

# What's New, What's Left, What's the New Left on Campus After September 11<sup>th</sup>?

DRAFT: 5 February 2002

Presented 7 February 2002 at the LSU English Department Graduate Student Conference

We've been asked to consider the impact of September 11<sup>th</sup> on academia. My impressions are gathered from my experience teaching a small seminar of 17 first-year students at LSU, my engagement with the "Progressive Student Alliance" at LSU, and a monitoring of the Internet. It should go without saying, but I'll say it anyway, since I have personal experience with right-wingers either assuming from the outset that the left "justifies" terrorism or twisting one's words to imply such "justification," that I do not, nor do any leftists of my acquaintance or whose words I read since September 11<sup>th</sup>, "justify" terrorism. I hope everyone is satisfied with this ritual and that we can proceed.

## WHAT'S NEW ON CAMPUS AFTER SEPTEMBER 11<sup>TH</sup>?

Nothing much, at least by the standards of the last ten years. It was a little more than ten years ago that our first full-blown postmodern war, the Gulf War, took place. Or didn't take place, as Baudrillard provocatively put it, since place, and the taking of it, are decidedly modern practices. Wars used to be fought, we need to be reminded, over places, for the sake of expanding imperial territories. Now they're fought for "freedom," "civilization," for the "New World Order." To make the world safe for globalization.

(Perhaps one thing that's new on campus is the appearance of an excellent work on the globalized world, Michael Hardt's and Antonio Negri's *Empire* [Harvard UP, 2000], which, while not the final word on anything ["thank the movement, comrade, the final word has appeared and we can now stop thinking and simply apply the program!"], nonetheless provides a thought-provoking set of tools for understanding the New World Order. It is also, in its relentless focus on the promises as well as the dangers of globalization, the most hopeful work of leftist thought in many years. You all should buy this book and form reading groups and/or lobby teachers to include it on syllabi: I'll do so this fall in a course called "Genealogies of Postmodernity I: The Political Economy of Globalization.")

Anyway, it seems to me that campuses had much the same reaction to Afghanistan as to the Gulf War, at least after the first days of shock and sincerely moving mourning ceremonies (although it must be said that the moving quality of the mourning was

accompanied by a strong and somewhat disturbing nationalization of the mourning: we were called to a "NATIONAL day of mourning" to mourn our "American dead": it was some ten days before any real notice was paid to the international character of the WTC death toll; the nationalization put us on a war footing and destroyed in advance the chance to cast the attacks as a crime against humanity: Jesse Helms and the "Hague Invasion Act" that forbids US involvement with the proposed International Criminal Court also playing some role here). After those first terrible days, there was some flag-waving, mostly in the form of T-shirts, some flags adorning faculty cars, and a few teach-ins, mostly by somewhat left-leaning faculty, but mostly business as usual. The poor old Association of College Trustees and Alumni, headed by Lynne Cheney, William Bennett et al., tried to drum up some outrage at the lack of patriotism displayed at these teach-ins, but all they could come up with was a list of quotes from profs saying such hair-raising things as "maybe we should try to understand why they hate us so much"; meanwhile, Bob Bennett, the smart Bennett brother, is signing on for some important work: defending the Enron executives... Actually, all in all, it may have even been a little more muted reaction than for the Gulf, pro or con, which is probably what infuriated the ACTA folks more than anything. After all, crushing the Iraqi army looked enough like WWII that even though the Gulf War (didn't) take place, it did appear on our TV screens as at least a ghost of the last good war. The bad guys had tanks and bunkers and so forth, drawn up in neat lines. So there was a little vicious thrill at the "turkey shoot" and all that carnage, a little frisson at the stats about tons of explosives (more in the first month than in all of WWII, wasn't it? That oft-cited comparison kept the ghost of "The Big One" shimmering). But ten years on, with a little practice seeing smart bombs in Kosovo, the thrill was gone. Let alone protests, was there even a victory celebration anywhere other than the studios of the pundits over the "fall" of Kabul or Kandahar or Tora Bora? Maybe muted campus reaction was really just boredom with the old technology ("dude, didn't they have these things like ten years ago?").

Or maybe it had something to do the whole thing being just so multi-cultural that it reminded everyone too much of a well-meaning Western Civ course trying to understand "the other." What was up with all those shifting allegiances anyway? Nobody seemed to have a handle on explaining the workings of bands of nomad warriors, whose allegiance is not to a nation but to a personally charismatic leader, whose allegiance in turn is not to some glorious mission to save civilization, but to getting booty for the boys, so that if the leader is bought off, then "hooray, let's turn our pick-up trucks around and let's roll with our new friends. There's a new town to take just over the next set of hills!" Forget about *1984*: Orwell's description of a totalitarian erasing of history in order to fabricate a new history doesn't fit at all. Rather, this was *Mad Max* in the post-apocalyptic barbarism of gas, guns, and young males looking for the thrill of battle. Actually, to slip in a little Western Civ, this was more like Achilles in the *Iliad*. If he had decided Agamemnon's snub was enough to have him side with the Trojans, all his boys, the bad ass Myrmidons, would have followed him, and no one

would have blinked an eye.

So even while everyone was lauding the new campus patriotism, there wasn't any dancing in the streets when the warlords took over. Maybe there will be victory celebrations when (when?) they catch Osama bin Laden, but it does seem to me that the postmodern war, with high tech air power and surrogate native troops, just doesn't catch the media-glazed eyes of today's campus kids, though they might look on in bemusement as profs work themselves into a state about the precarious position of Musharraf ("who? Some Indian dude, man, just chill ... Ask him another question: maybe he'll go off on another tangent and we won't have to discuss the *Aeneid* this class!").

All of this poses a terrible problem for Washington. When American civilians die, the nation is tremendously united, but we can't risk losing American troops for fear of a Vietnam-style backlash. But when you fight a postmodern war, everyone is bored, because nothing's really at risk. So you have to up the ante with mediatized crises: anthrax letters, shoe bombs, and so on. But that has a saturation point too, so really weird stuff, like Florida 9<sup>th</sup> graders flying planes into skyscrapers, has to be played as "Not Terrorism, No, Not At All, Don't Even Worry About It." By the way, all this handling of crisis is a purely physiological matter, as makers of horror movies know perfectly well: there's only so much adrenaline you can stand before you switch it all off - our vaunted post-modern irony and cynicism are nothing but physiological protection strategies, like a rat who pretends not to want to press the electrified bar anymore.

Two points here are relevant to understanding the patriotic campus reaction to September 11<sup>th</sup>. One is that the unity of the nation was completely predictable. The nation just IS the political unit that unites in time of war - which is why, by the way, the post-September 11<sup>th</sup> flying of the flag was not a misuse of the flag, as someone could claim it was in forcing support for Vietnam or the Gulf down everyone's throat. All flags are battlefield emblems, designed to rally the troops under attack. When we were attacked on September 11<sup>th</sup> (the "we" being the marker of our self-identification as Americans), then of course the flag had to fly.

National unity in time of attack is also why criticism of the war itself as an end, rather than criticism of the means to prosecute the war, had very little room to be launched from a citizen base. A citizen can say, "we shouldn't have this or that imperialist war as an end for our nation, because it's not essential to the protection of our sovereignty," but the very definition of a citizen is he who unites with his fellows in time of attack (and here I'm pointing to a deep patriarchal structure by deliberately using "he"). Thus any opposition to A war in response to the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks seems to me to have to be conducted from a supra-national standpoint, although I think it's clear that we as

citizens can criticize the prosecution of THIS particular war that the Administration has chosen to conduct. I hope this is clear: the difference is between ends and means. A war must be fought in response to September 11th, given the logic of the state, but it's not clear that it has to be THIS war. (The recent interest in the writings of Carl Schmitt [Chantal Mouffe et al.; Derrida's *Politics of Friendship*; Agamben's *Homo Sacer*] will only be magnified in the post 9/11 academy, as the following selection of his theses should demonstrate: the state is the Dasein of a people; the state decides on friend and foe in the concrete sense of waging war; the state can compel the individual to fight in a war; the sovereign is the one who decides on a state of emergency that suspends constitutional rights; a liberal constitution with a separation of powers even in emergency is tantamount to a challenge to the notion of sovereignty.)

The second point has to do with what Foucault called bio-power. One of the marks of modernity, Foucault claims, is that governments begin to focus on the biological base of the population: its health, its productivity, its reproduction. Hence his famous analyses of discipline as raising industrial productivity while lowering the political cost of massing workers together by individualizing them even as they are taught team-work (thus undercutting in advance Marx's hope that the socialization of production would result in the construction of the conditions for the socialization of politics) and of sexuality as the nexus of the individual biological unit and the population.

Even if the switch to post-modernity is the switch to a "control society" in Deleuze's phrase (which is not to say that disciplinary institutions have vanished, just that their function has shifted), the focus of government on biology has remained. But we've shifted production styles. Here's is where analyses of post-modernity retain all their interest. Instead of mass-producing disciplined and hence replaceable industrial workers (the Fordist / Taylorist model) we now nurture post-industrial informatized singularities: from each his or her or his/her contribution to production: swing shifts, tele-commuting, each one an entrepreneur and free agent; to each his or her or his/her micro-market niche, and to each one his or her or his/her focus group and feedback loop! Thus since now consumption is such a patriotic duty, you can contribute even as unemployed, simply by having your consumption patterns monitored, thus providing a little extra string of singularized information. ("His or her or his/her": we're not mean old prejudiced modernists anymore: we like difference! Long live difference and flux and flow! Make no mistake, there are plenty of post-modernists still around: they're just in ad agencies and HRM offices as well as in English departments, as Thomas Frank pitilessly shows in *One Market Under God*.)

Thus each singular informatized life is precious, since each life contributes his or her or his/her singularity to the intricate web of social production. Hence the heart-rending quality of the *New York Time's* mini-obits of the victims of September 11<sup>th</sup>. Hence the rage at the destruction of such irreplaceable individuals. And hence the unwillingness to risk even one soldier: not just because of the capital investment in training and

equipment (although that is a considerable factor), but also because of the singularity of each American life.

And hence, finally, the inability to relate to the Afghans as singular. Because they aren't: they haven't been nurtured by a society to become singular parts of a great informatized body politic. They're just "bare life" as Giorgio Agamben would put it, and so they can just be "collateral damage." (This is not to say that the Pentagon didn't imply that the Taliban faked civilian deaths and misled gullible foreign journalists - thank God we had Geraldo there, locked and loaded as he was, to focus our attention on the truly important story, his movements - because they did, and it's not to say US newspapers didn't intentionally downplay stories of Afghan civilian casualties, because they did - there's a "smoking gun" memo printed in the January 2002 issue of *Harper's* if you need that sort of proof -- just that all this was protection against a humanitarian reaction that is not at all clear would occur.)

## WHAT'S LEFT ON CAMPUS AFTER SEPTEMBER 11<sup>TH</sup>?

Concerning old-fashioned political categories, the right, whose slogan since the 11<sup>th</sup> might well be "leave no dead horse unflogged," has made much of two deceased equines which were disinterred from their campus burial grounds for a new round of vigorous whipping: the supposed equation of terrorism and the left and at the same time, the supposed equation of pacifism and the left. They can only do this by, on the one hand, recalling memories of the widespread left support for armed national liberation struggles in the Third World during the classic era of de-colonialization (1945-1975), as well as scattered support for the IRA, the Basques, the Red Brigades, the Baader-Meinhof gang, the Weather Underground and so on in the First World. (I will discuss the case of the Palestinians in a moment.) On the other hand, the equation of the left with pacifism rests on memories of the anti-Vietnam war movement as protesting an imperialist war, and perhaps the nuclear disarmament movement. None of these fits the case now, for first of all, Bin Laden is not a de-colonialist or a nationalist, and second of all, the fight against him is not imperialist, though it might be imperial, to borrow the terminology of Hardt and Negri's *Empire*.

To take up the first point, it's a pure slander to say bin Laden is a favorite of the left. If there's anything he is, besides simply someone who wants to control Saudi oil riches, it's a theocratic fascist, and no reading of the left, not even the most vulgar creation of a monolithic Left by the collapsing of say, Trotsky and Stalin (Stalin certainly knew the difference between himself and Trotsky, that's why he had him killed!), not even the most abstract analysis of "totalitarianism," could ever stretch it to cover those terms. About the only connection possible is a general leftist sympathy for the Palestinians, which, to repeat my opening remarks, at least as far as I can tell doesn't amount to a

"justification" of suicide bombing, reflects more of a nostalgia for the days of national liberation movements than it is a real concern for globalization theorists, who have been foretelling the growing irrelevance of nation-states not named the USA for some time now (the Europeans certainly have thrown in the towel, except for England: there'll always be an England, but if it doesn't adopt the Euro it'll be nothing more than a medieval theme park for American and Euro-tourists -- bringing up the deliciously ironic prospect that the real solution to Northern Ireland may come when Dublin, by virtue of the Euro, is finally richer than London!). But bin Laden's new-found enthusiasm for the Palestinians fools only those who want to be fooled (since when have high-placed Saudis cared anything for Palestinians? Isn't it clear that Bin Laden didn't spend the 80s fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan or most of the 90s attacking American imperial outposts to help the Palestinians?), although it certainly does help Ariel Sharon to call his provocation and intensification of the current *intifada* part of the "war on terrorism" - a decidedly non-delicious irony that throws us into the arms of the butcher of Beirut (it was the ISRAELI commission, after all, which found him "personally responsible" for the massacres at Shabra and Shatilla during the Lebanese campaign, 1982's version of the "war on terrorism").

Now it is the case that the campus left is interested in telling the tale of bin Laden's creation, as we are HISTORICAL materialists, after all. Just a reminder of what you all should know by now: the confluence in 1979 of the Soviet's sending of troops to Afghanistan (the consecrated phrase "the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan" warrants analysis: as far as I can tell, there was at least a plausible claim to be made that the Soviets were supporting the Communist government at the time), the Saudi / Pakistani / CIA connection in creating and supporting the Islamic fundamentalists of which bin Laden was one (often said to be with the hopes of unsettling the Muslim regions of the USSR), the Iranian revolution against the Shah (after the 1953 CIA-supported coup against Mossadegh), and so on, including the creation of Saddam Hussein in Iraq in the 70s, the funding of him in the Iran - Iraq war of the 80s, and the Persian Gulf War, with its stationing of US troops in Saudi Arabia and the bombing and blockade of Iraq ...

Let's pause for a moment to consider this newly popular pseudo-question: why didn't Bush the Elder depose Saddam Hussein in 1991? Anyone familiar with the general interests of empires in having unstable borders (or did you ever wonder why the Brits constructed Afghanistan as the particular collection of minorities it contains? Do you think it might have had something to do with destabilizing the borders for the Turks and the Russians?) or with the particular interests of Saudi Arabia in having a Sunni buffer between themselves and the Shiites of Iran, or with the desire of the Saudi royal family to have a pretext for American troops on their soil ("it's to keep us safe from that madman Saddam Hussein, you know, it has absolutely nothing to do with protection from internal dissidents like, for instance, Osama bin Laden ..." ) should recognize why this is now and always was a pseudo-question.

To return to our history lesson, all the above needs to be discussed before we even broach the subject of the creation of the modern Saudi state by the Brits in the 30s, the unholy alliance of Wahabist fundamentalism and petrodollars in the royal family, the many connections of the current Bush administration via entities like the Carlyle group to the royals, despite its sponsoring of Wahab movements all across the world, not to mention the 12-15 hijackers of September 11<sup>th</sup> - stop me when you've had enough! (If only this were a DEAD horse I'm flogging -- unfortunately, it's got all too much life in it ...).

So the campus left has plenty to gain by exposing the public record here, but this is a tale of "blowback" (a CIA term, not a leftist term!), not of "payback," which raises the specter of moral equivalence. Which is why, of course, the media could never make this elementary distinction between the amoral and technical analysis of chains of conditions ("blowback") and the stupid moralizing assignment of blame for causes ("payback"). (Judith Butler has an excellent discussion of the difference between conditions and causes in the online journal *Theory & Event*.)

The real question here is not who is to blame, or whether they were justified in doing what they did, but how do suicide killers do what they do? There's a long history that testifies to the ability of many men (another patriarchal structure) to engage in rage-fueled killing, in which the killer works himself into a beserker frenzy and kills whatever moves close by, and a barely less long history of cold-blooded killing from a technologically-mediated distance (the difference between the frenzy of the sword, axe, and spear versus the coolness of the bow and arrow), but what is much less common is the cold-blooded short-range suicide killer, who has either to blend in with a crowd or pilot a plane, neither of which can be done in a beserker frenzy. How do the bodies of suicide killers keep their cool? It's easy to denounce terrorism, but a lot harder to understand the physiology of it.

Speaking of war, then, the other side of the bellicose and terrorist campus left is the allegedly pacifist campus left. But here it bears repeating that the left has never been absolutely pacifist. In fact, as Christopher Hitchens would be happy to tell you, the left has always been in the forefront of the fight against fascism. After all, the Abraham Lincoln Brigade in the Spanish Civil War is one of the founding myths of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century left (the young Noam Chomsky wrote his first published piece on them), as is the French Communist Party as the vanguard of the Resistance against Vichy and the Nazis (they called themselves the "*parti des fusilés*": the party of the executed ones). Finally, there are many things to denounce about Stalin, and many leftists have done so, but helping to win WWII is not one of them.

Now there are many leftists who might question the means but not the ends of "war on terrorism." (I'm one of them.) But such questioning is hardly confined to the left, as

reading the floor speeches of someone like the libertarian Republican from Texas, Ron Paul, or the columns of William Safire, make clear. If the ends are to neutralize bin Laden in the short term, stabilize the region in the mid-term, and reform the global situation in the long term, then the left as well as the right can agree. That the means chosen by the Administration to pursue that end include turning loose the bombers, thereby killing thousands of Afghans as "collateral damage," bringing Pakistan and India to the brink of war, and still not capturing bin Laden or his side-kick Omar, then maybe we should have listened to Colin Powell and Tony Blair to start with ("the stiletto and not the sledgehammer"), and come up with a new war paradigm. This is increasingly clear to many on the right as well; for instance, see David Hackworth, who can recognize that the warlords are just using US bombers to settle old scores, as the infamous bombing of the car and truck caravan heading to the inauguration in Kabul shows. "Mission creep" and "learning the lesson of Vietnam" are as much right-wing critiques of the Wolfowitz - Cheney - Rumsfeld group as they are left critiques.

## WHAT'S THE NEW LEFT ON CAMPUS AFTER SEPTEMBER 11<sup>TH</sup>?

Probably the reason for the disinterring of that poor old nag "postmodernism" was a nostalgic recollection of its utility as a way to get at the left. Stanley Fish even got called out of the dean's office in order to defend it in the *New York Times*. Now if there's any sign that your disruptive movement has achieved dead horse status, it's got to be appearing on the Op-Ed page of the *NYT*!

To understand the sudden flare-up of interest in the alleged evils of po-mo we have to remember a real golden oldie, "political correctness." Let's go back in time all the way to the early 90s. After the end of the Cold War, the right needed a new villain, since the "international communist conspiracy" seemed to have run out of steam as a rallying cry for the John Birchers, and there was a need to remind Christian right-wingers why they should have anything to do with anti-Communists and free-marketers in the first place (the "big tent" of the Republican Party was getting pretty stretched out by then, with no more Reagan charisma remaining to keep it all in place). Remembering that in the 60s there used to be something called the New Left, which proposed culture as an important area for political analysis and action, the right decided to cook up a menace to free thought right here at home, on our college campuses, as "tenured radicals" in league with resentful feminists, uppity blacks, ungrateful Chicanos and Asians, and pushy gays (am I leaving anyone out?), started destroying America by teaching "deconstructionism" and proposing speech codes and otherwise making "our children" feel "uncomfortable" in the classroom when all they were doing was stating their "opinion"!

Leaving alone the fact that even the most widely whipped of PC dead horses, the



Antioch code, largely amounted to a plea for people to speak with each other while having sex ("can I do this?" "would you like it if I did that?"), and leaving alone the fact that what's sacred in America is the right to voice an opinion, not to have that opinion go unchallenged, the most amazing thing to me about the PC era is that it lasted as long as it did, or that people thought to transfer the situations at small progressive liberal arts colleges to large state universities. I didn't come to LSU until 1994, a bit after the height of the PC hysteria, but I can assure you that since then more first-year students have known how to denounce PC than ever would have dared confront a racist or sexist comment from one of their peers.

This scene is all so confused it's hard to know where to start, but let's say that probably the only people more worried about French theory in the academy than the right was the Old Left, who, in the guise of Fredric Jameson and David Harvey, played up the menace of that most dastardly of villains, the French intellectual. There wasn't such a denunciation of that scourge of right-thinking Anglo common sense, the fiendishly clever Left-bank café-dweller, since Edmund Burke lashed out at the social engineers of the Revolution. Anyway, this all is better suited to a retrospective than a report on today's campus, so let me ask what's an old New Leftie like me, an academic post-structuralist leftist, or in my preferred terms, a historical-libidinal complex geo-materialist to do after September 11th? Well, I'd say pretty much the same thing I've always done: teach classes, write articles, organize networks interweaving each of these terms.

**HISTORICAL:** genealogies of modernity and postmodernity: or, against the "clash of civilizations" (when posed as the dynamic West versus stagnant Islam). I would propose we study the Atlantic slave trade as a turning point in the European vs Arab world history, as it then led to the industrialization of England using super-profits from New World slavery. Following that, the 19<sup>th</sup> century shift of European attention from the New World to Asian and African colonization, bringing the Morocans, Tunisians, and Algerians under the French, the Libyans under the Italians, and the Egyptians under the British. The Sykes-Picot Agreement and the breakup of the Ottoman Empire after WWI: Lebanon and Syria to the French, Palestine and Iraq to the British. The Balfour Declaration and the splitting of the radical Jewish movement between Zionism and international Communism. The post WWII breakup of the British Empire: Israel and the "partition" of India and Pakistan, which left Kashmir as the wound in both their sides (to indulge a little more "body politic" talk.) The replacement of British by American patronage of the Saudis. The role of the Americans in playing the Pakistanis and Indians off against each other in the creation of Bangladesh. And so on up to 1979, which we talked about a few minutes ago.

**LIBIDINAL:** "bodies and pleasures" as Foucault once said, but also bodies and rages, panics, highs, depressions, patriotism, "power of pride," and so on. Short term: How did the hijackers keep their cool? Remember the horrible slight bank to the left of the

second WTC plane just before impact. Pilots testified to the delicacy of maneuver needed in the swirling winds of downtown Manhattan. Long term: we mentioned New World agriculture: what about the new body of Euro-American capitalism: the sugared, nicotined, and caffeinated body capable of long concentration (materialization of the Protestant Ethic thesis). (See Mintz, *Sugar and Power*.) That coffee was coded as Turkish might suggest that while the Turks may not have militarily taken Vienna, that the caffeinization of the beer-soaked German body amounted to an Islamization of the German body politic in other ways (here Schivelbusch, *Tastes of Paradise*). (Another interchange of Islamic and European genealogies.) "Diet as politics by other means" to mangle Clausewitz: something to think about in the struggles against McWorld: Jose Bove and the French "anti-malbouffe" movement, the turnaround that results in obesity being a disease of poverty in the US, while fat is still a feminist issue, the dropping of PopTarts on Afghanistan, and so forth.

A side note: informatizing singular lives in a web of social production doesn't remove their biological status; rather it heightens the feeling of belonging to a body politic, with a stress on the "body": hence the urge to give blood in the immediate shock of the 11<sup>th</sup>. Not only had individuals been wounded, but our nation had too. Now it had to be clear quite quickly that the pint of blood one gave in Baton Rouge would never get to a vein in New York or Washington, but that didn't diminish the felt need to give. (There are also no doubt heavy Christian overtones here about giving of one's body and blood to save others.) There was also a lot of money spent as well: flows of blood, flows of money in response to flows of flame and concrete, the hope for life and the certainty of death locked into a horrible exchange.

COMPLEX: global capitalism as a self-organizing system. Braudel and Wallerstein on capitalism as always already a "world-system." Marx on the creation of the world market as the tendency of capitalism. Formal vs real subsumption as the turn from modernity to postmodernity. The breakdown of Bretton Woods in the early 70s leading to currency speculation, global capital flows, the IMF and World Bank as disciplinary tools, the de-industrialization of the First, and now the Second World ("what's that, Mr. Perot? A new giant sucking sound as jobs flee those pampered Mexican workers for China?"), info-networks allowing just-in-time production and "flexible accumulation," the informatizing and singularizing effects of First World biopower, the search for traditional patriarchies to ensure female sweatshop labor, the mixup of geography: the Third World is in North Baton Rouge! Or simply Louisiana compared to Connecticut? Without forgetting, of course, the glee of the techno-market right (e.g. Kevin Kelly of *Out of Control* fame and the *Wired* crowd) in adopting complexity jargon: recently, and completely, skewered by Thomas Frank in *One Market Under God*.

GEO-MATERIALIST: using complexity theory to show the same processes at work in geology and society: strata, territories, plateaus ... Deleuze and Guattari's *A Thousand Plateaus* as the great work of our time, uniting the sciences of complexity and the

political economy of globalization, the two genealogies of postmodernity.