

# LOVE

John Protevi  
 Department of French Studies  
 Louisiana State University  
 Baton Rouge LA 70803 USA  
 protevi@lsu.edu

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Once one of the most important philosophical concepts (it is impossible to think of Plato without *erôs*, or Aristotle without *philia*, or Augustine without *caritas* and *cupiditas*), love doesn't get much philosophical notice nowadays, at least outside psychoanalytic circles. Or so it seems. But couldn't one just as well say that Derrida and Deleuze think about nothing but love? What have they written that isn't linked rather directly to desire, to alterity, to getting outside oneself, even if "love" isn't among their most widely recognized concepts?<sup>(1)</sup> In this essay I take up their scattered references to love as a way to foreground the differences between their basic philosophical orientations: for Derrida, post-phenomenology; for Deleuze (at least in his collaboration with Guattari), historical-libidinal materialism.<sup>(2)</sup>

There are two keys to understanding the different notions of love for both our thinkers. The first is expressed in the ambiguity of the French *expérience*. For the post-phenomenologist Derrida, the sense of the *expérience* of love is captured by the English "experience" and the German *Erlebnis*: that which one undergoes, what one lives through. (Derrida will of course change the sense of "living through": love is precisely that which forces us to recognize that the living present has always already been disrupted, so that the experience of love is living through what can't be experienced, if experience is restricted to an event recorded in a supposedly self-present living present.) For the historical-libidinal materialist Deleuze, on the other hand, the sense of the *expérience* of love is captured by the English "experiment": that which one does in order to provoke a novel occurrence, to elicit a new event, to produce a new body.<sup>(3)</sup>

The second, allied, key to understanding the different notions of love for Derrida and Deleuze is to consider the different statuses they accord to "memory" in the *expérience* of love. For Derrida, the memory of love is not the recall of time gone by, what we

once experienced in the living present of our consciousness, but is an originary difference, the possibility of mourning that inaugurates friendship in an absolute past that vitiates the living present. For Deleuze, the memory of love is the rumble of Body without Organs, the roads not taken in the virtual that echo in the actual, the memory of the body they stole from us. Love is the call to enter that virtual and open up the actual, to install inclusive disjunctions so that the roads not taken are still accessible, so that we might experiment and produce new bodies.

## DERRIDA

Since Gasché's work in *The Tain of the Mirror* (1986), we've become accustomed to reading Derrida's first 25 years of work as the working out of a network of concepts or quasi-concepts, each of them displaying a family resemblance, each of them expressing from a different angle "the same thing": the breakdown of the living present. In this network *différance* is only the most famous of a long list of post-phenomenological and (hence, since phenomenology is the capstone of metaphysics) marginally metaphysical terms, including *pharmakon*, *hama*, trace, supplement.... Since the late 1980s or early 1990s however, Derrida has shifted the register of his thought from what had become for many a relatively familiar deconstructive strategy of discovering/inventing<sup>(4)</sup> quasi-concepts that perform a post-phenomenological solicitation at the margins of metaphysics to a stranger and more paradoxical stance which highlights the experience of "aporia."

We must not exaggerate the import of this shift, however, and think Derrida has left behind his post-phenomenological orientation. The shift from deconstructive quasi-concept to experience of aporia maintains a continuity of concerns with his earlier work. Thus in "Finis," the first essay in *Aporias* (1993), he goes all the way back to "Ousia and Grammè" (1968) to pick up his "analysis of the Aristotelian-Hegelian aporetic of time, carried out with Heidegger" (15). He then mentions "the interminable list of all the so-called undecidable quasi-concepts" in order to place them under the rubric of "aporia," calling them "so many aporetic places or dislocations"; in this catalogue he specifically mentions concepts we'll need to investigate to articulate the aporia of love: "the work of impossible mourning" and "the gift as the impossible" (15-16). After a brief recall of his analysis of decision and of duty, Derrida then firmly knits together these early and late approaches, deconstructive and aporetic, in commenting on his work on the unity of Europe: "This formulation of the paradox and of the impossible therefore calls upon a figure that resembles a structure of temporality, an instantaneous dissociation from the present, a *différance* in being-with-itself of the present..." (17)

After showing how "aporia" is now his favored way of expressing the breakdown of the living present—in other words, that "aporia" remains a post-phenomenological strategy—it

remains for Derrida to show that aporia isn't simple, that there is a "plural logic" (20) at play here. He mentions three figures that do not oppose each other, but are instead "hauntings" of each other. The first case of aporia as non-passage is that of impermeability, "the opaque existence of an uncrossable border"; the second is non-passage due to the absence of limit; the third that of "the impossible, the antinomy, or the contradiction [which] is a non-passage because its elementary milieu does not allow for something that could be called passage, step, walk, gait, displacement, or replacement, kinesis in general. There is no more path (*odos, methodos, Weg, or Holzweg*)" (20-21).

To focus now on Derrida's explicit treatments of love, let us note that in his early work the key to love is the acceptance of the necessary possibility of mourning the other. In *Memoires: for Paul DeMan* (1984) Derrida writes some of his most moving passages about love, talking precisely about one he loved<sup>(5)</sup>: "We know, we knew, *we remember*-before the death of the loved one-that being-in-me or being-in-us is constituted out of the possibility of mourning" (34). The very constitution of subjectivity, and *a fortiori* of friendly or loving subjectivity, passes not only through the other, but through the other as mortal: "It suffices that I know him to be mortal, that he knows me to be mortal-there is no friendship without this knowledge of finitude. And everything that we inscribe in the living present of our relation to others already carries, always, the signature of *memoirs-from-beyond-the-grave ...*" (29).

This focus on love as accepting the necessary possibility of mourning is intensely conveyed in "Aphorism Countertime" (1986), Derrida's reading of *Romeo and Juliet*: "To no matter whom, I must be able to say: since we are two, we know in an absolutely ineluctable way that one of us will die before the other. One of us will see the other die, one of us will live on, even if only for an instant. One of us, only one of us, will carry the death of the other-and the mourning" (*Acts of Literature*, 422; *Psyché*, 524).

In the experience of love the living present, the very seat of experience, is rent by finitude and by the necessity of possible mourning; returning to *Memoires* we clearly see in this theme Derrida's debt to Levinas, his friendship or love of Levinas: "This finitude can only take that form through the trace of the other in us, the other's irreducible precedence; in other words, simply the trace which is always the trace of the other, the finitude of memory, and thus the approach or remembrance of the future" (29). Love marks the necessity of reading the constitution of subjectivity as passage through the finitude of the other. Since it's impossible to experience in the living present the love of the other, because it's precisely the other that rends the living present, then the self-presence of the living present itself must be a fiction, it must have always already have been rent asunder by an originary alterity. Hence we need to redefine subjectivity in order to save the experience of love.

It is within this very work of mourning for a loved one, within *Memoires: for Paul de Man*, that Derrida begins to discuss love, the deconstructive breakdown of the living present, in the terms of the experience of aporia. Indeed, Derrida reports, the thought of aporia is a gift from a loved one, for when the necessary possibility of mourning Paul de Man becomes an actual duty, the working through of his mourning brushes up against "aporia," first the word, then the experience: "The word 'aporia' recurs often in Paul de Man's last texts... the experience of the aporia, such as de Man deciphers it, gives or promises the thinking of the path, provides the thinking of the very possibility of what still remains unthinkable or unthought, indeed impossible" (132). *Memoires*, the work of mourning dedicated to the memory of Paul de Man, then is the path *to* aporia, the path to the thinking and the experience of the non-path, and hence to the later Derrida: "No path is possible without the aporia of the gift, which does not occur without the aporia of the promise. I have tried to show elsewhere, in a seminar on the gift (given at Yale on Paul de Man's invitation [which appears later as *The Gift of Time* -- JP]), that there is no gift except on the aporetic condition that nothing is given that is present and that presents itself as such. The gift is only a promise and a promised memory ..." (147).

Now that we have learned to express the breakdown of phenomenological accounts in terms of the experience of aporia, now that we have entered the current register of Derrida's thought, we need to see what difference this makes to Derrida's treatment of love. Here we move from love as the acceptance of the necessary possibility of mourning the other to love as the experience of impossibility of a pure relation to the other, to love as endurance of aporia. Although to my knowledge Derrida does not articulate an "aporia of love" in just those terms, we can try to work out how such an aporia might be signaled toward, following the third sense of aporia noted above, that of "the impossible, the antinomy, or the contradiction."

First, let us use the aporia of the gift as our model, following the analyses of friendship in *Politics of Friendship*. Pure love is impossible, it cannot be experienced or be present, for any love that is acknowledged or recognized by lover or beloved would fall into an economy, a reciprocity of mutual benefit and hence cease to be love and become a mere "friendship of utility," as Aristotle might say. Yet for the relation to the other to be a relation, there must be a moment of reappropriation that reaches through a certain self-image, through a certain narcissism.<sup>(6)</sup> But then we are at the beginning once again: any relation to the other that passes through a living present is an appropriation, a domestication, that destroys alterity. But on the other hand, it must be my love, I must be the one committed to the other, the one who gives my love, for what is a love that is not my commitment?

Another way to articulate the aporia of love would use the model of the aporia of decision: pure love is impossible because it can neither follow a program of previous

love without the risk that the partners are simply "in love with love" and not with each other; but on the other hand, not just any relation deserves the name of love, and so it cannot not have a relation to past loves.

In either register, early or late, deconstructive or aporetic, we see Derrida describing the experience of love through a series of linked terms: alterity, trace, intersubjectivity, mourning, mortality, finitude, law, tragedy, desire. In the early Derrida, our subjectivity is redefined as a passage through the other by the experience of accepting the necessary possibility of mourning; this redefinition is needed in order to save the experience of love as originary relation to alterity. But in later Derrida, love is the very experience of aporia or nonpassage, the passion or endurance of the impossibility of an experience of pure love, the impossibility of a pure relation to alterity. In the early work, love is the passage through the other that disrupts presence, that redefines experience in terms of alterity rather than identity; in the later work love is the nonpassage through the other that reinforces the experience of the impossibility of identity or present-based "experience."

Let's recap our philosophical passage in terms of love: Derrida's first (philosophical) love was for Husserl, and love for Levinas' love of the other and for Heidegger's love of difference led him to deconstruct Husserl's love of presence. His love for Paul de Man brought him to think of the gift, and mourning de Man's death brought him to think of de Man's love of aporia, to which his thought passes. Paul de Man's gift of love then for Derrida is the thought of aporia. <sup>(7)</sup>

## DELEUZE (AND GUATTARI)

For Deleuze and Guattari, as we read in *Anti-Oedipus* and *A Thousand Plateaus*, love is a form of desire, the process of material nature. In *Anti-Oedipus* love is anti-Oedipality itself: "sexuality and love do not live in the bedroom of Oedipus, they dream instead of wide-open spaces, and cause strange flows to circulate ..." (AO 116). In *A Thousand Plateaus* it is life itself, the very process of creating novel uses for available materials: "Why not walk on your head, sing with your sinuses, see through your skin, breathe with your belly: the simple Thing, the Entity, the full Body, the stationary Voyage, Anorexia, cutaneous Vision, Yoga, Krishna, Love [in English in the original], Experimentation" (ATP 151).

In *Anti-Oedipus*, love has two valences, Oedipal / paranoid and revolutionary / schizophrenizing. (It's important, of course, to emphasize Deleuze and Guattari's focus on the process of schizophrenizing; they don't valorize the schizophrenic as entity, which is precisely the failure of the process.) When desire is captured in capitalist axiomatics, it takes the Oedipal form. Analyzed by the five paralogisms, Oedipal love is personal, exclusively differentiated, fixed in meaning, guilty, and familial. This is

what they will call "sick desire": "a desire to be loved, and worse, a sniveling desire to have been loved ..." (334). Oedipus is the name of a sick desire, a desire hardly worthy of the name; but Oedipal love is not the only kind; there is also what we can call schizo love.

Let's look at three major points in the *Anti-Oedipus* treatment of schizo love: love as material (not representational), as social (not familial), and as multiple (not personal).

Schizo love is a material process, a factory not a theater. When Deleuze and Guattari talk about love's "flows" (love "cause[s] strange flows to circulate" [116]), they mean real material flows: flows of body fluids, of course, but also flows in the body politic: cars on the road (Kerouac), horses in the street (Little Hans) .... Revolutionary desire, desire as material process of nature, is "in itself not a desire to love, but a force to love, a virtue that gives and produces, that engineers" (333). Engineering is the installation of triggers and patterns, the mapping of the virtual realm of a body: experimental verification of which connections with other bodies turns the body's flows on or off, at which speeds and with which intensities.

Schizo love is social, not familial: "our choices in matters of love are at the crossroads of 'vibrations', which is to say that they express connections, disjunctions and conjunctions of flows that cross through a society ..." (352). Here Deleuze and Guattari make their oft-repeated point about the direct libidinal investment of the social: there is simply no need for familial mediation of desire, although that can be arranged too, in certain circumstances. Thus our loves are "symptomatic," revealing our unconscious investments in social libidinal flows: "Our libidinal investments of the social field ... appear only in our sexual choices of lovers. A love is not reactionary or revolutionary, but it is the index of the reactionary or revolutionary character of the social investments of the libido" (352).

Schizo love is multiple, not personal. For Deleuze and Guattari the important thing is that schizo love doesn't aim at whole objects, but has to be evaluated on the level of its molecular processes. Thus there can be an Oedipal homosexuality. They recall Deleuze's analysis of Proust, in which Deleuze reveals Proust's thought of multiple sexes within each person meeting in a "statistical aggregate of intersexual loves" (295). Reading Proust is the pathway to understanding schizo love, a sort of deconstruction of Oedipal love: "we are statistically or molarly heterosexual, but personally homosexual, without knowing it or being fully aware of it, and finally we are transsexual in an elemental, molecular sense" (70). Molarity is the analysis of a body in terms of large numbers, a statistical analysis; molecularity is the analysis of local interactions. It's not a matter of size, but of type of analysis. "So at the level of elementary combinations, at least two men and two women must be made to intervene to constitute the multiplicity in which transverse communications are established: connections of partial objects and flows" (69). As we will see, this is not a theory of "bisexuality" but of "*n* sexes."



Revolutionary desire as sketched out in *Anti-Oedipus* is a desire for higher intensity in an encounter of multiple flows on a body without organs. Schizo love is only unleashed at the level of multiple flows unhooked from a statistically dominant pattern. This is made clear in *A Thousand Plateaus*, to which we now turn.

In the second volume of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, love is the release of multiplicities from their servitude<sup>(8)</sup> as predicates of a subject. "What does it mean to love somebody? It is always to seize that person in a mass, extract him or her from a group, however small, in which he or she participates, whether it be through the family only or through something else; then to find that person's own packs, the multiplicities he or she encloses within himself or herself which may be of an entirely different nature" (35). A pack or multiplicity is a set of gestures, of part objects, or organs (an "emission of particles") analyzed in itself, not as predicates of a subject. A multiplicity is the multiple treated as a substantive, so that it "ceases to have any relation to the One as subject or object" (8). A multiplicity thus has "only determinations, magnitudes, and dimensions that cannot increase in number without the multiplicity changing in nature" (8). Love then is exactly this creative novelty of connection, this joining of multiplicities: "To join them to mine, to make them penetrate mine, and for me to penetrate the other person's. Heavenly nuptials, multiplicities of multiplicities" (35).

But it's not easy to join multiplicities. They must be freed from bondage to the organism and to the person: "Every love is an exercise in depersonalization on a body without organs yet to be formed, and it is at the highest point of this depersonalization that someone can be named, receives his or her family name or first name, acquires the most intense discernibility in the instantaneous apprehension of the multiplicities belonging to him or her, and to which he or she belongs" (35). Only haecceities are named: that is, multiplicities of flows and gestures, freed from organism and subject respectively and set loose on a Body without Organs, a body freed for novel, creative interactions. Haecceity is a body defined in terms of its flows and affects, its speeds and slownesses and what it can do, its "longitude" and "latitude." A haecceity thus occupies a position on the Body without Organs of the Earth and thus also receives one of "all the names of history."

Treating a body as a multiplicity, respecting the uniqueness of its assemblage, is thus different from treating it as an organism: an organism is "a phenomenon of accumulation, coagulation, and sedimentation that, in order to extract useful labor from the BwO, imposes upon it forms, functions, bonds, dominant and hierarchized organizations, organized transcendences" (159). Our "body" (ability to form new connections with others, our ability to schizo love) is "stolen" and replaced with an "organism," the stereotyped pattern of material flows we call Oedipus: what we're allowed to be turned on by, what organs and bodies (corporeal and social at once) we're

able to hook up with.

All love then must be a material dismantling of the organism and the subject to reach the body, that is, a reshuffling of the stereotyped patterns and triggers of Oedipal living: "Make the body without organs of consciousness and love. Use love and consciousness to abolish subjectification" (134). And this dismantling of the organism to regain the body, must, notoriously, and certainly not unproblematically, <sup>(9)</sup> pass through "becoming-woman": "The question [of becoming-woman] is not, or not only, that of the organism, history, and subject of enunciation that oppose masculine to feminine in the great dualism machines. The question is fundamentally that of the body-the body they *steal* from us in order to fabricate opposable organisms" (276).

Here Deleuze and Guattari recreate the story of Oedipalization: "This body is stolen first from the girl [*la fille*]: Stop behaving like that, you're not a little girl [*une petite fille*] anymore, you're not a tomboy [*un garçon manqué*], etc. The girl's [*la fille*] becoming is stolen first, in order to impose a history, or prehistory, upon her" (276/339). The history of femininity is imposed on her; a stereotyped set of triggers and patterns. A feminine organism is produced by contraction of the body's affects to a small set, the feminine set. <sup>(10)</sup> Or indeed it is the prehistory of femininity that is imposed: the essence of woman, that which has never changed. Masculinity is then produced in relation to imposed femininity: "The boy's [*garçon*] turn comes next, but it is by using the girl [*la fille*] as an example, by pointing to the girl [*la fille*] as the object of his desire, that an opposed organism, a dominant history is fabricated for him too. The girl [*la fille*] is the first victim, but she must also serve as an example and a trap" (276).

To avoid Oedipality, the fate of being an organism and a subject, to avoid being a good little boy in relation to a nice young lady [*une jeune fille*], to avoid being the nice young lady who must wait to be pursued but whom the good little boy can never imitate, all of us, regardless of which body has been imposed on us, must "become-woman." "That is why, conversely, the reconstruction of the body as a Body without Organs, the anorganism of the body, is inseparable from a becoming-woman, or the production of a molecular woman. ... becoming-woman or the molecular woman is the girl [*la jeune fille*] herself" (276). <sup>(11)</sup>

Once the restricted body of the Oedipal boy/man is constructed in relation to the "young lady" (the girl whose body was stolen and who was then used as example and trap, the anti-model), it can then be used to shame the young lady. To use an American discourse: "see, you're not brave and tough like the boys, so don't even bother trying to play football: everyone knows football is a boy's sport," and so on. And it's true; young ladies can't play football, and neither can sissies. But girls can! The "girl" is the name for the body as multiplicity, as BwO: "The girl is certainly not defined by virginity; she



is defined by a relation of movement and rest, speed and slowness, by a combination of atoms, an emission of particles: haecceity. She never ceases to roam upon a body without organs. She is an abstract line, or a line of flight" (276-77).

The mention of "speed and slowness" reminds us that the discussion of "becoming-woman" belongs to a section entitled "memories of a molecule," in which Deleuze and Guattari spell out their appropriation of Spinoza and ethology. The body is here shown to be susceptible to definition not only by subject and predicate (and hence by genus and species), but also by "longitude and latitude." Longitude measures the body in terms of the speed and slowness of its material flows, while latitude measures the body by its affects: what the body can do. The "girl" is chosen as the name for this treatment of the body in terms of flow and affect because "she" lives a body that avoids capture by the developmental line that leads from little girl to nice young lady. Because the "girl" avoids this line, "she" is not a tomboy either when acting against gender stereotype and experimenting with the capabilities of the body (how fast can I run? how tough can I be?). But by avoiding the Oedipal organism, the option of "girl," if it can be accessed (a question of constructing political and social frameworks: Deleuze and Guattari are never "lifestyle" mavens, never "individualists"), can also include experimentation with patterns stereotyped as "feminine" (how pretty AND tough can I be?)

Whatever the anthropological accuracy of these statements taken as observations of contemporary bourgeois child rearing, in France in the 1970s or America in the 2000s, whatever their worth as guides for practical experimentation by people whose bodies were stolen and who had gendered organisms given them in their stead, the historical-libidinal materialist rather than purely psychoanalytic context of Deleuze and Guattari's notion of the "girl" should be clear. The "girl" is not the name for a particular stage of development, but is the name for the experimenting body: "Thus girls do not belong to an age group, sex, order, or kingdom: they slip in everywhere, between orders, acts, ages, sexes; they produce  $n$  molecular sexes on the line of flight in relation to the dualism machines they cross right through" (277).

How then does love enter the picture at this point? What is love, if not "girling," experimentation with the organism they gave you to find the body you might make with others? "Knowing how to love [*Savoir aimer*] does not mean remaining a man or a woman; it means extracting from one's sex the particles, the speeds and slownesses, the flows, the  $n$  sexes that constitute the girl of *that* sexuality" (277). Love is freeing bodies from the organism and subject, allowing their triggers and patterns to interact and form new maps (new longitudes and latitudes) that allow new types of flows and hence new affects. When bodies join in the mutual experimental deterritorialization that is love, we find Deleuze and Guattari's most adventurous concept: the living, changing, multiplying virtual, the "Divine Game" of differentiation (*Difference and Repetition*), given a material twist and becoming in *A Thousand Plateaus* "the unfolding of the

plane of consistency." Love is complexity yielding novelty, the very process of life.

In other words, love is a war machine: "[Sexuality] is badly explained by the binary organization of the sexes, and just as badly by a bisexual organization within each sex. Sexuality brings into play too great a diversity of conjugated becomings; these are like *n* sexes, an entire war machine through which love passes" (278). "War machine" of course is yet another Deleuzoguattarian name for creativity. Only the failure of the war machine leads to war, as they stress again and again (e.g., 231).<sup>(12)</sup> "This is not to return to those appalling metaphors of love and war ... it is only after love is done and sexuality has dried up that things appear this way. What counts is that love itself is a war machine endowed with strange and somewhat terrifying powers. Sexuality is the production of a thousand sexes, which are so many uncontrollable becomings" (278).

## CONCLUSION

We have considered the different treatments of love in Derrida and Deleuze, the different ways difference pulls us outside our allegedly secure and self-identical subjectivity (Derrida's post-phenomenology) or outside both our subjectivity and our organism (Deleuze's historical-libidinal materialism).

For Derrida, to recap, love is a relation to alterity, to the other, which pulls apart the supposedly self-identical metaphysical subject by forcing it to undergo the tragic experience of aporia. Thus, love disabuses one of illusions of identity, for it is deconstruction leading to aporia. Contra the metaphysics of the everyday, then, love produces a tragic wisdom, in taking on the risk of living on (undergoing the experience of mourning). In this way, desire is constituted by the (im) possibility of mourning the death of the other. Thus, mortality is finitude, the site of loss, the possibility of love as aporia, that is, the impossibility of pure love.

For Deleuze, love is deterritorialization, which changes the material flows and affects of the organism they have given us and thus disrupts the produced identity of the Oedipal subject. Love is doing new things; it is experimentation leading to adventure. Contra the Oedipalizing patterning of bodies which produces mere organisms, love produces new bodies, new flows, new affects. For Deleuze, desire is the process of life itself, so that death is that by which one desires, for it is only by breaking down old patterns, by dying to an old subjectivity, by killing the organism (but not the body!), that one creates a new body. Thus, mortality is the opportunity for creation

Perhaps we can fit Derrida and Deleuze together in the following way, by treating deconstruction as a propaedeutic which disabuses one of metaphysical illusions in order to free one for material experimentation. ("The soul is the prison of the body," as Foucault writes once wrote.) The danger of deconstruction, however, is getting stuck by

focusing exclusively on the awareness of the breakdown of consciousness as experience of aporia, and not shifting registers to material experimentation.

This is not to say Derrida is "theoretical" and Deleuze "practical." On the contrary, both Derridean deconstruction and Deleuzian pragmatics are practical, both are intimately concerned with *expérience*, both urge us to do this, to try that. Derrida tells us: here's a new interpretation of love. Try this way of thinking and see whether it doesn't illuminate your experience of love. Deleuze tells us: love is not interpretation of experience, but material experimentation. Here are some hints and guidelines for experimentation; try them out, see what happens!

## NOTES

1. A note on terminology. While the French noun *l'amour* corresponds well to the English "love," the verb *aimer* can also mean "to like" as well as "to love," so that "je l'aime, il est mon ami" can simply mean "I like him, he's my friend" while "je t'aime," can mean "I love you." The ambiguity of *aimer* is noted by Derrida, who coins the term "aimance" for that which is "beyond love and friendship following their determined figures" (*Politics of Friendship* F88/E69).
2. The relation of the works Deleuze signed alone to those he wrote with Guattari is too complex and important to be treated in a note. (As are, by the way, the various relationships that can be established among the works they did together, notably the two volumes of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* [*Anti-Oedipus* and *A Thousand Plateaus*, which we will examine in this paper] and their last work, *What is Philosophy?*.) Nonetheless, let me to cite some words of Deleuze from "Letter to a Harsh Critic" that are relevant to the topic of this essay: "I know very well that they're [*Difference and Repetition* and *The Logic of Sense*] still full of academic elements, they're heavy going .... And then there was my meeting with Félix Guattari, the way we understood and complemented, depersonalized and singularized-in short, loved-one another" (*Negotiations*, trans. Martin Joughin [NY: Columbia University Press, 1995], 7).
3. In a 1991 interview translated in *Points*, Derrida explicates his sense of "experience" as "traversal, voyage, ordeal"; the connotation of "experiment" is left off the list (362).
4. Just what it is exactly that deconstruction "does" is of course an issue to which Derrida devoted many complex pages. See for example, "Psyché: Invention de l'autre" in *Psyché: Inventions de l'autre* (Paris: Galilée, 1987).
5. Recall the shift in tone in the *Symposium*, famously noted by Martha Nussbaum in *The Fragility of Goodness*, from abstract discussion to Alcibiades' impassioned

discourse about his concrete love for Socrates.

6. *Points*, 199.

7. In a longer work, one might try to insert Deleuze into the history of Derrida's philosophical friendships. As he writes in his eulogy for Deleuze: "Deleuze remains no doubt, despite so many dissimilarities, the one to whom I have always considered myself closest among all of this 'generation.' ... I only know that these differences left room for nothing but friendship between us. To my knowledge, no shadow, no sign has ever indicated the contrary."

8. As always with Deleuze and Guattari, this is not a metaphor. The body as tool of a soul (as *organon*) is enslaved, as Aristotle tell us. Under the rule of the soul, the body becomes unified, a single organ, *panta yar ta physika sômata tês psychês organa* (*De Anima* 2.4.415b18). Any formation of a unity is always that of ruler/ruled, and the unification of the animal body under the rule of the soul is masterly rather than political (*Politics* 1.5.1254a30). Thus psychic organization entails somatic enslavement. I have worked out this connection in "The Organism as the Judgment of God: Aristotle, Kant and Deleuze on Nature (that is, on Biology, Theology and Politics)," in *Deleuze and Religion*, ed. Mary Bryden, (London: Routledge, 2001).

9. The landmark feminist essays examining "becoming-woman" are well-known by now; Elizabeth Grosz's "A Thousand Tiny Sexes" in Boundas and Olkowski, eds., *Gilles Deleuze and the Theater of Philosophy* (London: Routledge, 1994) is a good starting point for those wanting an entry point to the debates. I will restrict myself to what I hope is a careful and clear exposition of Deleuze and Guattari's writings on the connection of "becoming-woman," the "girl," and love, and forego a direct confrontation with the many different feminist treatments of these issues.

10. Iris Marion Young's famous essay "Throwing Like a Girl" maintains all its relevance here, as it details the small set of constricting affects to which the feminine body is restricted. But perhaps Deleuze and Guattari would want to amend to the title to "Throwing Like a Young Lady."

11. Massumi correctly elides the difference between *la fille* and *la jeune fille*, using only "girl" in his translation. Why is this an excellent move on his part? As I note in the text, the consecrated French phrase for "nice young lady" is *la jeune fille*. Deleuze and Guattari seem unaware of this and move from *la fille* to *la jeune fille* without comment, using *la jeune fille* as the name for "Body without Organs." Now it would have been more elegant if Deleuze and Guattari had left *la fille* as the name for the BwO, as they do in the beginning of this passage, for one could easily see *la fille* as the escape from the developmental line steals the body and imposes an organism (that restricts the

body's affects to those approved as feminine), that leads from *la petite fille* to *la jeune fille* by avoiding *le garçon manqué*, that is, that leads from "little girl" to "nice young lady" by avoiding the "tomboy." Unfortunately, in the latter part of the passage they insert *la jeune fille* as the name for BwO; the only way I can see to avoid charging them with a confusing terminological choice is to propose we read *la jeune fille* as "une fille qui est jeune," as "a girl who is young," rather than "nice young lady." In that way we refer to Deleuze and Guattari's treatment of youth in the passage under consideration as the maintenance of a relation to flexible body patterning, as a contemporary "block of becoming," rather than as regression or nostalgia. All in all, Massumi's choice of "girl" to cover both *la fille* and *la jeune fille* helps us by omission; you could say it helps Anglophone readers use *A Thousand Plateaus* more effectively, even if by standards of translation drawn from a signifier-signified model of language it is deficient, it drops some meaning. But after all, it's Deleuze and Guattari that remind us to "never interpret"!

12. I have produced a detailed treatment of the war machine in "'A Problem of Pure Matter': Deleuze and Guattari's Treatment of Fascist Nihilism in *A Thousand Plateaus*," in *Nihilism Now!: "Monsters of Energy"*, ed. Keith Ansell-Pearson and Diane Morgan (London: Macmillan, 2000).