral pedagogy needed to meet the “without qualification” portion of this normative standard is not easy. But at least we can say that in trying to get people to enact repeatable active joyous encounters for self and others “without qualification” we are working to arrange social life to expand the scope of a basic orientation of human nature for care and cooperation and not, pace Huxley (“Darwin’s Bulldog”) and the 150 years of people in his wake, trying to intensify a mere cultural constraint on a deep and primary natural impulse to violent competition within and across groups (e.g. Wrangham 1999).<sup>8</sup> In a way, I’m arguing for Kropotkin rather than Huxley as the true heir to Darwin: natural selection, especially in human beings, operates via cooperation **and** competition, not just competition. Struggling cooperatively with your group *and with other groups* against environmental forces and not just struggling competitively within the group and across groups for scarce resources.

We have that capacity for violent intra-group competition, of course, as history sadly attests (inflamed *amour propre* in which injury becomes insult is nothing to mess around with). But the postulated violence within early human groups is exaggerated; i.e., it follows a questionably “chimpanzee” view of humans, as I will detail shortly [Vaesen 2014; Gonzalez-Cabrera forthcoming].

As for inter-group competition, a strong “in-group / out-group” distinction is arguably not reflective of the early evolutionary setting for humans, where fission-fusion in the unsegmented forager band way of life, and the relative advantage of making allies when the spoils of conquest were so meager and the defensive advantage so great (Kelly 2005; Sterelny 2014), meant porosity of boundaries rather than strong borders (Casey 2017). This is the condition for cultural diffusion via trade and imitation, as group members are always going back

and forth. Even for Bergson (1977 [1932]), the “closed society” is a tendency rather than a chronological posit. This is our opening to insist that any group – even “primitive” to use Bergson’s outdated terminology – includes potential for peaceful collaboration and alliance with outsiders from the start.

#### RISKS AND REWARDS OF EVOKING A CONCEPT OF HUMAN NATURE

For much too long, exclusion from political participation or even personhood was justified by a thick conception of human nature, one we can define as copying, explicitly or implicitly, the characteristics of “White Man.” (I’m operationally defining personhood, using terms from the Greeks, as those whose mistreatment would warrant a charge of *hubris*: paradigmatically, treating a free adult man like a woman, child, or slave.)

These thick conceptions converged on an idea of culturally induced rational control of brutal, recalcitrant, and at best tamable emotions (think of the image of the charioteer and the dark horse in the *Phaedrus*). And the accounts of an essentially violent emotional constitution held in check by culturally induced top-down cognitive structures leave us with a pessimism that forecloses many political reforms based on positive and bottom-up care and cooperation capacities, labeling them as idealistic fantasies.

Despite that history, I think a philosophical intervention to reclaim human nature is worth the risk. For one thing, past efforts to destroy the above-sketched concept because of its abusive consequences and replace it with social constructivism have left those sympathetic to the constructivist position open to charges of adopting a naïve and politically motivated reliance on cultural anthropology at the expense of evolutionary biology.<sup>9</sup>

*But we don’t have to give up on the life sciences to distance ourselves from the old notion of human nature, and to rescue quite a bit of what made social constructivism appealing, namely deep cultural variability.* There are live debates at the intersection of biological, evolutionary, and cultural anthropology that put the above longstanding assumptions about human nature in question.<sup>10</sup>

Those two debates are 1) challenges to the long-dominant “Chimpanzee Referential Doctrine” (CRD) for the Last Common Ancestor (LCA) for the *Pan* (chimpanzees and bonobos) / *Homo* lineages (Appendix B), and 2) whether, in the *Homo* lineages, inter-group “coalitionary violence” was widespread and intense enough to form the primary selection pressure for human altruism (Appendix E).

If you reject the CRD, you can remain agnostic as to the LCA, and begin your analysis of modern humans within the hominin line, maintaining that chimpanzee, bonobo, and human traits had independent evolutionary origins; or you can adopt a “mosaic” conception of the LCA, such that it should be modeled with both bonobo-like and chimp-like traits.

If you accept the CRD, you're pushed in the direction of a deep roots theory of violence and war, which means establishing intra- and inter-group peace entails an uphill battle against the grain of human nature.

This brings us to some high stakes issues in moral psychology. If you accept the CRD, conscience is top-down cognitive control of emotions driving one to dominate others. In a way that echoes Nietzsche's analysis of the herd versus the aristocrats, conscience is rooted in fear of group punishment, i.e., conscience is an adaptation to "social selection" against would-be dominators by an egalitarian group, up to and including capital punishment (Boehm 2012b). The difference from Nietzsche is that such "herd" production of conscience is not a late, post-state, cultural psychological struggle, but a straightforward and early, pre-state, one. But in this picture, joy in collaboration vanishes and in its place would be mere relief at behavior that doesn't attract punishment, or at best satisfaction at having obeyed ethical precepts

If you accept conscience as derived from fear of punishment directed at dominators, that doesn't mean you have to throw up your hands, but your main path to social improvement is to reinforce and / or supplement the teaching of explicit moral principles by child rearing practices and social institutions of detection and punishment of dominance bids resulting from failures of conscience (Kitcher 2011).

If you reject the CRD, conscience is still top-down, but has two origins: physical punishment for dominance bids but also social punishment (rebukes) for failed care and cooperation such as quitting or non-sharing. Here, emotion doesn't have to *only* be a primitive source of trouble to be controlled so that later evolved and rationally based care and cooperation can have room to operate; it can *also* include a positive impulse to care and cooperation that can be nurtured. So, if you reject the CRD it's easier for you to root the normative standard of active joyous encounters of care and cooperation in human nature.

### THREE CLUES TO PROSOCIALITY

#### INTRINSIC MOTIVATION TO CARE AND COOPERATION IN CHILDREN

Let's begin with why "joy" in care and cooperation belongs in human nature, and the importance of the "without qualifications" part of my thesis.

1-3 year olds show tendencies to cooperation and care.<sup>11</sup> They not only actively cooperate, they also repair cooperation by helping others, even in the absence of external rewards. In fact, through the "overjustification effect," extrinsic rewards hurt helping behavior [Warneken and Tomasello 2008; Tomasello 2016].

It's crucial that the reward for the helpful children is immanent to their action, that it's intrinsic rather than extrinsic. That reward is joy in sympathetic care and fair cooperation, joy that accompanies an increase in "power" as capacity to affect and be affected in ways that increase the power of our collaborators. Hence the important thing is that prosocialized care and

cooperation works via the nurturing of evolved predispositions for joy in cooperation and caring, and not merely via the internalization of constraints on dominance-seeking and violence-employing individualism.

An evolutionary aspect about play and joy: adult chimps groom each other, but they do not play with each other. Play disappears after early childhood in chimpanzees. Adult play continues however in bonobos and humans. Hence our adult play can be explained as neoteny, or preservation of childhood features into adulthood. There is new research on play and neural development, so that play might help preserve plasticity later in life (neoteny again) so that our ancestors could continue to adapt to complex eco-social environments. But adaptationist accounts of play might not be the only way to go. There is also neurological research done on play and joy; perhaps play is primitive and just fun, not good for something? Here's something I'll be working on in the future.

Of course, there is an exclusionary, bullying, side to contemporary childhood play as well. No one is claiming prosociality means domination can't occur; joy in care and cooperation is a default, not the only possible outcome.

## DISASTER POLITICS

The second clue to evolved prosociality is the evidence of widespread prosocial behavior in crises, such as earthquakes and hurricanes, as we saw with the "Cajun Navy" volunteers in Hurricane Harvey.<sup>12</sup> Two other famous examples of prosociality at work: in the towers on 9/11, and in the ditched plane in the Hudson.

Note that time and space constraints can lead to panicked stampedes. So I'm not saying that "every man for himself" never trumps prosociality; I'm saying that prosociality is the default setting which emerges quickly and durably except in the most extreme situations. I just don't see why we should look at fire in a crowded theater as especially revelatory of "the essence of human nature." It's a matter of defaults and extremes.

We can hope that we've turned the corner in appreciating post-disaster prosociality. The comparison of media coverage of Hurricane Harvey with that of Hurricane Katrina is striking, notably, the lack of initial credence to subsequently proven false "security" fears – anarchy in the streets, food riots, "looting," sexual predation – that delayed and militarized the US response to Katrina [Protevi 2009; Tierney et al 2006]. The people of New Orleans had not "descended into anarchy" but "were their own first responders" (CNN 2010; Rodriguez et al, 2006). It's a kind of litmus test: when you think of Katrina, do you think of Kropotkin or of Hobbes? What was needed was technical support for already operating rescue efforts, as well as logistical support for the relief phase; there was very little need to securitize the situation.

So, far from showing a Hobbesian nightmare of atomized or gang predation in the wake of the failure of the state, prosocial behavior in disasters shows the fragility of the atomization practice of contemporary Western society. It's not that the state is needed to keep a precarious

social contract together so that otherwise “naturally” atomic individuals will not prey upon each other; it’s that the state is needed to enforce policies that produce rational egoists by artificial scarcity that forecloses the prosocial behavior that would otherwise emerge and that does in fact emerge in disasters (Ostrom 2005; Appendices G and H). However, delays of a few critical days in relief can allow the emergence of incidents of antisocial behavior that are then, retrospectively, seen as justification for the initial “security” fears.<sup>13</sup>

## THE INHIBITION ON CLOSE RANGE KILLING

Our third clue to prosociality as our evolved default setting, and our opening to the “without qualifications” in embracing out-group members, comes from the act of killing. Killing exists in assemblages informed by a multiplicity whose elements are physical and social distance, teamwork, technology, and command. We find considerable historical evidence that in many such assemblages there is a reluctance to engage by many relatively untrained conscripts, and we find the incompetence of even highly trained personnel in many circumstances, especially one-on-one, cold-blooded, and close-range fighting (Grossman 1995; Collins 2008).

This inhibition on killing allows us to complicate the usual story on the evolution of prosociality. Since Darwin suggested it in *The Descent of Man*, it’s been widely thought war was a primary selection pressure for altruism and prosociality in human evolution.<sup>14</sup> According to this narrative, we are the descendants of victors in warfare.

The thesis that widespread pre-state warfare provided the selection pressure for prosociality is however bitterly disputed (Appendix E). Here the basic question is whether war is a universal human experience, or whether it only occurs in certain social circumstances, namely, the state (Fry 2013; Scott 2017).

While the critics of the universal war thesis admit that nomadic forager groups have individual-level murder and revenge killing and even group “executions” of murderous individuals, they deny they have warfare as anonymous group-level conflict in which any member of the opposing group is fair game (Kelly 2000; Fry 2007). The critics of universal war also look askance at using current violence rates among contemporary foragers as transparent access to our evolutionary past (thus treating them as “living fossils”), by reminding us of the need to look at them in the context of state contact and subsequent territorial constriction and / or rivalry over trading rights (Appendix D).<sup>15</sup> For these thinkers, then, we are not the descendants of victors; we are the descendants of cooperators whose sharing in times of crisis avoided war – to repeat what I said above, war really doesn’t pay for nomadic foragers: there’s too much to lose and too little to gain (Kelly 2005; Sterelny 2014).

If we were essentially or even simply strongly predisposed to killing due to a warfare selection pressure – whether or not that is continuous with chimpanzee lethal raiding (Wrangham 1999) – military and police training efforts would be toward control, when in fact the effort has to go to enabling. Now such enabling has, to be sure, made great strides with training using live-fire realistic targets aiming at reflex and quick decision or “shoot / no-shoot” engagements (Protevi



2008). We can of course extend this analysis of training to the living conditions, initiation rites, and other training procedures of gangs, guerrilla groups, and so on. Not only do we “have to be taught, carefully taught” to hate, as *South Pacific* tells us, we have to be trained to kill effectively.

#### A NON-WAR BASED HYPOTHESIS FOR EVOLVED PROSOCIALITY

So, if there was a time before war, then what was our selection pressure for prosociality?

It’s *obligate collaborative foraging*, which, evolving by mutualism and reciprocity, is not group-level selection. This, and not warfare, was the selection pressure for anger control or “self-domestication” (Appendix C) **and** for cognitive and affective capacities for joint attention allowing for the development of prosocial capacities of care and cooperation beyond kin, even to the point of psychological altruism, in which the ends and needs of others motivate our action (Appendix A).<sup>16</sup>

This line of thought (Tomasello et al. 2012; Tomasello 2016; Sterelny 2014), allows for evolved egalitarian sentiments to positively contribute to mutualistic cooperation. The selection pressure here would be collective self-defense against non-human animal predators and so-called “power scavenging” in which hominins cooperatively chased predators from their kills.

So, my bottom line here: our ancestors did indeed develop ways to detect and punish bullies and shirkers and so to suppress our dominance-enabling hair-trigger temper and violent reactive aggression, as in the so-called Human Self-Domestication hypothesis (Appendix C). But they **also** genuinely and positively developed an emotional structure that can motivate us, their descendants, to search for the joy we directly find in cooperation, sharing, and helping.<sup>17</sup>

For most people, most of the time, it’s a little bit of both. It’s not impossible to find pure examples of bullies and cooperators, devils and saints, but either pure state seems relatively rare. What we have to watch out for is having our social structures tilt toward rewarding bullies and shirkers.<sup>18</sup>

But that also means we can work with human nature, and not against it, to work toward institutions that would support our hortatory ideal. It’s a matter of nurturing a deep capacity for care and cooperation, and expanding it so it is without qualification, not a matter of desperately fighting a single deep drive to dominance.

#### THE POLITICS OF JOY

You get joy in joining an assemblage that increases your power. We must distinguish active and passive joy in Spinoza’s sense: active joy comes when you are contributing to the increased power, as opposed to simply being passively uplifted by external forces.<sup>19</sup>

Here we need the distinction between *pouvoir* and *puissance*. *Pouvoir* is transcendent power: it comes from above. It is hylomorphic, imposing form on the chaotic or passive material of the

emotions or the mob. In its most extreme manifestation, it is fascistic: it is expressed not simply as the desire to rule, but more insidiously as the longing for the strong leader to rescue us from the chaos into which our bodies politic have descended. *Puissance*, on the other hand, is immanent self-organization. It is the power of people working together to generate the structures of their social life. The difference between *pouvoir* and *puissance* allows us to nuance the notion of joyous and sad affect with the notions of active and passive power.

Consider the paradigm case of fascist joy. The Nazis at the Nuremberg rallies were filled with joyous affect, but this joy of being swept up into an emergent body politic was passive. The Nazis' joy was triggered by the presence of a transcendent figure manipulating symbols—flags and faces—and by the imposition of a rhythm or a forced entrainment—marches and salutes and songs. Upon leaving the rally, they had no autonomous power (*puissance*) to make repeatable mutually empowering connections. In fact, they could only feel sad at being isolated, removed from the thrilling presence of the leader.

We then come back to our ethical standard: does the encounter produce repeatable mutually active joyous affect in enacting positive care and cooperation? Does it increase the *puissance* of the bodies, that is, does it enable them to form new and mutually empowering encounters of care and cooperation outside the original encounter?

A final remark. I've tried to keep this talk neutral with regard to classic questions in political philosophy. But I don't think I can make it all the way to the end, for, to develop capacities for active joyous encounters for self and others without qualification we need positive or substantive liberties that enable claims on material support and appropriate care. It's only then, relieved of the anxiety produced by artificial scarcity, and its attendant rational egoism, that we have institutionalized the means to develop our prosocial potentials, whatever the register – art, science, politics, philosophy, love – for singular differentiations of the multiplicity of human nature. It's only then that we can continue to explore what we – self and others, without qualification – can become.<sup>20</sup>

## APPENDIX A

## VOCABULARY

1. Prosocial behavior: a default setting of care and cooperation, though with potentials for violence and competition, intra- and inter-group. Hence, "prosocial" doesn't mean "nice all the time." It means an intellectual understanding of, and emotional investment in, social patterns, which inflect our care and cooperation as well as motivate and justify punishing violators. The important question is whether we settle for cooperation when punishment for domination attempts are too costly, or whether we can directly desire joy in cooperation.
2. Fitness = descendants living to reproductive age.
3. Altruism
  - a. Biological altruism = helping behavior with a fitness cost (direct risk to life and limb, but also just time spent away from mate selection, child raising, resource provision, etc.). Self-sacrifice is a dramatic example, but it can be less than that. Further, prosocial and 3<sup>rd</sup> party punishment [punishing X for violating a norm affecting non-kin person Y] carries risks: you could start a feud; you eliminate a potential ally, ...
  - b. Psychological altruism = mental state in which benefitting others at a cost to the agent is the primary motivation for action.
4. Ways of explaining helping behavior that appears to be altruistic, but has hidden benefits that outweigh the fitness costs.
  - a. Kin selection: costly helping behavior that helps genes in kin to survive ("I would sacrifice myself for two brothers or for 8 cousins.")
  - b. Reciprocal altruism: aid given back to donor by recipient with time delay ("I'll scratch your back if you scratch mine.")
  - c. Mutualism: working together so that immediate benefits (at end of successfully completed task) accrue to all parties compensating for any costs. ("Hey, let's all go hunting this woolly mammoth.")
  - d. Indirect altruism: aid given to donor by a third party (due to reputation gained by altruistic acts) ("Scratch an 'altruist,' watch a hypocrite bleed.")
5. Sexual selection (female mate preference as well as male arms race): altruism as predictor of genetic quality. "Costly signaling": "think how much energy I have if I can waste it like this."
6. Social selection (Boehm 2012a): enforcing egalitarianism. Ridicule, exile, killing. Often it is the kin of the mad dog or simple bully prone to violence who step in to take him out, to prevent escalation. Supposed origin of conscience as self-inhibitor of temptations to non-sharing and active theft, bullying, killing, etc. ("You better think twice, because if you make a mistake the group is going to react harshly.") The alternate, cooperation-based origin of conscience is disapproval from disappointed would-be collaborators ("You should have held up your end of the bargain better!")

## APPENDIX B

## THE CRITIQUE OF CHIMPANZEE REFERENTIAL DOCTRINE

The CRD posits extant chimpanzees as the best model for the *Pan / Homo* LCA.

There are some technical neuroscience aspects to this debate covered in the references to this appendix, but here I will try to explain a relatively simple anatomical argument.

High levels of sexual dimorphism in canine teeth suggest male-on-male violent competition for status that is cashed out in food and mates (the teeth are used as weapons).

Chimpanzees have relatively high levels of canine teeth dimorphism, but bonobos do not. This correlates well with the observation of their behaviors, in which the possibility of female coalitions in bonobos serves to suppress much male-on-male violence, whereas chimpanzees have constant formation and dissolution of male coalitions producing intra-group male violence in search of the alpha male position.

Humans have very little sexual dimorphism in canine teeth, so our teeth have not been under selection pressure for their use as weapons. That could be because other weapons have rendered them superfluous in intra-group male violence, or it could be that there was little intra-group male violence.

Now the recent discovery of an early member of the *Homo sapiens* lineage is *Ardipithecus ramidus*. It is omnivorous, whereas both *Pan* survivors tend to be frugivores (though chimpanzees will hunt, kill, and eat monkeys, the vast majority of their survival comes from fruit eating). Most importantly for this story, however, is that *Ar. ramidus* had relatively low levels of sexual dimorphism in canine teeth, suggesting low levels on intra-group male violence. Hence it behaved relatively more like bonobos than like chimpanzees, or perhaps better, it behaved more like modern humans than like either bonobos or chimpanzees, but within that comparison group, more like bonobos.

However, another early species, discovered earlier, but having appeared later than *Ar. ramidus*, is *Australopithecus afarensis*. It was frugivorous, and had relatively high levels of sexual dimorphism in canine teeth, suggesting relatively high levels on intra-group male violence, hence suggesting chimpanzee-like behavior.

Now *Au. afarensis* is later than *Ar. ramidus*. So, if *Au. afarensis* were directly in our line of descent, as is *Ar. ramidus*, and is, as usually claimed, relatively more sexually dimorphic than humans, then that means there was a significant behavioral uptick in male violence from the time of *Ar. ramidus* to that of *Au. afarensis*, putting selection pressure on growth in male canine teeth, and then another significant downtick in male violence in later species leading to *H. sapiens* and consequently loss of selection pressure on growth in male canine teeth. In other

words, there was a shift from a species whose behavior can model as bonobo-like to one whose behavior we can model as chimpanzee-like.

Now that might be because the LCA was more chimpanzee-like, then became in *Ar. ramidus* bonobo-like, then in *Au. afarensis* our line returned to its earlier chimp-like behavior.

On the other hand, if *Au. afarensis* were not in our direct line of descent – if it represents a “paraphyletic” sister lineage – then there would be a simpler line of low male intragroup violence (using teeth) from *Ar. ramidus* to *H. sapiens*. Or it might be that *Au. afarensis* was less sexually dimorphic than is usually claimed, so that it remains in our line of descent, but as less of an anomaly.

Either position on the relation of *Ar. ramidus* and *Au. afarensis* would mean calling into question the CRD and its “chimpocentric” model of the LCA, and opening the door to either an agnosticism about the LCA, or to the “mosaic” model proposed by Gonzalez-Cabrera, in which the LCA had some behaviors that would be more bonobo-like than chimpanzee-like.

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## APPENDIX C

## THE HUMAN SELF-DOMESTICATION HYPOTHESIS

The Human Self-Domestication (HSD) hypothesis is one of the most interesting new developments in anthropology. The HSD hypothesis concerns the evolution of reactive aggression control (Hare 2017). As we have seen, reactive aggression occurs with blocked flight after threat detection, and berserker rage is out-of-control reactive aggression. But HSD cannot be perfect; it can increase the cortical means of behavior control and raise danger detection thresholds for defensive behavior activation in a large portion of the population, but the genetic disposition to develop defensive motivational circuits remain for many, so for them the circuits themselves are present and able to be activated, and there will be also be ontogenetically-induced variation in control and thresholds. All that means that given the right circumstances, instances of blind rage behavior are still possible in many members of the population.

According to the HSD hypothesis "later human evolution was dominated by selection for intragroup sociality over aggression," and because of this, "the reduced emotional reactivity that results from self-domestication and increased self-control created a unique form of human tolerance allowing the expression of the more flexible social skills only observed in modern humans" (Hare 2017). The HSD hypothesis is an advance on the "emotional reactivity hypothesis" which states that "human levels of cooperative communication were a result of an increase in social tolerance generated by a decrease in emotional reactivity... an increase in tolerance in humans allowed inherited cognitive skills to be expressed in new social situations. Selection could then act directly on revealed variance in these newly expressed cognitive abilities" (Hare 2017; with reference to Hare and Tomasello 2005a, b). The HSD predicts neurological changes in humans ("interaction between subcortical and cortical pathways"; as well as increased serotonin, which is known to inhibit impulsivity and reactive aggression [Nelson and Trainor 2007]) producing self-control via reduced reactivity and increased inhibition, which "creates the human-specific adaptation for more flexible tolerance and unique forms of human social cognition" (Hare 2017).

What we think the baseline for the HSD is vital. For Hare (2017), the HSD "also led to enhanced cooperation in intergroup conflicts." This pushes the HSD toward an assumption of a relatively chimp-like LCA for *Pan / Homo* (Vaesen 2014; Gonzalez-Cabrera 2016).

If the LCA was more chimp-like than bonobo-like, then evolutionary human emotional development allowing complex social life is primarily about top-down cortical anger / aggression control of emotions oriented to domination. But if there were significant bonobo-like traits in the LCA we would have developed capacities for bottom-up pacific emotions (joy in cooperation, helping, and caring) at the same time as those for top-down anger control. When circumstances permit – here is the zone for political philosophy – humans are remarkably pacific and sharing in-group AND out-group, relative to chimpanzees. Is this because we have learned ways to suppress our dominance-enabling hair-trigger temper and violent reactive

aggression, so that we can appreciate when cooperation is the rational choice? Or is it because we *also* genuinely and positively have an emotional structure that provides joy in care and cooperation, in peace and sharing? Do we merely settle for cooperation when punishment for domination attempts are too costly, or can we directly experience, and hence desire, joy in care and cooperation?

A “chimpanzee” view like the HSD emphasizes anger control as the condition for later development of care and cooperation. Although I’m tempted to question that, the HSD still has some fascinating implications. Note that a prime selection pressure for self-domestication in early humans is capital punishment (CP) in unsegmented foragers (Wrangham 2014). There is an interesting dialectic here: the acephalic social structure of forager bands is reinforced (and possibly initially produced, if we are chimpanzee) by the CP killing of murderers *qua* would-be dominators, while that same structure produces the need for CP, as, without an alpha to impose conflict resolution, individual conflict can result in murder, and hence the need for CP (Boehm 2012a).

Forager CP is a paradigm case of “warm” proactive aggression (Wrangham 2014), but the targeted killers are those hot-heads exhibiting poor control of reactive aggression or those cold-blooded bullies whose instrumental aggression is used to dominate others. CP thus selects for the ability to carry out the controlled anger / proactive aggression complex that enables war when social circumstances permit. CP is language-mediated, group-oriented, and premeditated, though sometimes achieved by taking advantage of spontaneous opportunity.

Note that Kelly 2000 distinguishes single CP from ambush by multiple people. This is on the way to social substitutability and war, as it requires group vengeance duty. Once we couple group duty on the side of the victimized avengers to group liability on the side of the offenders, we have set up feud, a form of war as anonymous inter-group violence.

## APPENDIX D

## CONTEMPORARY FORAGERS ARE NOT LIVING FOSSILS

A side note here is necessary: we cannot consider contemporary foragers to be “living fossils” as many of Rousseau’s formulations seem to suggest. (While Rousseau never claims that contemporary non-state peoples are fully “savage man” in the sense of never having departed the “first state of nature,” he will does say that the Caribs “have deviated least from the state of Nature” [Rousseau 1997: *DI*, Part I, para 44, p. 156.]

However, while it might be possible to carefully consider ethnographies of their social life as part of a reconstruction of early human foragers, we cannot make Rousseau’s unqualified assumption that contemporary foragers are “closer” to early bands. A number of issues arise here: 1) it is increasingly difficult to find people who haven’t had dealings with States and their agents, or to find people whose neighbors deal with them on the basis of their own dealings with States; 2) geographical circumscription by States will tend to push contemporary foragers to lands whose exploitation by States is more difficult than just letting the foragers occupy them for the time being, whether or not the foragers would prefer other territories; the contemporary necessity of food-production on the marginal lands to which they are confined might very well have led to significant changes in forager behavior relative to earlier, pre-State times; 3) in particular, State-led geographical circumscription might lead to two problems: a) the loss of group fission as a form of intra-group conflict-resolution, and b) the loss of group flight as a form of inter-group conflict-avoidance. The loss of these options might then have led to increased intra- and inter-group violence relative to pre-State peoples. No one proposes a time in which humans did not engage personal violence; what is disputed is the ease with which one extrapolates from contemporary data to pre-State times. (It is here that bitter debates around archeological findings spring up.)



## APPENDIX E

BIOLOGICAL, ARCHEOLOGICAL, AND ETHNOGRAPHIC CONTROVERSIES  
WITH REGARD TO PRE-STATE WARFARE

There is bitter controversy in anthropology about the alleged universality of warfare in human evolution and history. There are three elements to consider here: the biological, the archaeological, and the ethnographic.

*Regarding the biological*, an important first step is to distinguish human war from chimpanzee intergroup raiding (Kelly 2005). Chimps have lots of inter-male aggression, hierarchy and male alliances, tolerated food scrounging, and opportunistic ambush killing of neighbors in border zones. Bonobos have female alliances suppressing male coalitions, little inter-male fighting, use of sex in various combinations for conflict-avoidance / resolution, and no border ambushes. (See Appendix on critiques of the CRD.)

*Regarding the archeological*: Proponents of universal war often point to findings of crushed skulls and the like in the archaeological record (Keeley 1997). Critics reply that some of the claims of war-damaged skulls are more plausibly accounted for by animal attacks (Fry 2007, 43). The anti-universalists will also seek to demonstrate that the universalists have cherry-picked their evidence (see Ferguson 2013a and 2013b).

*Regarding the ethnographic*: we must distinguish smaller and less internally differentiated forager bands from more internally complex hunter-gatherer tribes with chiefs, such as the Yanomamo "Fierce People" (Chagnon 1988). Chagnon 1988, focusing on the Yanomami tribes of Brazil and Venezuela, proposed war as an evolved adaptation. One of the most controversial papers of the last 50 years, it has multiple critics (Albert 1989; Ferguson 2001; Fry 2007) and defenders. The anti-universalists make two claims with regard to the penchant of the universalists to cite Chagnon: 1) they criticize the use of the horticultural Yanomamo as indicative of pre-State forager societies, and 2) they deny that Yanomamo warriors really did have reproductive fitness advantages [Fry 2007, 135-139].

While the critics of the universal war thesis admit that forager groups have individual-level murder and revenge killing and even group executions of murderous individuals (CP qua "social selection" per Boehm 2012a, b), they deny that they have the "logic of social substitutability" which enables warfare as anonymous group-level conflict in which any member of the opposing group is fair game (Kelly 2000; Fry 2007). The critics of universal war also remind us of the need to look at current tribal warfare in the context of Western contact and subsequent territorial constriction and / or rivalry over trading rights (Ferguson 1995).

## APPENDIX F

## NEW WORK IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY AND THEORY OF EMOTIONS

A strong strand of moral psychology is skeptical of the explanatory power of moral reasoning in many cases, seeing it as very often (or even always, for the hardcore), simply an *ex post facto* rationalization of an intuited preference: in modern times, we find Hobbes, Spinoza, and Nietzsche in this line of thought. Contemporary scientific formulations of this school include Damasio (1995, 1999) and Haidt (2001).

According to this corporeal school of thought the intuited preference arises from a state of the subject's body – a certain relation of neural firing patterns, neurochemical releases, bodily information, gut feeling, and so on – expressed as an affective state of liking and attraction, or disliking and repulsion. From this bodily state and its affective expression stem a judgment. In Hobbes canonical formulation, "I judge something good because I like it." Positive or negative emotion here is thus an efflorescence of the body, and moral reasoning seeks to rationalize judgments stemming from that intuited feeling.

This corporeal position differs from Stoic philosophy, in which emotions are cognitive judgments: "If I am appropriately virtuous, my liking a thing is consistent with my judgment that it is good relative to the nature of rational beings." The neo-Stoic Martha Nussbaum puts it like this: emotions are "intelligent responses to the perception of value."

Between corporealism and cognitivism we find constructivist theories of emotion, which will insist upon the contribution of semantic factors alongside somatic changes, as in Lisa Feldman Barrett or Joseph LeDoux. LeDoux's allows some reference to specific neural circuits, such as the subcortical defense reactive circuits that are added to other inputs in his "recipe" for fear and anger (LeDoux 2015, 93-112). Barrett (2017), however, insists on a strong neural globalism, which, with her insistence on holism, emergence, and degeneracy (same outcome from different mechanisms), results in a strong nominalism, such that no "fingerprint" of necessary circuits can be identified for either emotion instances or even emotion categories (2017, 35-41; see also Pessoa 2017 for a similar distributed network approach to emotions).

Barrett's work shows the relevance of Deleuzian ontology. For Barrett, emotion concept construction occurs via bottom-up summarizing of singular experiences, drawing on neural inputs from multiple brain sites mapping the body and other higher and lower intra-brain regions; each of these "core affect" experiences is tagged with culturally specific emotion terms. Hence there is a high-level, cortical / semantic component to emotion concepts, which are constructed from these multiple inputs. Such summarizing produces concepts as abstract but non-essential capacities that don't exist as enduring, locatable, actual firings, but only insist as potentials for actualization. Given her strong holism, emergence, and degeneracy, concept creation is the progressive construction of a virtual field: virtual, because emotion concepts do not exist, but insist as potentials.

An emotional episode is the actualization of the potential concept. It occurs as prediction, a top-down simulation that “unpacks” concepts, constructing an instance of the concept that assembles its components from occurrent inputs and checks the assemblage against the prediction. This actualization occurs in a degeneracy mode, such that no single set of neural firings is necessary for each instance of the concept. Hence the concept is a virtual diagram with multiple mechanisms for the actualization of instances. In Deleuzian terms, it is an “abstract machine” with multiple machinic assemblages for its actualization / individuation / integration / differentiation.

This is not all that different from the corporealists if we allow for cortical / semantic brain firings to count as “states of the body.” Where does that body state come from? From the history of encounters of the body, that is, from the interaction of the particular character of the body – its “conatus,” to speak like Hobbes and Spinoza or its “system of drives” to use Nietzsche’s terms – and the people and things it encounters. The history of encounters patterns the body by modulating its characteristic responses, deepening the affective response upon repetition of similar objects, that is, in Barrett’s terms, the formation of more and more deeply and finely grained emotional concepts.

Here the brain / body is neither a blank slate nor a preformed set of responses. Encounters are neither imprintings nor are they mere triggers; rather, the body has characteristic dispositions that set up a range of stylized responses. Similarly, this is neither a nominalist position of sheer idiosyncratic – and hence unpredictable – responses, nor is it a universalist human nature in which we can predict responses. Rather, if we get to know someone, and see an encounter with a relatively familiar object, we have a good sense of what will happen. But bodies are complex and internal changes arise, as do situations unfamiliar to the agent, such that prediction of the response are less reliable, both to the onlookers and even to the experiencing agent: we can surprise ourselves with changes in our emotional patterns.

Whatever your position in theory of emotions, as a corporealist (Damasio 1995, 1999; Haidt 2001) or a constructivist (LeDoux 2015; Barrett 2017), singular encounters are the genesis of emotional structures. And whatever your position in moral psychology, as an emotion-first intuitionist or someone according some weight in some circumstance to moral reflection (interestingly, Jonathan Haidt [2001], although most closely identified with the former, also allows for the latter), emotions are important, either as generators of opinion, as obstacles to proper judgment, or as indicators of virtue or vice.

From the importance of encounters flows the importance of institutions to political affect. If one can set up ways in which some patterns of encounters can be made more likely than others, one can influence brain / bodily histories, and thus emotional responses, and thus the impulses toward moral action (whatever you think of the efficacy of later rational reflection). When people live in a society with firmly set institutions, their brain / bodies, intuitions, emotions, and impulses toward actions are more or less predictable, and, if the institutions are well-attuned to each other, social reproduction occurs more smoothly than if the institutions clash. (Although I’ve insisted that no society is so simple and integrated that clashes of patterns

never occur, I don't want to gainsay differences in frequency and intensity of such clashes across cultures.)

In a multicultural society, however, there are many institutions, hence many different and not necessarily concordant patterns of encounters, many patterned bodies, many intuitions as to right action, many emotional reactions, and many different ex post facto rationalizations. Hence Plato's desire for cultural control, evidenced by the expulsion of the poets from the city of the *Republic*, or the complete cultural control of the city in the *Laws*.

## APPENDIX G

PRODUCING *HOMO ECONOMICUS*

Do we really have a “natural propensity to truck, barter, and exchange,” as Adam Smith would have it? I would claim instead that the rational egoism of *homo economicus* is both produced by specific social circumstances, and, once up and running, works as a sort of autonomous operating system overriding prosocial desires.

There are mundane areas of socio-political practice that try to render irrelevant the effects of subjective agency by rendering behavior predictable. This black-boxing of consciousness can either occur *en masse*, by economic practices which produce the conditions which will in turn produce "rational," that is, predictable, behavior (for such an externalist reading of rational choice theory, see Satz and Frerejohn 1994), or in individuals and small groups, by discipline (Schwartz, Schuldenfrei and Lacey 1979).

Externalism holds that in certain forms of political activity consciousness is not eliminated, but is rendered superfluous in prediction and manipulation. In certain conditions, it simply does not matter what one would "prefer" in some private interiority, since social constraints can be made strong enough to render the vast majority of actors predictable. (Bartleby's withdrawal did not change the productivity of Wall Street scribes.) We see this in disciplinary institutions at the individual scale, for after a certain amount of training, most of the soldiers snap to attention, whether they like it or not.

But it is not just the military; Schwartz, Schuldenfrei and Lacey investigate the nexus of behavioristic emptying out of subjectivity and factory discipline:

[W]hile behavior in the workplace now seems to conform to operant principles, it did not in an earlier time, prior to the development of industrial capitalism. . . . the fit between operant theory and modern work is so close in part because operant principles, in the form of the scientific management movement, made modern work what it is. . . . successful applications of operant theory do not necessarily confirm the theory. Rather, applications of operant principles to social institutions may transform those institutions so that they conform to operant principles. (Schwartz et al 1979: 229)

On the social scale, consider Satz and Frerejohn's (1994) externalist reading of rational choice theory, where, using an analogy with statistical dynamics, they show that in normalized conditions the structure of a social system is all that need be analyzed. They dispense with the assumption of internal, psychological, rational agents; what they say needs to be studied are social conditions that produce behavior that can be modeled on the assumption of rational agents.

We believe that rational-choice explanations are most plausible in settings in which individual action is severely constrained, and thus where the theory gets its explanatory

power from structure-generated interests and not from individual psychology. (Satz and Ferejohn 1994, 72)

A short piece by Elinor Ostrom, "Policies that crowd out reciprocity and collective action" (2005), has some important points. Ostrom begins by reviewing evidence for strong reciprocators, the presence of which contradicts the rational choice theory assumption that rational egoists (utility maximizers driven only by external rewards / punishments) are the only type of agent that needs to be modeled to account for social behavior.

Thus, Ostrom proposes that we need to model different ratios of strong reciprocators and rational egoists and how those ratios change over time given different conditions. Strong reciprocators are conditional altruistic cooperators and conditional altruistic punishers. They are concerned with fairness of process rather than only outcomes; in a word, they have internal motivations.

Ostrom continues: if you assume only rational egoists, then you have to design policies with external rewards and punishments. "Leviathan is alive and well in our policy textbooks. The state is viewed as a substitute for the shortcomings of individual behavior and the presumed failure of community" (Ostrom 2005: 254). The kicker is that such policies actually hurt the prosocial behaviors that would exist in their absence. "External interventions crowd out intrinsic motivation if the individuals affected perceive them to be controlling" (260).

But internally motivated prosocial behaviors are not supposed to exist in a world of only rational egoists. So, we have a self-fulfilling prophecy, or another example of "methodology become metaphysics": policies of externally compelled cooperation recommended on the assumption that social reality is a collection of rational egoists produce the very extrinsic-reward-driven reality that you have assumed.

At this point, we should remember Satz and Ferejohn's externalism: what you study with rational choice theory is social constraint conditions. Properly set up, you can dispense with psychological attribution. To use a term of art in philosophy of mind, rational choice theory is the study of political economy zombies.

But all is not lost, Ostrom notes. If you design them properly, you can use external systems to "'crowd in' behaviors based on intrinsic preferences and enhance what could have been achieved without these incentives" (254). In other words, there really is, literally, a political economy of consciousness; with enough control you can produce a combination of scarcity and disciplinary coercion that so constrains action as to render modeling of conscious decisions superfluous to prediction and control of behavior.

In these situations, behaviorist manipulation via external rewards and punishments is not only sufficient for modeling predictable behavior, but also crowds out reciprocity and collective action. (Recall the "overjustification effect" we saw in Warneken and Tomasello 2008.) Externalism can defeat internalism, if you will. Conversely, you can create institutional

structures that provide the conditions for the survival and flourishing of internal motivations and concern for fair processes.

In other words, we can create the conditions in which prosocial internal motivation can play an effective role in political economy once we realize that *homo economicus* only appears through its own set of social processes.

## APPENDIX H

## FLEEING THE STATE

James C Scott and *The Art of Not Being Governed*

Before we begin, let us note that Scott's whole analysis is governed by the "last enclosure" thesis whereby post-WW2 "distance-destroying technologies" (roads / cars / ATVs; planes / helicopters / drones; electronic communications) are severely encroaching upon ability to live a self-governing or non-state life. However, again (something Scott underplays), climate change could quite possibly throw a spanner in the works and allow more leeway for non-state living.

*Scott's Method*

For Scott, "state" and "non-state" processes are in "dialectical" or "mutually constituting" relations. The "state" processes (enclosure, enslavement, taxing ...) here are orienting limits, with classic, colonial, and post-colonial states with varying capacities to approach the limits and maintain / reproduce those gains. The "non-state" processes (flight, nomadicism, raiding ...) also admit of degrees, with well-administered states in times of economic growth sometimes attracting non-state peoples to settle down. States and non-states exchange (at different rates at different times) people, customs, and goods across the "membrane" that frontiers provide, all mediated by smugglers, traders, brokers, peddlers, and so on.

Scott's anti-state-centrism has two moves. First, there is a critical interpretation of state denigration of the other. Scott's positive project then is writing the history of non-state peoples as the complement of state-centered history.

Next, let us consider Scott's anti-progressivism. From a state perspective, "self-governing peoples" are "living ancestors," a glimpse of pre-agricultural, pre-civilized life that is teleologically fulfilled in states. Scott argues, on the contrary, "hill people are best understood as runaway, fugitive, maroon communities who have, over the course of two millennia, been fleeing the oppression of state-making projects in the valleys—slavery, conscription, taxes, corvée labor, epidemics, and warfare" (Preface, p ix).

*Scott's Multiplicity*

Scott describes a multiplicity with topographical / transport-technological, political-economic, political-organizational, administrative, and violence elements. A multiplicity is a set of interacting processes in which thresholds in the relations of processes produce qualitative changes in the behavior of the system.

Topographical-transport-technological, or the "friction of terrain." State spaces: valleys and rivers / oceans allowing for military enforcement, administrative "visibility," and economic integration. Non-state spaces in Scott's Zomia are hills and mountains, but are generalizable to any zone where state reach is hampered: jungles, deserts, marshes, and so on.



These transport processes intersect the production aspect of the region's political economy. States are able to coerce sedentary river valley rice agriculture due to its "legibility." It is taxable or able to be directly appropriated, and the population can be conscripted into military service or into *corvée* labor for infrastructure and / or monuments. Scott also describe the use of enslavement by the capture of hill people by raiding or by debt bondage, as well as share-cropping.

When it comes to political organization, Scott notes that state-building projects require -- and aim at, in mutual presupposition -- concentrated manpower, central command, military specialization, taxes, and *corvée* labor. All those state-building practices however incentivize flight to non-state "shatter zones" where we find various non-state political forms, such as egalitarian or acephalic bands, chiefdoms, and temporary alliances.

Consider the regimes of violence Scott describes. Scott implicitly accepts the distinction between the "primary violence" of statification warfare aiming at territorial incorporation and at population enslavement and resettlement, from the "secondary violence" of terror aimed at tax collection and at the enforcement of conscription and *corvée* labor.

Initial and ongoing statification violence finds its counterparts among non-state peoples in fighting against state agents (let's call this "state avoiding"), internal state-preventing violence (exile, "capital punishment"), and predation on state economies in targeting trade routes for robbery or extortion of tolls, and in raids which steal from the produce of valley agricultural slaves, as direct enslavement, in which valley population is itself the target.

## APPENDIX I

FRACTURES OF THE STATE  
AFFECTIVE IDEOLOGY

Prosociality is not a fixed state; it's an ever-recurring process of prosocialization; and life in states has its own forms of repairing the fractures it provokes. Now, living "within a state" is a falsely spatialized image. Statification processes are ongoing and always seeking to repair the fractures of bodies politic: the social / somatic resistances to and deviations from statification. One name for the repair process is "ideology." This section makes the case that we need to consider "affective ideology" to make sense of ongoing prosocialization in its statification mode.

"Ideology" has a psychological and a functional sense. Psychologically, ideology is the process that produces a rough coincidence of body political affective-cognitive patterns of an entire society. Functionally, the sharing of affective-cognitive orientation we call "ideology" contributes to the stability and reproducibility of social patterns of thought and practice on daily, lifespan, and generational scales.

Ideological social reproduction is non-coercive, but all societies have practices of physical force that punish or eliminate those prone to system-damaging behavior such as free-riding or bullying. Call that coercive social pattern reproduction. (A big question in recent debates is whether collective action problems brought on by sophisticated coercive practices haven't rendered the notion of "ideology" otiose [Rosen 1996].)

The agents of such coercion -- police, army, and workplace personnel -- are themselves kept in place by practices of external rewards (raises, promotions, and esteem of their fellows for good behavior) and punishments (fines, demotions, dismissal, execution for deviation). That is, there are effective collective action problems produced by coercive reproduction practices targeting them, the enforcers. Call that lateral coercive reproduction.

However, that system of lateral coercive reproduction itself requires an ideological buy-in on the part of at least some portion of the enforcers for them to do their work of disciplining the others who produce the punishment practices contributing to -- or wholly responsible for -- large-scale social reproduction. That notion of ideological buy-in on the part of (some portion of) the punishment-dispensing enforcers has to include an affective dimension since torture and killing (by non-psychopaths) requires overriding at least some level of inhibition produced by empathic identification with a subject in pain, even given attenuation of empathy across group lines.

The relations among empathy, arousal, and violence are complex and the literature discussing them is massive and constantly evolving. Nonetheless, some outlines can be observed: increasing in-group empathy increases the violence of punishment of out-group members for threats to in-group, and the targets of that violence receive less empathic resonance with the

punishers, resulting in lower estimations of the pain dealt out. However, there must still be some recognition of pain in the targets, or else the notion of punishment loses its sense: you don't torture a wall, even if you bang on it out of frustration. So, despite the attenuation of empathy toward out-group members, consistent testimony from combatants shows the strong emotional surge necessary for almost all people to engage in violent confrontation.

To get to “affective ideology,” we have to think that the encoding of experienced regularities is going to encode the affective tone of the situation along with representations of state of the world. The reproduction of the practice of white supremacy for a slave-holding family (to use Jason Stanley’s [2015] example) is not simply accounted for by instilling in children beliefs with the propositional content of racial superiority and inferiority and binding them to those identities by love for friends and parents who participate in that practice. The reproduction of the practice of white supremacy is also constituted by an affective structure of white pride and vengeance motivated by white vulnerability, and hatred, fear, and contempt for blacks that is encoded along with the representational content of the scenes of humiliation, torture, and death that constitute the daily practices of the coercive reproduction side of plantation white supremacy (see Baptist 2014 for claims that widespread torture was responsible for increased productivity on cotton plantations).

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## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Other-directed and internally motivated altruism is “commitment” to use the term of Amartya Sen [1977].

<sup>2</sup> In principle, “rational utility-maximization” can be distinguished from “rational selfishness.” “Utility” is purely descriptive: any consistent pattern of choice can be described as maximizing a function that can be labeled “utility.” So “rational” here just means “consistent preference ordering when confronted with choices.” And so the “utility” that is maximized doesn't have to be My Money; it can be selfless devotion to charity or revolution or art or philosophy or whatever. But it's individual in the sense that it's “my” selfless devotion to charity, etc. So you can have all the other-directed emotional commitment you want in your decision-making, and as long as that decision-making is consistent, then you are rationally maximizing your utility. However, and this is the key, “rational utility” often – surreptitiously, in practice, etc. – means “selfish” utility in the sense that it maximizes my consumption of zero-sum goods. And that's a whole ‘nother kettle of fish, opening up all sorts of questions of social conflict, ecological strain, etc. It's the question of the commons as non-zero-sum (far from my getting better at philosophy depriving someone of the chance to get better at philosophy, there's a real sense in which my getting better at philosophy depends on other people getting better, and vice versa, in a “virtuous spiral”) vs consumer goods or ranked status as zero sum.

<sup>3</sup> I don't think the misanthrope or hermit is being immoral by not using this principle to guide their actions; rather they are not living as well as they could be. They would only be immoral by actively seeking encounters that spread a downfall of power to self and others (and hence producing sadness).

<sup>4</sup> The dark mirror of altruism is psychopathy, so the political theory question of security from social predators – what Kant in “Perpetual Peace” calls making a state that would work for a “race of devils” – is beyond what I can do here, but suffice it to say that the problem is real. Having sympathetic care and fair cooperation be the default setting doesn't mean disarming ourselves. In addition to Sen 1977, see Hirstein and Sifferd 2014.

<sup>5</sup> Rather than being essentialist or teleological — in which one concrete form effaces itself in its guise of a universal — the human nature concept here can only be nomological (Machery 2008), describing general outcomes for most people under loosely defined environmental situations, and without pejorative boundary-setting for those whose performance is atypical (psychopaths are human beings, after all).

<sup>6</sup> I wrote *Political Affect* before I came across Wynter, but there I sketch out Iris Marion Young's analysis of the corporealization of femininity in “Throwing Like a Girl” and describe a multiplicity of intersecting corporealization practices producing a field of “bodies politic.”

<sup>7</sup> Recall that Bergson, for one, doubts whether prosocial tendencies, which he associates with the “closed society,” could ever be expanded; it might be that a leap into another regime of political affect, an “open society” regime, is required (Lawlor 2018).

<sup>8</sup> This is not, by the way, the problem with Steven Pinker's *Better Angels* (2011), who clearly denies a basic violence drive and instead insists that we have both peaceful and violent capacities that are elicited by social circumstances. And as a good modern liberal, I endorse the changing social circumstances of mobility, cosmopolitanism, revisionist history and so on that, per Pinker's hypothesis, led to an uptick in moral investment in fairness and respect for

individuals versus old-fashioned takes on communal loyalty, authority, and purity. Rather, my issue with him is his acceptance of the CRD so that social eliciting of altruism is always scrambling to catch up with what used to be a violence orientation to our evolutionary ancestors. This results in a model in which top-down and outside-in (“internalized norms against violence”) rational frontal lobe self-control (the most important of “our better angels”) keeps limbic system emotional temptations to violence (“our inner demons”) in check. That’s fine as far as it goes, but for the most part his treatment of our better angels, although it does include empathy / sympathy, doesn’t really analyze bottom-up limbic-based emotional dispositions to sympathetic care and fair cooperation. This is compounded with other problems with Pinker: 1) his questionable methods in his analyses of pre-state violence (Ferguson 2013a and 2013b), contemporary nonstate violence, and contemporary state violence (not just death rates in war narrowly considered, but war widely considered [e.g., influenza after WWI], and the fate of condemnation to hidden slavery sweatshops and to being despair-ridden “losers” leading lives worse than death; and 2) the restricted political space in which Pinker’s Western Civilization Whig story operates.

<sup>9</sup> Hence the real struggle is between an ultra-Darwinist Evolutionary Psychology and a combination of cultural anthropology and empiricist cultural psychology. For a strong presentation of social constructivism based on the latter perspectives, see Prinz 2012.

<sup>10</sup> Now using values as tie-breakers in situations of live first-order debates is itself a matter of meta-debate, so although I know what side I’d *like* to win in both these first-order and meta-order specialist debates, I’ll stay agnostic, and simply show what’s at stake in the first-order anthropological debates. See Douglas 2015 for an overview of the “values in science” debates. Bright 2017 is also of interest.

<sup>11</sup> Note that widespread capacities that are early appearing and robust across cultures are thought to be clues to human nature as internalization via learned socialization is considered less likely than nurturing of evolved predispositions.

<sup>12</sup> See the University of Delaware Disaster Research Center (<http://www.udel.edu/DRC/>; see also the Local to Global group <http://www.local2global.info/> for case studies in Burma/Myanmar, Sudan, South Sudan, and Zimbabwe).

<sup>13</sup> Although the above is a good general framework, it needs some nuancing. Some media coverage of disasters emphasizes prosocial behavior, celebrating it as evidence of common humanity underneath “political” or “social” divisions (rarely thematized, it must be said, as “racial” or “class” divisions). However, the Katrina coverage was notable for its credulity with regard to false rumors of anti-social behavior that in retrospect were little more than shameful racial stereotypes of violent and sexually aggressive African-American males. So, it often depends on whether the “right kind” of victims of disasters is being portrayed. The extra affective charge of panic makes it more attention grabbing; in other words, we are evolutionarily primed to pay more attention to panic behavior in conspecifics than to prosocializing care and cooperation behavior, as that is the norm or default setting. This extra affective charge is used by media to elicit attention to reports that emphasize if not invent panic and anti-social behavior in disasters.

<sup>14</sup> When two tribes of primeval man, living in the same country, came into competition, if (other things being equal) the one tribe included a great number of courageous, sympathetic and

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faithful members, who were always ready to warn each other of danger, to aid and defend each other, this tribe would succeed better and conquer the other (Darwin 2004 (1871), 113).

<sup>15</sup> The anti-universalists make two major claims with regard to the penchant of the universalists to cite the Yanomamo: 1) they criticize the use of the horticultural Yanomamo as indicative of pre-State forager societies, and 2) they deny that Yanomamo warriors really did have reproductive fitness advantages [Fry 2007, 135-139].

<sup>16</sup> Recall the transition in the *Discourse on Inequality* (1997) from Rousseau's hypothetical reconstruction of savage man in the primary state of nature – the super-abundant “forest” – to the discussion of human life in the “happiest and the most lasting epoch,” after the catastrophe-induced formation of “nascent society” but before the formation of states, agriculture, slavery, and war (Appendix E). As there never were solitary primates in our line, nor was there ever a time without the sort of ecological “accidents” Rousseau invokes as the cause of our coming together, but there was arguably a time before war (though not before violence per se), what we see here is the opportunity to discuss evolution of prosociality without the assumption of universal war.

<sup>17</sup> This means foragers don't settle for cooperation simply out of the fear that not cooperating would unleash the bullies and shirkers that lurk within all of us (Gaus 2015).

<sup>18</sup> Barker 2015 thinks bullies might be expressing a developmental switch in a norm of reaction model which produces a behavior set adapted to circumstances of violent uncertainty.

<sup>19</sup> Our capacity for mutually active joyous encounters resolves the conflict of egoism and altruism as in those cases increasing my power increases yours. One of the greatest passages Spinoza ever wrote is this one from Book 4 of the *Ethics*:

Nothing is more advantageous to man than man. Men, I repeat, can wish for nothing more excellent for preserving their own being than that they should all be in such harmony in all respects that their minds and bodies should compose, as it were, one mind and one body, and that all together should endeavor as best they can to preserve their own being, and that all together they should aim at the common advantage of all. From this it follows that men who are governed by reason, that is, men who aim at their advantage under the guidance of reason, seek nothing for themselves that they would not desire for the rest of mankind; and so are just, faithful, and honorable. (E4P18s)

<sup>20</sup> One must be protected, cared for, and nurtured to reach one's potentials. I think there is a possible connection with the Sen / Nussbaum capabilities approach, but it must be “without qualification,” to ward off the implicit economic productivity and political performance orientation of Sen and Nussbaum that Eva Feder Kittay detects. That's why I go with the capacity for joy Kittay finds expressed in her daughter's life: “But I have since learned — from her, from the disability community and from my own observations — that she is capable of having a very good life, one full of joy, of love, of laughter” (Kittay 2005: 110).