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Chapter 5: The Political Economy of Consciousness

The phrase "the political economy of consciousness" has a dual sense. It means both that the consciousness of individual actors plays a variable role in the "economy" of politics, that is, the analysis of factors that make up political activities, and that the production of the large-scale patterns of individual consciousness can often be analyzed in terms of subjectification practices that are tied to political economy. I will discuss the latter sense in the next chapter as the "granularity problem." Here I look to political situations in which the effects of consciousness is attenuated or rendered superfluous in the economy of political action. I will provide three disparate and fairly self-contained analyses of such situations in this chapter: 1) discipline and Rational Choice Theory; 2) a case study in the "socially invaded mind"; and 3) affect in OWS.

Discipline and Rational Choice Theory

Alva Noë notes in *Out of Our Heads* the possible treatment of dogs as "a merely mechanistic locus of conditioned response" (Noë 2009, 27-28). He goes on to say we can do the same with human beings, noting that part of our horror at the Nazis lies in their "objectified, mechanistic attitude to human beings" (28). But we do not have to go that far. We can look at other much more mundane areas of socio-political practice that try to render irrelevant the effects of subjective agency by rendering behavior predictable. This black-boxing of consciousness can either occur in mass, by neo-liberal economic practices which seek to produce the conditions which will in turn produce "rational," that is, predictable, behavior (for such an externalist reading of rational choice theory, see Satz and Frerejohn 1994), or in individuals and small groups, by discipline (Schwartz, Schuldenfrei and Lacey 1979).

The idea is this: in certain forms of political activity consciousness is not eliminated, but is rendered superfluous in prediction and manipulation. In certain conditions, it simply does not matter what one would "prefer" in some private interiority, since social constraints can be made strong enough to render the vast majority of actors predictable. (Bartleby's withdrawal did not change the productivity of Wall Street scribes.) We see this in disciplinary institutions at the individual scale, for after a certain amount of training, most of the soldiers snap to attention, whether they like it or not. But it is not just the military; Schwartz, Schuldenfrei and Lacey investigate the nexus of behavioristic emptying out of subjectivity and factory discipline:

[W]hile behavior in the workplace now seems to conform to operant principles, it did not in an earlier time, prior to the development of industrial capitalism. . . . the fit between operant theory and modern work is so close in part because operant principles, in the form of the scientific management movement, made modern work what it is. . . . successful applications of operant theory do not necessarily confirm the theory. Rather, applications of operant principles to social institutions may

transform those institutions so that they conform to operant principles. (Schwartz et al 1979: 229)

On the social scale, consider Satz and Ferejohn's (1994) externalist reading of rational choice theory, where, using an analogy with statistical dynamics, they show that in normalized conditions the structure of a social system is all that need be analyzed. They dispense with the assumption of internal, psychological, rational agents; what they say needs to be studied are social conditions that produce behavior that can be modeled on the assumption of rational agents. "We believe that rational-choice explanations are most plausible in settings in which individual action is severely constrained, and thus where the theory gets its explanatory power from structure-generated interests and not from individual psychology" (Satz and Ferejohn 1994, 72).

Elinor Ostrom, Samuel Bowles, and Herbert Gintis and others in behavioral economics also have things to say to us here. A short piece by Ostrom, "Policies that crowd out reciprocity and collective action" (2005), has some important points relevant to our notion of the political economy of consciousness. Ostrom begins by reviewing evidence for strong reciprocators, the presence of which contradicts the rational choice theory assumption that rational egoists (utility maximizers driven only by external rewards / punishments) are the only type of agent that needs to be modeled to account for social behavior. Thus Ostrom proposes that we need to model different ratios of strong reciprocators and rational egoists and how those ratios change over time given different conditions. Strong reciprocators are conditional altruistic cooperators and conditional altruistic punishers. They are concerned with fairness of process rather than only outcomes; in a word, they have internal motivations.

Ostrom continues: if you assume only rational egoists, then you have to design policies with external rewards and punishments. "Leviathan is alive and well in our policy textbooks. The state is viewed as a substitute for the shortcomings of individual behavior and the presumed failure of community" (Ostrom 2005: 254). The kicker is that such policies actually hurt the prosocial behaviors that would exist in their absence. "External interventions crowd out intrinsic motivation if the individuals affected perceive them to be controlling" (260). But internally motivated prosocial behaviors are not supposed to exist in a world of only rational egoists. So we have a self-fulfilling prophecy, or another example of "methodology become metaphysics": policies of externally compelled cooperation recommended on the assumption that social reality is a collection of rational egoists produce the very emptied-out, de-subjectified reality that you have assumed. At this point, we should remember Satz and Ferejohn's externalism: what you study with rational choice theory is social constraint conditions. Properly set up, you can dispense with psychological attribution. To use a term of art in philosophy of mind, rational choice theory is the study of political economy zombies.

But all is not lost, Ostrom notes. If you design them properly, you can use external systems to "'crowd in' behaviors based on intrinsic preferences and enhance what could have been achieved without these incentives" (254). In other words, there really is, literally, a political economy of consciousness; with enough control you can produce a combination of scarcity and disciplinary coercion that so constrains action as to render modeling of conscious decisions superfluous to prediction and control of behavior. In these situations, behaviorist

manipulation via external rewards and punishments is not only sufficient for modeling predictable behavior, but also crowds out reciprocity and collective action. Externalism can defeat internalism, if you will. Conversely, you can create institutional structures that provide the conditions for the survival and flourishing of internal motivations and concern for fair processes. In other words, you can -- or better, you must -- create the conditions in which conscious internal motivation can play an effective role in political economy.

A Case Study of the "Socially Invaded Mind"

United States Representative Gabrielle Giffords was shot in an apparent assassination attempt on Saturday 8 January 2011 in Tucson, Arizona. She survived, though six others were killed. After my initial horror at the case -- a feeling that, my God, fascism is really here now, they are starting to assassinate their enemies -- a short post at one of the blogs I frequent (Lawyers, Guns, and Money) piqued my philosophical interest. I commented there and then made some posts that elicited other responses on my own blog (New APPS) and as a guest on another (The Contemporary Condition). I was thus caught up in a give-and-take that began with issues of causality and eventually led me to the notion of the "socially invaded mind," which I initially liked quite a bit, but have subsequently come to question.

Although I will not spend too much time on it, there is a meta-level discussion to be had here in terms of the socially embedded mind: the process by which give-and-take on blogs helped my thoughts crystallize. They are my thoughts, but I would not have had them without this discussion. Or in other terms, there was social extension -- me reaching out and making others think -- and social invasion -- thoughts bubbling up within me that were triggered by interactions with others.¹ I am going to present most of this in my own voice, as if the dialectic of proposal and objection was mastered by me all along, as if there were no extension and invasion, just a self-contained dialogue (the original version [Protevi 2011] preserves some of the give-and-take). But this sort of masterly presentation is a trick that hides the inter-subjective process behind a seemingly self-contained product. So here we have yet another sense of the political economy of consciousness, consciousness as the fetishization of social labor, if you can accept the analogy with Marx's critique of the fetishization of commodities.² The academic practice of long lists of acknowledgments -- to say nothing of long lists of notes -- marks our anxiety about this troubling way in which we appropriate the intellectual commons which makes it possible for us to be scholars as private intellectual property, as "my ideas" (as if on cue, here is my reference: Read 2010).

In any case, in the blog discussion of the Giffords case, I noticed a binary being produced: either we can show a direct ideological link between right-wing rhetoric and the (journals or video) expressions of the alleged shooter, OR the case is utterly mysterious and "senseless." For example, one social scientist said: To prove that vitriol causes any particular act of violence, we cannot speak about "atmosphere." We need to be able to demonstrate that vitriolic messages were actually heard and believed by the perpetrators of violence. That is a far harder thing to do. But absent such evidence, we are merely waving our hands at causation and preferring instead to treat the

mere existence of vitriol and the mere existence of violence as implying some relationship between the two. (Sides 2011)

But this binary between "hand waving" and billiard ball causality is a terribly impoverished view of causation. Biological thought helps us much more than this sort of physics model. Schmalhausen's Law shows that we can make sense of the interchange of environment and population without meeting an impossible billiard ball causality standard. (I am relying on the presentation of this concept in Lewontin and Levins 2007.) Schmalhausen showed that in species-typical environments, developmental robustness hides a lot of genetic variation. In other words, in normal environments you can get roughly the same results in a population with genetic variance. But put that population under environmental stress and the previously hidden genetic variation shows up in a greater range of phenotypes. This is not "hand-waving" but neither does it adhere to an impossible physics standard. The analogy is that the political rhetoric environment of Tucson was so extreme that we can plausibly suppose that it exposed the psychological variation in the population that would have otherwise remained unexpressed. Such an argument is not hand waving, and it should not be dismissed because it does not match some inflated standard of a direct cause-and-effect relation of one statement to one act. We could say that billiard ball causality is "extensive" in its reliance upon already formed objects and extensive properties of spatial and temporal location, whereas the sort of biological causality exemplified in Schmalhausen's Law is "intensive" as it looks to triggering events that modulate ongoing intensive developmental and behavioral processes.

Now the psychological variation at stake concerns thresholds for violent action, which are very high in most people (Chapter 2 and Protevi 2009, Chapter 6). In the overwhelming majority of people only direct immediate physical threats provoke violence in return (and then not always): we are an extremely peaceful species when raised in moderately secure environments (Hrdy 2009; Fry 2007; 2012). But Representative Giffords posed no direct immediate physical threat to the alleged shooter, Jared Loughner, so we are looking for an indirect link, a matter of "influence." But where should we locate the link? Not at the level of ideology, I would argue (see the OWS section concluding this chapter). The link seems to be immersion in the anti-government (and violence as the solution to the government-as-problem) milieu of Tucson. But we should not look for ideological motivation, as in a match between message intake and output, such as a repeated key phrase or even a possibly transformed key idea. Loughner did not have a coherent ideology. Nonetheless, he chose a Democratic politician targeted by right-wing rhetoric, and intensely so targeted by Giffords's opponent in the last election. So I think we have to look not to a smoking gun ideological match but to the way the target provided a promise to at least make a mark, to show he was serious, and so on. Any big target would do, but this one had a particularly salient energy attached to her. So, we could say, the ideology does not belong to Loughner, but he picked up on the energy that a particular ideology aimed at Giffords. It is not the ideology that counted to Loughner, but the social energy that became attached to Giffords. And that energy was not generalized "anti-government" sentiment, but specifically targeted by those who do have an ideological grudge at Democrats.

To come back to our leading question: Why is billiard-ball causality so

problematic in this case? Because it produces much too crude a view of political psychology, especially with regard to the role of "belief" in the reaction of Loughner to the environment. Note the key claim of the initial blog post cited above: "We need to be able to demonstrate that vitriolic messages were actually heard and believed by the perpetrators of violence" (Sides 2011). Answering the question of whether vitriolic messages were "heard" by Loughner is quite easy. The shooter was described as "obsessed" with Giffords; he attended one of her rallies in 2007; and she won her election by a small margin, 3500 votes, against a candidate whose campaign had all sorts of violent images. It is a vanishingly small probability that he was not exposed at some point to these sorts of things. Now as to Sides' second requirement, "belief," here we are a lot closer to the billiard ball causality I mocked above. With the requirement that we prove that Loughner "believed" vitriolic messages we are first called upon to prove that he had a mental representation with the semantic content "Giffords must be eliminated." And we are then called upon to trace the genesis of that representation to an event at time T1, the exposure to a particular message or set of messages. We would then have to show this representation with that content (plus some other representations) are then the necessary and sufficient conditions for his action.

Now it may be that Sides has a more sophisticated psychology than the above sketch, though it is hard to tell from that blog post. And it is certainly no good on my part to just chant "nonlinear dynamics" as a mantra so that anything goes in linking environment and shooter. But there has to be something along the lines of developed dispositions and thresholds that is better for thinking this case than the sort of linear belief-desire-action scheme Sides seems to be proposing, and which Susan Hurley memorably mocked as part of the "classical sandwich" view: sensory input -- computation on representations -- motor output (Hurley 1998). The important thing to remember is that the Giffords case is not an isolated incident; right-wing violence in the US is a well-established phenomenon.³

What view of causality must we develop in order to discuss the singularities in this pattern, such as Loughner? I would say that the poisonous rhetoric here is a factor in a complex system. What I object to is the exclusive binary by which, unless one can show a strict linear causality, then one can say nothing. I would be happy if people would say there are sometimes linear causation systems (with some *ceteris paribus* conditions) but they are a minority even in physics; the general case is complex nonlinearity. But we have then to expand our notions of causality rather than restrict them to linear causality versus mere correlationist "hand waving." Now with regard to the biology analogy, I do not think the unexpressed genetic variation gets all the credit here. In brief, it is the interchange between the environment and the genetic variation that is responsible, over development, for psychological variation with regard to violence thresholds. And that interchange is the individuation process of an eco-devo-evo multiplicity (Chapter 10). That is a long way from just "genetic variation," and besides, there is a way the environment constructs the expression, which, *ex post facto*, reveals what had been unexpressed. This is certainly paradoxical on a linear causality model, but I argue that is what we have to say in Chapter 11 below. Now I am not calling, necessarily, for restrictions on political discourse and images. But I am saying we need to think about it, as

Susan Hurley did when we called for thinking about the legal status of first-person shooter games (Hurley 2004). So finally I would say there is no sophisticated causality in which Palin's messages are THE cause of Loughner's action -- because that is not a sophisticated causality. Her messages, and those of others are, arguably, causal contributing factors in a political affect multiplicity.

To conclude this section, let us examine the notion of the "socially invaded mind." Continuing to bang away at this critique of the binary between having to show a direct link between specific pieces of rhetoric and Loughner's act versus having to content ourselves with general correlations, I thought I could adapt Susan Bordo's phrase, "psychopathology as crystallization of culture," which she used to resist the medicalization of anorexia (Bordo 1986 and 1993). We would never be able to identify one image and the onset of anorexia in a particular anorectic, but I would not want to say there was no connection at all between cultural images of desirable thinness (plus those of thinness as sign of willpower, etc.) and that particular anorectic. So the idea is that Loughner was not outside culture in being insane. On the contrary, he was too close to it; he had no filters, or not strong enough filters. He did not have a socially extended mind, he had a socially invaded mind; the outside just came pouring in.

But having laid out this model, my thoughts on Bordo were considerably sharpened by this comment by Hasana Sharp in personal communication:

My worry about the Bordo-model is that it could imply that the problem with [people as] social mirrors is that they are not Cartesian enough -- that the solution is better filters, better abilities to affirm or deny the validity of our sensuous representations. It does not have to imply that: it could mean we need better buffers. His social constellation did not provide any alternatives and exacerbated these cultural tendencies, whereas we are inserted in other constellations that make tea party rhetoric sound either (a) like rhetoric/ posturing/ playing a game and/ or (b) insane. . . . We need to resist the Cartesian conclusion that we need individually cultivated critical faculties that are permanently set on skepticism, or else we are profoundly vulnerable to the deceptions of opinion and sensation (=culture). I do not think Bordo is wrong, only that there is still some Descartes lurking there, despite her magisterial critique of him as a pathological symptom.

So I thought I have to stress not just Loughner's low filters that enabled him to be "socially invaded," but also Tucson as the invading element. The object of analysis is the individuation process, "Loughner-as-he-develops-in-Tucson." But even that might not be enough: as Sharp argues, the "socially invaded mind" idea is still too individualistic. It is not just that he had a socially invaded mind, but that the society that invaded him, Tucson, provided him no buffers; it was all "guns are the solution to government," all the time. Having no filters in Ann Arbor, Michigan might keep have kept him in a basement making YouTube videos, but having no filters in Tucson put him in that supermarket parking lot.

But then, having questioned the reversal of polarities and recognized that we are all socially extended AND socially invaded, we have to look again at the "we" from our population variation perspective, so that when it is a sick culture invading a population, it is still only the case that only a few will crack under the stress. But with this population perspective, especially when it comes to the production of embodied violence thresholds, is "mind" the right term, rather than

"bio-social subject"? How much dynamically affective enaction, how much of an eco-politico-devo-evo multiplicity can we build into our models before "mind" becomes an untenable term for what we are after? It is partially for that reason that I tend toward the formulation of "body politic" in Political Affect and elsewhere.

Semantic, Pragmatic, and Affective Enactment at OWS

The Occupy movement shows us how the semantic, pragmatic, and affective -- meaning, action, and feeling -- are intertwined in collective practices. The intertwining of the semantic and the pragmatic -- what we say and what we accomplish in that saying -- has been a topic of interest in the humanities and the critical social sciences for almost 50 years, since its thematization by Austin and its codification in Speech Act Theory; widespread interest in affect has been more recent, but the interplay of its twin roots in Tompkins and Deleuze -- producing a sort of evo-neuro-Spinozism -- has been usefully explored in The Affect Theory Reader (Gregg and Seigworth, 2010; for a mildly critical take on "affect theory," see Wetherell 2012). It is now time to bring speech act theory and affect theory together in understanding the role of political affect in the Occupy movement.

To do that, we will first need to do some housecleaning. The first thing that needs to go is the concept of ideology. Deleuze and Guattari say in A Thousand Plateaus: "Ideology is a most execrable concept concealing all of the effectively operating social machines" (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 68) I take that to mean that we have to thematize political affect to understand "effectively operating social machines." From this perspective, the real "German Ideology" is that ideas are where it's at, rather than affect. It is political affect that "makes men fight for their servitude as stubbornly as though it were their salvation" (Deleuze and Guattari 1984, 29).

Why won't "ideology" cut it? It does not work because it conceives of the problem in terms of "false consciousness," where that means "wrong ideas," and where "ideas" are individual and personal mental states whose semantic content has an existential posit as its core, with emotional content founded on that core, so that the same object could receive different emotional content if you were in a different mood. Thus to take up the great OWS poster, "Shit is fucked up and bullshit," the core act posits the existence of shit, and then we express our emotional state by predicating "fucked up and bullshit" of it, whereas we could have predicated "great and wonderful" if we were in a different mood. But that is "execrable" for Deleuze and Guattari, because it is far too cognitivist and subjectivist. It is too cognitivist because it founds emotion on a core existence-positing act, and too subjectivist by taking emotion to be an "expression," something individual that is pushed outward, something centrifugal. For them, emotion is centripetal rather than centrifugal, or even better, emotion is for them the subjectivation, the crystallization, of affect. Now Deleuze and Guattari do have a coporeal / Spinozist notion of affect involved with the encounter of bodies, but they also have what we could call a "milieu," or "environmental" sense of affect. Here affect is "in the air," something like the mood of a party, which is not the mere aggregate of the subjective states of the partygoers. In this sense, affect is not emergent from pre-existing subjectivities; emotional subjectivities are crystallizations or residues of a collective affect.⁴

Having done away with "ideology" as an analytical concept, we can turn to a simple, powerful talk by Judith Butler at OWS (Butler 2011a), which uses the term "enacting the political." Butler's talk calls upon the classic "very well then, we demand the impossible" trope, and ends with the wonderful line, "we're standing here together, making democracy, enacting the phrase, 'We the People'." A longer talk by Butler in Venice (Butler 2011b) discusses constituting political space while acknowledging the material precarity of bodies, developed alongside a critical analysis of Arendt's notion of a political "space of appearance." The overall aim is set forth when Butler states, "a different social ontology would have to start from the presumption that there is a shared condition of precarity that situates our political lives."

A brief excerpt from the beginning of Butler's Venice talk sets out some of the main lines of thought that would go toward this "different social ontology": assembly and speech reconfigure the materiality of public space, and produce, or reproduce, the public character of that material environment. And when crowds move outside the square, to the side street or the back alley, to the neighborhoods where streets are not yet paved, then something more happens. At such a moment, politics is no longer defined as the exclusive business of public sphere distinct from a private one, but it crosses that line again and again, bringing attention to the way that politics is already in the home, or on the street, or in the neighborhood, or indeed in those virtual spaces that are unbound by the architecture of the public square.... But in the case of public assemblies, we see quite clearly not only that there is a struggle over what will be public space, but a struggle as well over those basic ways in which we are, as bodies, supported in the world -- a struggle against disenfranchisement, effacement, and abandonment.

Butler's notion of a differential social ontology is obviously one with which I am highly sympathetic. However, I would say that the role of the body in social ontology need not be limited to shared precarity, as important as that is to emphasize in order to break down notions of individuals as disembodied bundles of rights. We can also think the positive affective contribution of public assemblies. In this case, the city government of New York unwittingly helped OWS tap into the affective potential of collective "bodies politic." I'm talking here about the human microphone, which works, quite literally, to amplify the constitution of political space by assembled bodies.

The human microphone thus offers an entry into examining political affect in the enacting of the phrase "We the People" at OWS. It shows us how direct democracy is enacted by producing an intermodal resonance among the semantic, pragmatic, and affective dimensions of collective action. It also shows how the production of contemporary neoliberal subjects (*homo economicus* as self-entrepreneur, as individual rational utility maximizer) is so successful and so pervasive as to be invisible. The city thought they were hurting OWS by banning bullhorns when in fact they helped them immensely by allowing the affect produced by entrained voices, a collective potential they could not grasp.⁵

As we saw in Chapters 1-3, I am fascinated by studies of human entrainment such as McNeill 1995, which studies the political affect dimension of entrainment (the falling into the same rhythm) by collective bodily movement as in communal dance and military drill. The neuroscientist Scott Kelso has studied

all sorts of small-scale examples of entrainment (toe-tapping and so on) by using dynamic systems modeling (Kelso 1995). A famous macro example of spontaneous entrainment is the **Millenium Bridge episode** in which the unconscious synchronization of walkers produced a resonance effect on the bridge cause a dangerous lateral sway (Newland, no date). The developmental psychologist Colwyn Trevarthen has studied **mother-infant inter-corporeal rhythms** in terms of "primary intersubjectivity" (Trevarthen 1979).

The upshot of this research is that humans fall into collective rhythms easily and that such collective rhythms produce an affective experience, a feeling of being together, an eros or ecstasis if you want to use classical terms, the characteristic joy of being together felt in collective action (Ehrenreich 2007). So I wonder if **the human microphone** (Ristic 2011), an invention of the OWS assembly when NYC banned electric bullhorns, does not contribute a little to the joyful collective affect of OWS. (Needless to say, the prospect that the human microphone might aid in the production of such collective joy **frightens the right-wing commenters** [Dyer 2011].) It is not quite a choir, but it is a chorus, and so the bodies of the chanters (their chests, guts, throats, eardrums) would be vibrating at something close to the same frequency, something close to being in phase.

Now I'm not a reductionist; the semantic cannot be reduced to the corporeal; the message is not dissolved into the medium. What interests me is how in the human microphone the message (enact the phrase "We the People") is resonant with and amplified by the medium (collective rhythm). In her Venice talk Butler analyzes the Tahrir Square chant translated as "peacefully, peacefully" in these terms:

Secondly, when up against violent attack or extreme threats, many people chanted the word "silmiyya" which comes from the root verb (salima) which means to be safe and sound, unharmed, unimpaired, intact, safe, and secure; but also, to be unobjectionable, blameless, faultless; and yet also, to be certain, established, clearly proven. The term comes from the noun "silm" which means "peace" but also, interchangeably and significantly, "the religion of Islam." One variant of the term is "Hubb as-silm" which is Arabic for "pacifism." Most usually, the chanting of "Silmiyya" comes across as a gentle exhortation: "peaceful, peaceful." Although the revolution was for the most part non-violent, it was not necessarily led by a principled opposition to violence. Rather, the collective chant was a way of encouraging people to resist the mimetic pull of military aggression -- and the aggression of the gangs -- by keeping in mind the larger goal -- radical democratic change. To be swept into a violent exchange of the moment was to lose the patience needed to realize the revolution. What interests me here is the chant, the way in which language worked not to incite an action, but to restrain one. A restraint in the name of an emerging community of equals whose primary way of doing politics would not be violence. (Butler 2011b)

This is an insightful, eloquent analysis of the pragmatics and semantics of the chant. So it is not to undercut it that I call attention to the material dimension of the resonating bodies that accompany the semantic content and pragmatic implications of this chant. It is to point to the way in which an analysis of material rhythms reveals the political affect of joyous collectivity, and the inter-

modal (semantic, pragmatic, affective) resonance such chanting produces.

Finally, let me end with a few words on political affect. Joy in entrained collective action is by no means a simple normative standard. There is fascist joy; the affect surging through the Nuremberg rallies, building upon and provoking even more feeling, was joyous. If there is to be any normativity in political affect it will have to be active joy rather than passive joy; active joy I understand as "empowerment," the ability to re-enact the joyous encounter in novel situations, or to put it in semi-California-speak, the ability to turn other people on to their ability to turn still others on to their ability to enact active joyous collective action, on and on in a horizontally radiating network, or, to use Deleuze and Guattari's term, a "rhizome." Now political affect does not occur in a vacuum. It is not a matter of implanting a new feeling in any empty body; it is a matter of modulating an ongoing affective flow. So the joy of OWS has to convert a mood of shame. What counts in the "effectively operating social machine" demonizing welfare in the USA is the shame attached to receiving public aid without contributing to society with your tax dollars. It is shameful to have lost your job or your home; you're stupid, a loser to have been in a position to lose it, and you're a lazy, stupid loser if you have not found another one, or if you never had one in the first place. You do not arrive at this American shame by aggregating individualized, subectivized, packets of shame; you get shamed subjects as the crystallization of the collective affect of shame in the American air.

And so you do not combat this shame by trying to change individual people's ideas, one by one, with information about unemployment trends; you combat it by showing your face, by embodying your lack of shame, by putting a face on unemployment or homelessness. You counteract the existing collective affect by creating a positive affect of joyful solidarity. Shame isolates (you hide your face); joyful solidarity comes from people coming together. It is joy released from the bondage of shame, to follow up on the Spinozist references. What is especially heartbreaking, then, about the "We Are The 99% Tumblr" site (2012), is that so many people still have some shame, as they only peak out from behind their messages. Hence the importance of the Occupy meetings; shared physical presence, showing your whole face: these create the positive affect, the shamelessly joyful solidarity needed to fully overcome shame. Fighting the residual shame, the half-faces of private pictures sent to a website: that is what makes the collective occupation of space so important: bodies together, faces revealed, joyously.⁶

So I am going to propose that a full enactment of direct democracy means producing a body politic whose semantic ("we are the people, we are equal, free, and deserving of respect in our precarity and solidarity"), pragmatic (the act of respecting and supporting each other the assembly performs), and affective (the joy felt in collective action) registers resonate in spiraling, intermodal feedback.

Notes to Chapter 5

¹ I am not suggesting any pathological "thought insertion" here, merely the everyday phenomenon of being prompted to form a new thought after discussion with other people. Thought insertion, we could say, is an extensive phenomenon in which a fully formed thought is inserted into a personal mental sphere, whereas prompting of thought is an intensive individuation process.

² See Vogel 2000 for a review of the classic Marxist feminist literature on domestic labor; the parallel is that hidden female domestic labor allows for the presentation of public male (supposedly self-constituted) identity.

³ A recent sociological survey with a long-term historical scope notes: "Violence is ubiquitous in right-wing movements as an action and/or a goal. Violence can be strategic, chosen among alternative tactical actions to achieve a goal, often by highly insular groups intently focused on their perceived enemies (. . .). Strategic violence is targeted at enemy groups, such as Jews, racial minorities, or federal government installations. Other right-wing violence is more performative. Performative violence binds together its practitioners in a common identity, as when white power skinheads enact bloody clashes with other skinhead groups and each other . . ." (Blee and Creasap 2010, 276; internal references omitted).

Meanwhile, a widely-noted 2009 Department of Homeland Security report notes that: "Rightwing extremists have capitalized on the election of the first African-American president, and are focusing their efforts to recruit new members, mobilize existing supporters, and broaden their scope to propaganda, but they have not yet turned to attack planning" (DHS 2009, 2). They note in particular that: "A recent example of the potential violence associated with a rise in rightwing extremism may be found in the shooting deaths of three police officers in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, on 4 April 2009. The alleged gunman's reaction reportedly was influenced by his racist ideology and belief in antigovernment conspiracy theories related to gun confiscations, citizen detention camps, and a Jewish-controlled 'one world government'" (3).

⁴ When I was unemployed, some 15 years ago, for six months, I was often overcome with shame, no matter how often I reminded myself of the objective factors, the nonsensical nature of the affect, etc. But where did I pick up this shame? I cannot see how it was transmitted to me by another actual instance of shame. You could say I had been socialized so that I carried a latent disposition to shame that became occurrent in the right circumstances. But that is hardly less "metaphysical" than an account of virtual or environmental collective affective with shamed selves crystallized out of that. I do not think we'll escape metaphysics that easily; there is a lot of potential versus actual metaphysics to be worked out there in the latent / occurrent disposition scheme, as I try to do in Chapter 7.

⁵ Another topic for analysis would be the bike generators being set up at OWS. In another possible blunder, recalling that of the banning of bullhorns, the city confiscated gasoline generators prior to the late October snowstorm. The brilliant OWS response was to acquire bicycle generators. Will there be an analogous affective supplement from taking turns on the bikes to generate electricity?

⁶ Faces are an extremely important factor in political affect. In analyzing OWS we'd have to consider the use of the Guy Fawkes / "V for Vendetta" masks; the

denunciation of "faceless corporations"; and the "faciality machine" in Deleuze and Guattari 1987.