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Class notes: not for citation in any publication!

I'd like to express my gratitude to Dan Smith of Purdue University, for letting me see his superb lecture notes on Difference and Repetition, to which these lectures are greatly indebted.

Spring 2007: The Major Works of Gilles Deleuze

Third day lecture: 5 Feb 2007: Chapter 2 of DR

Difference and Repetition is not just Genesis and Structure but also Being and Time. Chapter 2 is about repetition and time.

1. First part of the chapter is the three syntheses of time.
2. Then recap or repetition of them in Freud.
3. Then forecast of Ch 4 and 5: differential systems
4. Then Plato and simulacra

1. THREE SYNTHESSES OF TIME

- A. Hume and habit: living present
- B. Bergson and memory: pure past
- C. Kant and the pure and empty form of time: the future

Each of these syntheses will determine the others:

- A. the living present retains [past] and expects [future]
- B. the pure past allows the passage of the present and hence opens the way for the future
- C. the pure and empty form of time: present is effaced and past is mere condition of action

FIRST SYNTHESIS: HABIT: beneath active syntheses (thought) are passive syntheses (sensation) and beneath passive syntheses are

organic syntheses (biological function). There are thousands of repetitive cycles that compose our organic being: from long cycles of puberty and menopause to monthly cycles to daily cycles (circadian rhythms) to heart beats, breathing cycles, etc. Habit forms a living present that synthesizes the retention of the past and the anticipation of the future: the "heritage" of the organic history of life and the "faith" that things will repeat in the ways we are used to (that another breath will come: cf. the uncanny experience of the vigil and the death rattle or "respiratory distress" – "was that the last breath"?). There is a "contemplative soul" that "watches over" each organic synthesis, each variable present, the limits of which are set by fatigue. There is also a "larval subject" that draws satisfaction from each organic synthesis.

Two forecasts: 1) We see here a sketch of three synthesis of AO: connective-production, disjunctive-recording, and conjunctive-consumption. 2) Also the concern with rhythm which we will see in the "refrain" plateau of ATP.

Connection with the work of Arthur Winfree:

From a very nice obit by Steven Strogatz (author of *Synch*):

<http://www.siam.org/news/news.php?id=289>

Collective Synchronization

Winfree's first paper [4] concerned the mutual synchronization of biological oscillators. How is it that thousands of neurons or fireflies or crickets can suddenly fall into step with one another, all firing or flashing or chirping at the same time, without any leader or signal from the environment? Winfree studied the nonlinear dynamics of a large population of weakly coupled limit-cycle oscillators.

From *Synch*, p. 47: coupled oscillators are like two joggers on a track shouting instructions to each other: "speed up!" "slow down!"

From *Wikipedia*: A "limit-cycle" is a closed [trajectory](#) in [phase space](#) having the property that at least one other trajectory spirals into it. In other words, it's an attractor.

http://necsi.org/community/wiki/index.php/Main_Page

... the oscillators remain incoherent, each running near its natural frequency, until a certain threshold is crossed. Then the oscillators begin to synchronize spontaneously.

(The effect is somewhat like the outbreak of synchronous applause after a magnificent concert.) Winfree pointed out that this phenomenon is strikingly reminiscent of a thermodynamic phase transition, but with a twist: The oscillators align in time, not space.

This deep analogy has since been explored by many statistical physicists interested in non-equilibrium phase transitions ... Winfree's work on coupled oscillators provided one of the first tractable examples of a self-organizing system. It began as a problem in biology but has had a major impact on dynamical systems theory and statistical physics.

This “deep analogy” is the heart of “complexity theory”: are there deep mathematical similarities between self-organizing behaviors of systems in widely varying fields? Note that this is NOT a “biological metaphor”! It’s irrelevant that Winfree discovered this through biology and that others found the same thing in physics (and others in social systems?). That’s just a historical accident about the order of discovery. The similarity in the order of being is what’s important. This is what Deleuze calls an Idea in DR and a diagram of an abstract machine in ATP.

OR is it an accident that Winfree was working in biology? Is it that biology is particularly “close” to the virtual / plane of consistency?

Stopping a Biological Clock

Perhaps the most surprising of Winfree's discoveries is that biological clocks can be stopped by relatively mild perturbations. The claim is that a stimulus of appropriate timing and duration can drive the clock to a "phase singularity," roughly analogous to a biological North Pole at which all the phases of the cycle converge and the rhythm's amplitude vanishes.

In the “biological North Pole” we see what Deleuze will call the Body without Organs. (Full BwO as catatonia in AO vs empty BwO in ATP).

Winfree's work here changed the way we think about biological rhythms and arrhythmias. Subsequent studies (reviewed in [5]) have shown that mild perturbations can also quench other kinds of biological oscillations, including breathing rhythms, neural pacemaker oscillations, and the human circadian rhythm of body temperature, in each case by driving them to a phase singularity. Such findings may ultimately have medical relevance for disorders involving the loss of a biological rhythm, such as sudden infant death or certain types of cardiac arrhythmias.

In any case, these discoveries would not have occurred if Winfree hadn't introduced topological ideas into the study of biological rhythms. His work here went beyond

mathematical modeling; it showed that mathematics can play a genuinely heuristic, predictive role in biological inquiry.

Phase Singularities in Space: Spiral Waves and Scroll Waves

After 1972 much of Winfree's work concerned propagating waves of activity in excitable media. He focused on a chemical system, the Belousov-Zhabotinsky reaction, which has many qualitative similarities to nerve tissue, heart muscle, and other biological excitable media. The virtue of the BZ reaction is that the activity patterns are visible, appearing as bright blue waves of oxidation spreading through an orange sea of quiescent, reduced reagent.

Here we see what Deleuze calls “forced movements” in DR.

In 1972 Winfree discovered experimentally that thin layers of BZ reagent could display self-sustained rotating spiral waves [6]. Ever since, this example of pattern formation has fascinated researchers in applied mathematics, physics, chemistry, cardiology, and several branches of biology. Other examples of spiral waves have been found in heart tissue (where they are associated with tachycardias and other arrhythmias, thus accounting for much of the applied interest in spiral waves); in aggregation patterns of slime mold (a key example in developmental biology); in surface catalysis; and in calcium dynamics in cells.

Much of the motivation for Winfree's work on spiral and scroll waves came from cardiology. He spent the latter half of his career trying to crack the mystery of cardiac fibrillation, the arrhythmia that causes sudden cardiac death. He believed that it might be an essentially three-dimensional phenomenon, with the scroll waves playing a pernicious role in disrupting the heart's normal electrical rhythm.

Art Winfree changed the way we think about several entire subfields of science, ranging from coupled oscillators and circadian rhythms to chemical waves and cardiac arrhythmias. Although he was not a mathematician in the conventional sense, his work was always influenced by mathematical ideas, often of a topological nature, and his brilliant intuitions repeatedly opened new lines of mathematical investigation.

Here's a great line of Winfree's that is exactly the same as what Deleuze says in Chapter 3 about learning:

Of the many things he taught me, the most valuable was a lesson about how to do science. Just before we started working together, he wrote me a long letter with a list of dozens of unsolved problems, fun things he thought we could work on together. Most of them were way over my head, but he anticipated that and told me not to worry. The important thing, he said, was for us to choose a problem that "irrationally grips you (and me) by the imagination, else nothing remarkable can be expected to happen."

SECOND SYNTHESIS: MEMORY: We have to posit a second synthesis of time within which the first occurs. While habit is the foundation of time, memory is the ground of time. Memory is that which causes the present to pass. With the second synthesis we move from the living present to the pure past.

Bergson is one of D's most intimate resources. Duration or *durée* is psychological at first in *Time and Free Will*. Duration versus space. But Bergson develops an ontological view of duration. In *Matter and Memory* it will be associated with memory and in *Creative Evolution* with life.

What is duration? It is qualitative multiplicity: it is indivisible, or better, divisible only with qualitative change. It is heterogeneity or continuous variation. One image is the experience of melody: the melody is the process of the notes interpenetrating each other: the past growing with each new note passing into it and each new note changing the past with its addition. Each note comes from an indeterminate or free future.

Bergson distinguishes three forms of memory: habit-memory, representation-memory, and pure memory. Habit-memory and representation-memory are "image" memories, but pure memory is without image. Habit-memories are at the basis of sensory-motor mechanisms and are oriented to action, to utility for life. Representation-memories are dated personal memories. The construction of a habit-memory allows us to learn a poem by heart, while recall of representation-memories allows us to remember the specific times we sat down to learn the poem.

Pure memory is the key. While a recollection actualizes the past, pure memory IS the past. The past survives as a whole; it "presses" forward to gain access to the present as actualized in a recollection. Here pure memory inhabits present perception.

Duration as memory: the pure past, which has never been lived, is virtual. The virtual is not the possible. The possible is simply the image of the real, the real minus existence. While the possible is realized, the virtual is actualized. It is pure difference in itself (we will

see in Chapter 4 how the Idea is a pure differential structure or multiplicity) and its actualizations are divergent lines of creation.

Deleuze says the passive synthesis of memory constitutes the pure past presupposed by re-presentations of past, that is, active recollections.

The pure past is paradoxical:

- 1) Contemporaneousness of past w/ present that it was: each present has a past aspect; the present is "already" past, allowing for a smooth "passage" of the present to the past: the present has to be able to slip away; it can't be "greedy" and stay around forever.
- 2) Coexistence of all of past with new present: the past accumulates in an "archive" (James Williams) that exists in itself but is also contracted by the present: we are our history.
- 3) Pre-existence of pure past relative to passing present: there has to be a pure past for there to be the experience of the past. That is, for us to re-call something from the past, to re-present it to ourselves, it has to be "already" there, "before" we re-present it. In other words, active synthesis presupposes passive synthesis.
- 4) The cone: destiny: sign of present as passage to the limit: the present is the point of contraction of the past, the whole of which "insists" as virtual, as an infinity of levels of contraction and relaxation of duration. This is ontological plurality: the world is a multiplicity of durations. Matter is tendency toward relaxation of duration, with the end point being space as external succession of instants (remember that duration is the interpenetration of indivisible moments). Mind or spirit is tendency toward concentration or condensation of other rhythms of duration into its own duration.

Deleuze on p. 84 puts it as opposition of two kinds of repetition: Material repetition as contraction into a living present of successive instants vs "spiritual" repetition as repetition of the Whole on different co-existing levels. Spiritual repetition = passive synthesis of the pure

past. We can contract a level of the past into the present only if the past is a whole, an infinity of levels of contraction of duration.

The most relaxed level of duration is space or matter; the most condensed is contraction of the whole into the present of understanding, when your duration contracts the greatest number of other durations into itself.

While the passive syntheses are sub-representative, they can be lived as Proustian involuntary memory. Combray appears in the form of a past that never was present. Eros is the trigger of pure or involuntary memory.

THIRD SYNTHESIS: PURE AND EMPTY FORM OF TIME:

THE FRACTURED "I" OR *JE FÉLÉ*. In Chapter 4 Deleuze poses three aspects of "sufficient reason," the undetermined, the determinable, and the determined. Here in Chapter 2's discussion of the third synthesis of time, we find that Descartes has three aspects: determination (I think) and undetermined existence (I am) becomes determined (I am a thinking substance).

For Descartes, the subject is a substance, a thinking substance.

Kant adds time as the form in which the undetermined is determinable. The subject is no longer determined as a substance, but is split into transcendental activity [I think as transcendental ego] and empirical passivity [I am represented to myself as a thinking thing in time and space {empirical ego}].

CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON

WHAT IS KANT'S PROJECT?

Standard reading: Epistemology: relation of subject and object

Heideggerian reading: Ontology: critique of subjectivity as

fundamental ontology: we must understand transcendental

subjectivity to understand Being, that is, (our experience of) reality. Remember the definition of “transcendental”: method for searching for universal and necessary conditions for possible experience. Deleuze shows that the opposition is no longer appearance and essence, so that the other of thought is the spatial body in which the soul is captured, but apparition and conditions of apparition, so that the other of thought is time in the soul itself.

FOUR IMPORTANT "FACULTIES" OF THE SUBJECT

- 1.[theoretical] reason:
 - a. drive to complete series of judgments
 - b. such completion is an IDEA of totality
 - c. re: the drive of reason: cf. pleasure at finding laws [CJ 187]
- 2.understanding:
 - a. spontaneity
 - b. conceptual ordering: categories as universal predicates of any object – as “aspects” of any object, as senses of “to be”: any object is a *unity*, is a *multiplicity*, and is a *totality*; it is *real*, it excludes what it is *not* [it *negates*] and hence is *limited*; it is a *substance*; it is *caused*; and is a *reciprocal* cause of other things; it is *possible* or impossible; it is *really* existent or not; it is *necessary* or contingent.
 - c. rehabilitation of understanding from empiricism: not just habit
- 3.sensibility:
 - a. receptivity
 - b. openness to alterity
 - c. rehabilitation from rationalist degradation as confused thought
- 4.imagination: synthesis of the sense manifold
 - Reproductive imagination: forms images
 - Productive imagination: determination of space-time

LIMITATIONS ENFORCED BY CRITICAL REASON

- 1.theoretical reason has only regulative role in guiding understanding
- 2.understanding can only order sense manifold
- 3.sense is only appearance, not thing in itself

Knowledge or experience is thus a production: sensory manifold is shaped by forms of intuition (space as form of outer sense and time as form of inner sense) and then ordered by schematized categories (understanding plus imagination). The problem is how to connect the understanding, which has logical structure, taken from table of judgments, with the sensory manifold (which appears in the forms of space and time).

The solution is that the categories of the understanding are “schematized” [= “temporalized”] by transcendental imagination. The schema is a procedure for producing an image for a concept; it’s a “rule of production” for determining space and time so that we can recognize something as an instance of a concept. Now the categories produce the form of a concept as the “transcendental object” or object = x, what Deleuze will call “any object whatsoever” [*l’objet quelconque*]; the transcendental object is the intelligible correlate of receptivity [it’s the condition for empirical understanding’s grasp of objects, just as space and time as forms of intuition are the condition of sensation]. The transcendental or “pure” schematism makes the various categories [aspects of any object whatsoever] into determinations of time [schematized or temporalized substance = “permanence of the real in time ... as abiding while all else changes”; cause = “succession of the manifold, in so far as that succession is subject to a rule,” and so on {A 143-144 / B 183}].

The imagination, which produces the schematism, is thus a bridge or mediation between spatio-temporal sensation and logical categories. There are three syntheses of the Transcendental Imagination: apprehension [succession of sensations] and reproduction [retention / gathering], which are syntheses of space and time, and recognition [determination of the form of a concept {“any object whatsoever” / object = x} by a synthesized “block” of space-time sensations]. All this conditions an empirical synthesis: “this is a house.” The Transcendental Imagination is what’s behind the TUA, “the unity of thought of a manifold in general.” [Apperception is the reflection on the unity achieved in an act of perception.]

So we have the TUA as the formal / transcendental unity of the subject [condition of *unified* experience] and the object = x as the formal / transcendental unity of the object [condition of *orderly*

experience]; per Kant's transcendental idealism, the T subject is ultimately responsible for the T object [this is what is developed in German Idealism].

RESULTS:

1.no more rationalist metaphysics: reason cannot yield knowledge by seducing understanding to apply categories to mere ideas

2.no more empiricist skepticism: freedom is thinkable [not knowable]

DELEUZE: Time is the form of inner sense. It is a "pure and empty" form; it is no longer number of motion (of heavenly bodies moving in a circle); it is no longer subordinated to nature. It has become form of intuition, time in and for itself; time "unrolls" from a circle into a straight line. As a pure form, everything is presented "in" time: this gives us the "empirical reality" of time as "the real form of inner intuition." But nothing is presented "as" time. The empirical reality of time is not that of an "object," but is "the mode of representation of myself as object" (CPR A 37/ B 54). Thus although time has empirical reality, we must also acknowledge the "transcendental ideality" of time, for "if we abstract from the subjective conditions of sensible intuition, time is nothing ..." (A36 / B 52).

Deleuze doesn't enter this level of detail in DR, but he does in his lectures. Compare with Heidegger in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* (who also accuses Kant of backing away from the radicality of the A Deduction). Deleuze focuses on the syntheses of apprehension, reproduction, and recognition in the A Deduction, proposed by Kant as "the pure transcendental synthesis of imagination as conditioning the very possibility of all experience" (A 102). The transcendental imagination, as we have seen, is also responsible for the schematism, in which the form of time is that which bridges the manifold of intuition and the categories of the understanding.

For Deleuze, Kant's locating of the pure and empty form of time in the transcendental synthesis of imagination is the discovery of transcendental difference, an internal difference yielding an a priori

relation between thought and being. Kant has both activity and receptivity on both empirical and transcendental levels: empirical sensation [receptivity], imagination, and understanding [spontaneity] conditioned by transcendental forms of intuition and understanding [categories] as well transcendental imagination [synthesis and schematism].

In Kantian self affection as interpreted by Deleuze, we find that I cannot directly determine [I think] the undetermined myself [I am] as a thinking thing [the determined or the Cartesian subject as substance].

Rather, the form of time intervenes as the form of the determinable, so that "I can only *represent* the spontaneity of my act of thinking." Representation involves the machinery of reception and synthesis we've seen above: thus I can only affect myself as receiving my spatio-temporally located acts of thinking and empirically synthesizing them as an empirical object, as the empirical ego. But since this empirical level is conditioned by a transcendental level, this means that we have split the subject: it is no longer a substance. It is split between the transcendental and empirical levels and it is split at each level, between passivity/receptivity and activity/spontaneity. Now the key is that self-affection moves between transcendental activity and empirical passivity.

Thus, we find the passive self (*moi*): an empirical / phenomenal subject in which events of thought and sensation occur in time [which I empirically represent to myself by synthesizing {spontaneity} the manifold of internal sense reports {receptivity – and remember that time is the form of inner sense} as the empirical ego] and its condition, the transcendental ego (*je*): an active thinking subject which synthesizes time but whose activity cannot be represented as occurring in time. Thus correlated with the passive self is the fractured I (*je fêlé*): the pure and empty form of time (the synthesis of time by the transcendental ego) cracks the I, so that the spontaneity of "I think" is the affection of the passive self. I can only represent the spontaneity of my thought to myself as that of another. (cf Ch 1: "schizophrenia in principle" of thought [58 / 82]). Thought happens in me; "I" as the empirical ego is only the place where thought [as transcendental activity] happens.

Kant's failed breakthrough. The unity of the Cartesian cogito is guaranteed by the unity of God. When Kant outlaws speculative knowledge of God, there is a rebound effect leading to the fractured I. The transcendental difference between the fractured I and passive self, which founds the Copernican Revolution and forbids speculative knowledge or "metaphysics" thus implies the speculative death of God, but Kant turns back to give practical resurrection to God and the I, and even in the speculative realm, a new form of identity comes to supplement the fractured I, that is, active synthetic unity of the TUA. Deleuze will reject the Kantian restriction of synthesis to the active "I think" and the relegation of the passive self to receptivity, instead investigating passive synthesis.

2. PLATONIC REMINISCENCE. This is not really the introduction of time into thought, but rather the introduction of movement into the soul. In the *Phaedo*, Plato has Socrates argue that we must have a prior knowledge of "absolutes" (Ideas: equality, beauty, goodness, justice, etc.) in order to see that the equality, etc. we sense among sensed objects is not up to the level of absolute equality, etc. (74 B-75 D). This prior knowledge has to be acquired before birth, but then lost at birth and only afterward recovered. Learning (*mathēsis*) thus is "recollection" or "reminiscence" (*anamnēsis*) (76A).

[The context is the argument for the pre-existence of souls prior to birth leading to the argument for survival of souls after death. But "soul" = *psychē* and is a principle of life / motion rather than a personalized substance.]

We must concentrate when we read the Phaedo on the interaction between Socrates and Simmias / Cebes. This is not a treatise on the soul, but a dialogue in which Socrates addresses himself to the needs and wishes of his interlocutors. The stories he tells (61e) are directed to these two, and to the others present. Twice S will advise his interlocutors to find charms to charm away the fear of death (77e & 114d). Can we not read the entire dialogue in this light? That is, that the stories S tells here are his gift to his friends, beautiful charms that will calm their fears of death and make up for their evident lack of philosophical attunement? That S admits his own interest in convincing them (91e) only makes this seem less than ever like a sober, "rational," "disinterested," "objective," and so on treatise.

For Deleuze, the pure past of the Ideas still has the form of a present, and is still relative to the re-presentation that it grounds, in that it retains and elevates the principles of representation: identity and resemblance. We thus have a circle of time that makes the soul move. What we need is the thought of the caesura as pure and empty form of time.

3. PURE AND EMPTY FORM OF TIME AS ORDER, TOTALITY AND SERIES:

a. order of before and after: break or fracture of the I. Hamlet's formula is "the time is out of joint." D links "joint" with cardinality as measure: 24 hours in a day as rotation of the earth (time as "number of movement" [*arithmos kinēseos*] is Aristotle's formula). {Oedipus wanders on the line of time rather than the cyclical time of Aeschylean tragedy [which is also a "divine comedy" of rehabilitation and restoration.]} The caesura however establishes only an order of time, breaking the circle so that beginning and end no longer coincide. {The caesura as intervention of Tiresias or sea voyage of Hamlet.} Instead of time being the measure of movement, it is a pure form, the unmoving form of change. This is the fracture of the I we saw above with Kant (the synthesis of time by T imagination vs the representation of the empirical ego in time).

b. totality: symbolic image of caesura as unique / tremendous event that draws totality of time together as before and after the event. Symbol as *sym-bolein*, as putting together (broken coin as symbol.) Everything is oriented to the event (cf. the BC and AD system).

c. series: the caesura, establishes the three dimensions of time:

- i. Lived in past: act is "too big for me";
- ii. Present of metamorphosis: becoming-equal to the act: doubling of self and projection of ideal self equal to the act.
- iii. Future: self smashed to piece by coherence of event and act

4. REPETITION AS ETERNAL RETURN: D now pulls everything together to show that the caesura enacts repetition as the future of the ER. Repetition is not a historical fact, but the condition of action. Repetition as the third meaning of time takes the form of the eternal return. Everything that exists as a unity will not return, only that which

differs-from-itself. "Difference inhabits repetition." (DR 76). So, while habit was the time of the present, and memory the being of the past, repetition as the eternal return is the time of the future.

RECAP: the three syntheses of time (93 / 125)

Habit / living present: passive foundation on which past and future depended

Memory / pure past: ground causes passing of present and arrival of another

Caesura / future: present is effaced and past is mere condition of action

REPETITION and the three syntheses

Present is the repeater: content and foundation of time

Past is repetition itself: ground of time

Future is that which is repeated: order of time, totality of series, final end of time

LONG SECTION ON FREUD IS TOO COMPLEX FOR US HERE. IT'S A BIT OF A TOUR DE FORCE, A SHOWING OFF FOR THE COMMITTEE.

DIFFERENTIAL SYSTEMS [forecast of Chapters 4 and 5) (116-126 / 153-165).

Here D lays out a key concept: pure difference or difference in itself must be the difference between series of differences. D's term here is "the differentiator of difference" (116 / 153).

5) Organization in series of differential intensities

6) These series communicate in relating differences to differences: differentiator

1. Coupling
 2. Resonance
 3. Forced movement
- 7) Many differential systems: physical, biological, social, aesthetic, philosophical
- B. Pure spatio-temporal dynamisms (118 / 155)
- 1) Experienced only at the borders of the livable: embryos
 - 2) Thought can only be sustained by a larval subject (not a Cartesian cogito)
- C. The dark precursor: the "disparate" [= "different / disappearing"] (119 / 156)
- 1) Must be purely differential: must avoid temptation to require resemblance of series
 - 2) Conceals itself and its functioning, conceals true nature of difference
 1. This concealment gives rise to inevitable illusions of identity and resemblance
 2. Thus precursor has no place other than that from which it is "missing"; object = x
 3. Perpetual displacement / disguise
- D. Examples of literary systems (121 / 158)
- 1) Roussel
 - 2) Joyce
 - 3) Proust
- E. The refrain and the nonsense word (122 / 160)
- 1) Cf. Jean-Jacques Lecercle, Deleuze and Language.
- F. Chaos and cosmos (123 / 161)

This is an important section that wraps up the first part of the book. Chaos is "depth" or the virtual. It is realm of co-existing and simultaneously unfolding divergent series (contra Leibniz in which God chooses the world as convergent or compossible series). Cf. Dan Smith's Introduction to *Essays Critical and Clinical*.

This chaos of divergent series or "stories" has to be seen as positive (remember D's critique of forced choice between form and chaos as indifference) and the divergence as an object of affirmation (rather than resigned acceptance of our "finitude").

The totality of the system as unity of divergent series "corresponds to

the objectivity of a ‘problem’”. This is very important: “problems” are not subjective barriers, but the way the world is structured.

Here we see that presents can succeed one another and yet co-exist symbolically relative to a pure or virtual past. Examples from Freud and Proust.

P. 125: transition to discussion of simulacra via notion of ER: “if all series co-exist, then it is no longer possible to regard one as originary and the other as derived.”

ER is “groundless ‘law’ of this system.” “derived from world of pure difference.”

MONEY QUOTE: “IF DIFFERENCE IS THE IN-ITSELF, THEN REPETITION IN THE ETERNAL RETURN IS THE FOR-ITSELF OF DIFFERENCE.”

Three relations of ER and the “same.”

1. subject of ER is the different, dissimilar, many, chance
2. same and similar are effects of ER: identity is retrojected onto originary difference. Identity is “simulated.” Identity is now not error but “illusion.” (Cf. Kant).
3. ER is “the same of the different, the one of the multiple, the resemblant of the dissimilar.”

II. Plato and simulacra (126-128 / 165-168)

A. Plato's philosophical / moral decision to subordinate difference (126 / 165)

- 1) But Plato does not have Aristotle's categories of representation
- 2) So difference still “rumbles” in his work

B. Simulacra: the anti-Platonism at the heart of Platonism (128 / 167)

- 1) Challenges notion of copy: simulacra have no resemblances
- 2) Challenges notion of model: model of other, of difference, of becoming, of the false
- 3) Challenges notions of both copy and model: ending of the

Sophist

1. Triumph of simulacra
2. Immanent identity of chaos and cosmos
3. Being in the ER: resemblance gives way to repetition

In two passages of the *Sophist*, Plato has the Eleatic Stranger distinguish icons from phantasms (236a-b and 264c).

Icons do not have the same proportions as beautiful things, but do have precisely those different proportions that produce a beautiful appearance like that – resembling that – of the original beautiful thing.

On the other hand, phantasms produce an appearance like that of the beautiful, but only because they are seen from an unfortunate angle; if we had a view to the original, we would see that they do not resemble that which they claim to be like.

It's at this point that the Stranger heads off into a "very difficult investigation" (236e), the famous investigation of the being of falsehood as the being of non-being (*to mē on einai*), which as we know, will involve risking the charge of parricide in confronting Parmenides.

In the latter passage, the Stranger recalls, but then quickly dismisses, the possibility of a doctrine which asserts that "neither likeness (*eikon*) nor image (*eidolon*) nor phantasm exists, because falsehood never exists" (264c). Now if falsehood doesn't exist, that is because the true as original doesn't exist, from which the false as copy is distinguished.

The banishing of this option is what Deleuze calls Plato's decision in favor of a "moral view of the world" (127). If Plato is ultimately more interesting to Deleuze than Aristotle, it is because Plato, w/o Aristotle's categories which will lock difference into representation, still allows us to hear the "rumbling" of difference.

It's into this rumbling world of difference, a non-moral world of "cruelty" and dissolution of identities, of disguises, theft, and ill will, that Deleuze will lead us.